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               ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores and analyses the impact of ethno-religious conflicts in the 
city of Jos and other parts of the Middle Belt and Nigeria on gender relations and 
the lives of women. The thesis addresses the question of the impact of conflict 
on women beyond loss of life and property as seen in other literature. It shows 
how ongoing conflictual relations that are not always violent, but include aspects 
of political competition disadvantage women. 
The research locations covered by this research are urban areas. Data for this 
research was gathered through interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
with 102 respondents, recruited through purposive sampling and willingness to 
participate in the interview.  
This thesis argues that the conflict dynamics affect the life chances of women on 
different levels because women are associated with the transcendence or 
transgression of group boundaries in their private life. The growing importance of 
group boundaries means that women’s life choices, such as marriage, are 
increasingly subject to public comment and criticism. Beyond the private, the 
growing importance of group boundaries makes it increasingly difficult for women 
to participate in typically female activities such as trading and selling in local 
markets. At the political level, the desire for ever smaller groups to be recognised 
works against the representation of women, who are seen as being much less 
capable than men of  representing group interests. And within the public sector, 
too, the fallout from the crisis means that women here are also subject to 
increasing control and scrutiny. 
     
     DEDICATION 
 
To My Husband Bitrus Dayil Duwong and Our Children; 
Kwoopnan, Kyermun, King-Karshak and Beelong for enduring my absence. 
 
 
     And to Kyenpiya Ayuba Afang 
      1973 to 2014 
A Dear Sister who is greatly missed, but happily remembered and cherished.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am thankful to God Almighty for his Grace and sustenance throughout this 
programme. I first of all wish to thank my supervisor Dr Insa Nolte, who sharpened 
my thoughts and guided me through this research. I am grateful for the 
encouragement she gave in 2014 when I lost my sister. I could not have 
continued the programme without her direction and support. I always looked 
forward to our supervision meetings which were rigorous and tough, yet a fun and 
productive process. I will forever remain grateful to you.  
Thank you also to my lovely husband Bitrus Dayil Duwong and our children: 
Kwoopnan, Kyermun, King-Karshak and Beelong, whose encouragement has 
made me strong throughout the study - you have in so many unspoken ways lifted 
my spirit whenever I felt weak. 
Many thanks to my parents, Mr Dachi Dankah Gunat and Mrs Rahila Gunat, who 
took me to school at an early age and have always encouraged me to work hard 
I appreciate the constant phone calls, advice, prayer, support and words of 
encouragement- Da’Nan wuri le diret kiri kha wun, in plang des zam.  
To my brothers and sisters Namis, Pankyes, Nanfwang, Nankling, Peret, and 
Mercy, thank you for constantly checking on the kids during my absence. I have 
learnt through the years how crucial the encouragement of family and support is 
to success. I deeply appreciate my in-laws; Sunday A. Afang, Micheal D. Lamu, 
Dr Luka Solomon, Nankling Nanfwang, Nanlop, Dinah, Aunty Nakris, Kaka 
Napwas and Dikam Duwong for being so supportive. 
I am also deeply appreciative that Leyit and Mercy patiently kept up with the 
children while I was away and Hulda, Na’omi and Nanlop who diligently watched 
over the home and kept things in order. Thank you to my little cousins, nephews 
and nieces; Nanman, Nandes, Dyenkinan, Baby Diret, Baby Chat and 
Zugumnaan, who spent many weekends and holidays at my house playing with 
my children to reduce the burden of loneliness caused by my absence. I have 
learnt so much from your solidarity. 
To my colleagues at the University of Jos especially Prof Sunny Gwanle Tyoden 
for believing in me and nominating me for the Tertiary Education Training Fund 
(TET Fund) scholarship. I thank Prof Habu Galadima for encouraging me to 
pursue this doctorate and shaping my thoughts on the draft proposal; Prof 
Ja’adeyiba Gwamma and Prof Shedrack Best for mentoring me and providing 
advice and support; Prof S. S. Maimako, Mr Adakai Amaya, Dr Bonaventure Nkup 
Haruna, Prof Dung Pam Sha and Dr Juliana Malmucit whose words of 
encouragement energised me.  
I feel enormously privileged for the useful comments and suggestions from 
scholars who include; Prof Jil Vickers of Carleton University; Dr John Chesworth 
of the Oxford Centre for Muslim-Christian Relations; and Prof Julius Adekunle of 
Monmouth University. My gratitude to Prof Alemika of the University of Jos, who 
made initial comments on my methodology during my pilot study. I am particularly 
grateful to Prof Samuel Zalanga of Bethel University for his valuable feedback 
and generous comments on most of my draft chapters and for sharing his 
thoughts on my research and leading me to further resources.  
I am grateful to everyone who helped me with my field work. Special appreciation 
goes to Fidelia Piwuna, Sadiq Abubakar and Longmam Pienswang for arranging 
interviews and Judith Danfulani for transcribing most of the lengthy interviews. 
Thank you also to the Jos North Peace Ambassadors, especially Mallam Ahmed 
Adamu, for leading me through the no-go-areas and a member of staff of the Red 
Cross who assisted greatly but wants to remain anonymous. 
Numerous Governmental and Non-Governmental Organisations were helpful 
during my field work. I am grateful to Dr Joseph Golwa and John Ochugwu of the 
Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), for assisting during my pilot 
study; Rev Father Kasam Basil of the Justice Development Peace Caritas (JDPC) 
for helping out with contacts and resources; and Rev Simon Goro of the Centre 
for Peace Advocacy in Nigeria (CEPAN) for providing printed primary literature.  
I have benefitted greatly from my association with the Institute of Governance 
and Social Research (IGSR). A special thank you to Prof Jonah Isawa Eliagwu 
for giving me the opportunity to be part of the institute’s work on ending the cycle 
of violence and Peace Building in Jos, and for letting me have unrestricted access 
to the IGSR library and the support staff throughout the course of this study, and 
to Celestine Ukatu who manages the IGSR library and sent me resources at short 
notice. 
Many people made my stay in Birmingham a memorable one. Dr Ndubuisi and 
Chioma Nwokolo and their lovely children Zara, Kosi and Chikamso provided me 
with warmth, comfort and a home in Birmingham whenever I needed one. To 
Mariama Mba, Dr Folasade Hunsu, Sekela Mwandosya, thank you for the lovely 
time we shared. Special thanks to Rev Atunde Simon and Evangelical Church 
Winning All (ECWA) Birmingham for their spiritual support. Thank you to Rev Dr 
Emmanuel and Lucy Sule, for the insightful advice and hospitality. I shall also 
never forget the hospitality and warmth I experienced when I visited Bristol at the 
invitation of Gordon and Hillary Hulmes to share part of my research with the 
Royal African Society (RAS) of Bristol and their early comments on my work. 
Thank you to other members of RAS, Janet Kirk and Veronica Connolly, for the 
support and materials.  
I treasure Dr Chikas Danfulani, Mary Mailafiya, Cecilia Bako-Joseph, Lohna 
Bonkat, Tongret Kparbong, Nancy Katu and the entire ‘Mat Mwaghavul’ of 
Dahwol for their friendship and support. 
To all the staff of the Department of African Studies and Anthropology, University 
of Birmingham, thank you for your constructive comments. I am grateful 
especially to David Kerr for inviting me to share your food and for the lively 
entertainment whenever the Cadbury Fellows were around.  
Special thanks to the traditional rulers and community heads especially- HRH Alh 
Abdullahi Mohammed Adudu (Sangari Adudu, Nasarawa State), HRH Chief 
Nuhu Bature (Agwom Bajju, Kaduna State) and HRH Chief Daniel Ayuba 
Abomste (Tor Iyoshin, NAGI II, Benue State) for sharing their wealth of 
knowledge and materials which enriched my study.  
I am grateful to all those who granted me interviews, especially on inter-faith 
marriage and politics, for sharing  their personal life experiences and contacting 
me even after the end of the field work. Their perseverance amidst enormous 
adversity is inspiring. Thank you to the many teachers, traders, youths and NGOs 
for generously giving me their time. I am grateful to those who trusted me and 
gave me permission to use their real names, which I was unable to do for ethical 
reasons.  
Finally, my Gratitude goes to the TET Fund and the University of Jos leadership 
for the financial and institutional support that facilitated this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                       Page 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
 
INTRODUCTION/REVIEW OF LITERATURE…..................................................1 
1.1 Introduction....................................................................................................1 
1.2Statement of the Problem ……….………………………………………………...3 
1.3 Objectives of the Research.............................................................................4  
1.4 Significance of the Research.................................................... ………………5 
1.5 Scope of the Research...................................................................................6  
1.6 Federal Competition and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos and the Middle Belt. 
Review of Literature and Summary of Existing Research………………………….7 
1.6.1 Review of the Literature ………………………………………………………...7 
1.6.2 The Colonial Legacy of Difference……………………………………………11 
1.6.3 The Colonial Policy of Inclusion and Exclusion………...............................12 
1.7 Conflict and Antagonism Among Groups Within the System….....................14 
1.8 Politics in Post-Independence Nigeria……………..…………………………..15 
1.8.1 The Politics of Disorder in Nigeria and the Middle Belt…………...…………18 
1.9 The Missing Gender Dimension……………………………...…………………23 
1.10 Structure of the Research…………………………………………………...…28 
 
CHAPTER TWO: 
 
CONFLICT AND THE NIGERIAN ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE…..31 
2.1 Introduction………………………………...…………………………................ 31 
2.2 The Ethnic and Religious Landscape in Nigeria……………..........................32 
2.2.1 The Position of Women Within the Context of Competition……………….38 
2.3 Ethnic Minority Issues and Conflict in Nigeria……….………………………..41 
2.4 The Middle Belt Ethnic and Religious Landscape…….................................43 
2.5 A History of Jos and Plateau State……………………………….………….…51 
2.6 The Growth and Expansion of Economic Activities in Jos…………………..57 
2.7 Patterns of Conflict in Contemporary Jos and the Middle Belt……….….…..63 
2.7.1 Immediate and Remote Causes of the Conflict in Jos………….……........66 
2.7.2 Inter-faith Marriage and the Conflict in Jos…..……………………………...67 
2.7.3 Culture of Belittling and the Conflict in Jos………………………………..…67 
2.7.4 Religious Intolerance and the Conflict in Jos…………..............................68 
2.8 The Impact of the Conflict on Women……………………………………..…..69 
2.9 Conclusion and Reflection……..………………………………………………..70 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
 
METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION FOR THIS RESEARCH………………….…72 
3.1 Introduction..…………..…………………………………….….........................72 
3.2 Geographical Area Covered in the Research………………..…………..……74 
3.2.1 Identity Issues within the Geographical Area Covered………...................75 
3.3 Rationale for the Selection of Location and Respondents…………………..77 
3.3.1 Plateau State…...………………………………………………………………78 
3.3.2 Nasarawa State………………………………………………………………...78 
3.3.3 Benue State…………………………………………………………………….79 
3.3.4 Kaduna State…………………………………………………………………...79 
3.4 Research Respondents………………………………………………………….80 
3.4.1 Inter-faith Marriage………………………...……………………………..…....80 
3.4.2 Market Respondents…………………………………………………………..80 
3.4.3 Political Respondents………………………………………………………….81 
3.4.4 Professional Respondents……………...………………………………….....81 
3.5 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents……......................................82 
3.6 Data Collection Methods………………………...…………………………...….82 
3.6.1 Secondary Materials………………………………..……………………….…82 
3.6.2 Interviews……………………………………………………………………….84 
3.6.3 Focus Group Discussion……………….……………………………………..85 
3.7 The Pilot Study……...…………………….……………………........................87 
3.8 Research Sample and Sample Size……………………………………….…..88 
3.8.1 Research Sampling Technique………………………………………….……90 
3.9 Data Analysis Process…………………………………………………………..92 
3.10 Ethical Issues…………………………...……………....................................93 
3.11 Challenges and Limitations……………………………………………………97 
3.12 Conclusion: Sensibilities of Research in Conflict Zones………………….102 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
EFFECTS OF CONFLICT ON WOMEN IN INTER-FAITH MARRIAGES IN 
NIGERIA’S MIDDLE BELT: ISOLATION AND IN-BETWEENESS…………….106 
4.1 Introduction………………...……………………………………………………106 
4.2 The Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Sentiments and its Impact on 
Women……………………………………………………………………………….107 
4.3 The In-betweeness of Women…………………………………………………110 
4.3. 1 Inter-faith Marriages in Jos………………………………………………….111 
4.4 Women’s In-betweeness in Religion: Perception of Female Converts…….118 
4.4.1 Women’s In-betweeness as Form of Hypocrisy……………………...…....120 
4.5 Conflict and the Growing Isolation of Women……………………….………123 
4.5.1 Isolation and Lack of Acceptance from Friends and Family…………......124 
4.5.2 The Trauma of Isolation…………….……………………………................126 
4.5.3 Stigmatizing, Policing and Attacks on Women’s Dressing…………........128 
4.6 The Impact of Isolation on Children from Inter-faith Marriages…................131 
4.6 Conclusion: The Inbetweeness of Women as Victims of Social Isolation….140 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
 
THE CONFLICT, MARKET AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN JOS AND THE 
MIDDLE BELT..................................................................................................144 
5.1 Introduction……...……………………………………………………………... 144 
5.2 Composition of the Markets in Jos……………………..................................145 
5.3 Conflict and the Division of Markets……………...……………………………147  
5.4 Survival Strategy of Traders from Divided Markets……………...…………..149 
5.4.1 Dependence on Financial Support from Family, Religious Groups and Non-
Governmental Organizations………………………………………………………152 
5.4.2 Dependence on Old Time Networks and Relationships……...............….153 
5.5 Impact of Conflict on Markets and Relationships in Jos and the Middle 
Belt…………………………...…………………………………………………...….155 
5.5.1 Severed Relationship and Lack of Trust……….……………………...……155 
5.5.2 Exploitation in Trading Transactions………………................……………158 
5.6 Government, Market Politics and Gender Relations………………………...160  
5.6.1 Government Involvement in the Markets….…………………..……………175 
5.7 Conclusion and Reflection……..…………………………………………....…176 
 
CHAPTER SIX: 
 
THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN 
NIGERIA’S MIDDLE BELT...............................................................................179 
6.1 Introduction………………...……………………………………………………179 
6.2 Women and Politics in Nigeria: The Pre-colonial Era………….…………….180 
6.2.1 The Colonial Era…………………………………………………………..….180 
6.2.2 The Post-Colonial Era………………...………………………………..…….181 
6.3 The Challenges to Women Political Participation……………………………184 
6.3.1 Religion, Customs and Traditions……………………...............................185 
6.3.2 Labelling and Name Calling………………………….................................186 
6.3.3 Ethnic and Religious Manipulation…………………..................................187 
6.3.4 The Conflict and Dirty Politic……………………….………………………..192 
6.3.5 Scheduling Late Night Political Meetings……...……...……………………193 
6.4 The Use of Religious Rhetoric in Middle Belt Politics…………...................194 
6.5 Opposition and Manipulation by Family and Male Politicians…………...….198 
6.5.1 Women Using the Right Knowledge to Counter Opposition………………202 
6.6 Finance and Politics…………………………………….................................204 
6.7 Image as Form of Control: The Good Woman/Wife as Politician………..207 
6.8 In-betweeness of Women and Politics…...……………...............................210 
6.9 Impact of Ethnic and Religious Divides on Political Mobilization…………..213 
6.10 Conflict and the Increased use of Vanguards and Thugs..........................214 
6.11 Godfatherism and Political Maneuvering………………………………..….219 
6.12 Ethno-religious Conflict and Political Mobilization…………………..……..222 
6.13 Conclusion and Reflection……………………………………………..….….225 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: 
 
THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON WOMEN AND THEIR PROFESSIONAL 
WORK RELATIONSHIPS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EDUCATION 
SECTOR..........................................................................................................228 
7.1 Introduction………...………………………..................................................228 
7.2 Politics and the Nigerian Work Environment……………………..................239 
7.3 Gendered Competition in Professional Contexts…………..…………..……232 
7.4 Overview of Structural Discrimination in the Professional Work 
Environment.....................................................................................................235 
7.5 The Disparity in the Acquisition of Western Education in Nigeria................237 
7.6 Regional Disparity in Access to Education………...….................................239 
7.6.1 Education During the Colonial Era……...………………..…………………239 
7.6.2 Education in the Post-Colonial Era………………………………..………..241 
7.7 Gender Disparity in the Education Sector……..…………………..…………244 
7.8 Impact of the Conflict on Professional Relations in Institutions of Learning.245 
7.9 The impact of Segregated Settlement on Institutions of Learning…………249 
7.10 The Impact of the Conflict on Trust and Confidence in Tertiary Education.252 
7.11 Conflict and Gendered Notions of Professional Behavior and Dress…….255 
7.12 Conclusion: The Failure to Institutionalize Liberal Values in the 
Workplace……………………………………………………………………………260 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS……………………264 
8.1 Summary of the Findings…………...………………….................................264 
8.2 Contribution to Knowledge…………………………………………..………...270 
8.3 Areas for Further Research…………...……………….................................271 
8.4 The Way Forward.....………………………………………………...….……...272 
BIBLIOGRAPHY.………………………………………………..…….…………....275 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND APPENDICES 
 
LIST OF MAPS  
Map1. The Minority Commission of 1957 Map Showing Minority Areas.............45 
Map 2. Map of Nigeria Showing Proposed Middle Belt Region…………………..46 
Map 3. Map of Plateau Showing 17 Local Governments and Study Areas…….52  
Map 4. Map of Nigeria Showing the Middle Belt…..…………………………......303 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Selected Cases of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in the Middle Belt…..65 
Table 2: Total Number of Respondents by Location and Topic Discussed….…89 
Table 3: Women in Elected and Appointed Offices in Nigeria in 1999, 2003, 2007 
and 2011………………...………………………………………………………......182 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: A cross-section of the Farin Gada Vegetable Market ………………...146 
Figure 2: The Gada Biyu Vegetable and Yam Section of the Market…………..147 
Figure 3: The Asakio Yam Market……………………..…………………………..160 
Figure 4. Some of the Vacated Empty Shops at the Bukuru Market…………....167 
Figure 5: Political Rally in Jos………………………………………………..…….217 
Figure 6: Community Secondary School in Jos……………………………..…...238 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Plateau State Indigenous Ethnic Groups …………......……..…....301 
Appendix 2: Kaduna State Indigenous Ethnic Groups………………….……….301 
Appendix 3: List of Ethnic Groups in Nasarawa State……………………..…….302 
Appendix 4: List of Ethnic Groups in Benue State………...…………….………302 
 
 
  ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS 
 
ASUU-         Academic Staff Union of Universities 
ATR-            African Traditional Religion 
BBB-            British Broadcasting Corporation 
CAN-            Christian Association of Nigeria  
CCFN-          Christian Corpers Fellowship of Nigeria. 
CEPAN-       Centre for Peace Administration in Nigeria 
COCIN-        Church of Christ in Nations  
ECWA-         Evangelical Church Winning All  
EYN-            Ekklesiyar Yan’uwa a Nigeria  
FCS-             Fellowship of Christian Students  
FCT-             Federal Capital Territory 
FGD-            Focus Group Discussion 
FOMWAN-   Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria 
GRA-            Government Reserved Area 
IDPs-            Internally Displaced Persons  
IGSR-           Institute for Governance and Social Research 
IPCR-           Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution  
IRK-              Islamic Religious Knowledge 
ITF-              National Industrial Training Fund  
JAMB-         Joint Admissions and Matriculations Board  
JDPC-          Justice Development Peace Caritas 
JETS-           Jos ECWA Theological Seminary  
JIBWIS-       Jama’atu Izalatu Bidiah Ikamatu Sunna  
JNI-              Jama ‘atu Nasul Islam  
MBG-           Middle Belt Group 
NASFAT-     Nasrul-lahi- l- Fatih 
NIFES-         Nigerian Fellowship of Evangelical Students 
NIPSS-         National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies 
NMG-           Non-Muslim Group 
NPC-            National Population Commission 
NPCRC-       Nigerian Pentecostal and Charismatic Research Centre  
NRCRI-        National Roots Crops Research Institute  
NVRI-           National Institute of Veterinary Research 
SIM-             Sudan Interior Mission 
SUM-            Sudan United Mission  
TC-               Teachers College 
TCNN-          Theological College of Northern Nigeria  
TEKAN-     Tarayar Ekklesiya a Nigeria (Fellowship of Churches of Christ in 
 Nigeria) 
WACOL-      The Women’s Aid Collective  
WANEP-      West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 
WIN-             Women in Nigeria 
WPI-             Women for Peace Initiative 
UMBC-         United Middle Belt Congress 
VOA-            Voice of America 
 
1 
 
                                                      CHAPTER ONE 
    INTRODUCTION/REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
1.1 Introduction 
This study explores, describes and analyses the everyday difficulties and forms of 
exclusion women face as a result of the recent ethno-religious conflicts in the city 
of Jos and other parts of the Middle Belt.1 It shows how conflict has affected the 
daily lives and gender relations in Nigeria. In particular, it analyses the impact of 
the conflict on different aspects of the lives of Nigerian women by looking at four 
areas; inter-marriage, markets, politics and the public sector. The thesis addresses 
the impact of conflict on women beyond the loss of life and property by looking at 
everyday conflict relationship and what it means for women to live in an 
increasingly politicised society.  
The study shows how ethno-religious conflict has led to the growing exclusion of 
women from many aspects of life and similarly many levels of governance, as the 
oppression which takes place through the way they are viewed in cultural and 
religious terms is intensified by the nature of the ethnic and religious conflicts. This 
is especially so when other forms of interest are involved, such as competition for 
scarce resources, and the intersection of ethnic and religious identities and their 
                                                          
1The Middle Belt area of Nigeria refers to Kwara State, Kogi State, Benue State, Plateau State, 
Nasarawa State, Niger State, Taraba State, Adamawa State as well as the southern parts of Kaduna 
State, Kebbi State, Bauchi State, Gombe State and Borno State. It comprises people that exist in Nigeria 
with a consciousness, identity and culture that is different from the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri of the far 
North. It is a geo-political term, with a lot of ethnic and religious connotations. See Logams, (2004); 
Tyoden, (1993); Dudley, (1968).  
 
2 
 
politicization. Bayart’s (2009)2 Politics of the Belly explains that the manufacturing 
and utilisation of inequality as a method for the personal accumulation of private 
wealth in Africa has been responsible for a variety of discriminatory practices and 
abuse of office for personal gain and the conflict that feeds off this manufactured 
inequality has created particular difficulties for women.  
A number of studies which show the intricacies related to the struggle for scarce 
resources within the Nigerian Federal system include Benedict (1991); Kastfelt 
(1994); Kukah (1994); Falola (1998); Chabal & Daloz (1999) and Suberu (2001). 
These have shown how ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria’s Middle Belt and Jos is 
related to historical, social, cultural, political, religious and ideological biases which 
have continued to impact on the Nigerian polity at the regional, state, and local 
government levels. Many of them also explore how these conflicts have filtered to 
the level of personal relationships. However, these studies have so far failed to 
analyse in depth the implication of the struggle for scarce resources on gender 
relations and on women’s everyday life experiences. In fact, most of the literature 
on the ethno-religious conflict in Jos, the Middle Belt and Nigeria has given little 
attention to impact of conflict on these issues, as the literature that focuses 
specifically on gender and conflict concentrates on the more dramatic impact of 
conflict violence on women in terms of loss of life, property and the violation of 
human rights. As a result, the everyday impact of conflict on women remains 
understudied. This study, therefore, sheds light on the need to look beyond the 
                                                          
2
 Refer to Bayart’s (2009) Politics of the Belly Metaphor. He in fact disagrees with those who propose 
the separation of family problems from political problems. The text provides an explanation of the effect 
of personal and family rivalries [relations] on the state and power. His ability to carefully explain the link 
between ethnic [religious] strategies and resources of the modern economy is related to this study. 
3 
 
most obvious impacts of conflict and take a holistic view of gender and, in 
particular, women’s lives. Taking gendered everyday experiences seriously, this 
thesis presents evidence of the situation of women in Nigeria primarily on the basis 
of personal narratives, field notes and observation.  
As women constitute 68,293,683 million of Nigeria’s population of 140,003,542 
million (NPC, 2006),3 they cannot be ignored in any discussion relating to the 
wellbeing and development of the society, despite their continuous subordination 
to men in many aspects of life. Thus, the study is premised on the grounds that 
women must be considered an integral part of any conflict or peace process both 
because of their numerical significance and their importance for the nation’s 
economy. Because violence is gendered (Liebling-Kalifani & Baker, 2010: 190), 
the incessant conflicts in Jos and the Middle Belt constitute a major setback to the 
aspirations of many women to live a peaceful private life, to embark on income-
yielding activities without coming face to face with danger, to participate in 
governance without fear of harassment and to meaningfully contribute to the 
development of the economy in their various careers. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
As stated above, the purpose of this research is to examine the ways in which the 
ethno-religious conflicts in the Middle-Belt Region of Nigeria have impacted on the 
                                                          
3
 NPC stands for the ‘National Population Census’ of Nigeria. 
4 
 
lives and livelihoods and gender relations of women in Nigeria. The main research 
question addressed in this research is: 
- To what extent has ethno-religious conflict impacted on women’s lives and how 
has it affected gender relations in the Middle-Belt Region of Nigeria? 
Four sub-questions which represent each of the themes of this thesis have been posed 
in order to provide answers to the main question:  
i) In what ways has ethno-religious conflict influenced the attitude, perception 
and views of the community towards women and most especially women in 
inter-faith marriages, and how has this affected their daily lives? 
ii) In what ways has ethno-religious conflict constituted a setback to women’s 
trade ventures and market networks, and how has this affected their ability 
to embark on sustained income yielding activities? 
iii) In what ways has ethno-religious conflict influenced attitudes towards the 
political participation of women, and by extension the ability of women to 
establish themselves as political leaders? 
iv) In what ways has ethno-religious conflict affected the attitude towards 
women in the labour market and how has this influenced relationships and 
the ability of women to progress in their various careers? 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Research 
As already noted, the objective of this thesis is to provide an understanding of the 
impact of ethno-religious conflict on women’s lives beyond the very obvious impact 
5 
 
of violence, such as loss of life, property and the violation of human rights. In order 
to do this it refers to the literature on scarce resources in the Nigerian Federal 
system and the political manipulation of ethnic and religious sentiments for personal 
gain in order to explain the causes of conflict. It then builds on this literature to 
explore the negative implications of conflict on women. This study also explores, 
describes and analyses how the conflict impacts other structures in Nigerian society 
and how this in turn has transformed gender relations in inter-faith marriage, in the 
markets, in politics and in the work-place.  
To do this, the study looks at events which took place between 1993 and 2013 in 
Jos and other parts of the Middle Belt to articulate the impact of conflict on women’s 
daily lives. The conclusion is intended to motivate more research in the area of 
conflict and gender relations in Nigeria. It is argued that future studies on Jos and 
Nigeria’s Middle Belt should take women’s issues more seriously and examine the 
impact of conflict on women in more depth. It is my hope that this research will be 
a reference point for studies on gender in the Middle Belt and Nigeria at large. 
1.4 Significance of the Research  
The significance of this research is that it contributes to:  
- Redressing the gender imbalance in the existing literature on ethno-religious conflict 
through the contextualisation of women’s experiences. 
- Explaining the impact of ethno-religious conflicts in Jos and Nigeria’s Middle Belt 
region on women’s everyday lives, especially inter-faith marriage, market relations, 
politics and professional careers. 
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- Providing adequate information on how ethno-religious conflict has influenced 
attitudes towards the political participation of women, and by extension women’s ability 
to establish themselves as political leaders. 
-  Suggesting that a consideration of gender in any analysis of the impact of conflict in 
Nigeria will be helpful in providing further dimensions through which the impact of 
conflict can be analysed.  
1.5 Scope of the Research 
The year 1993 marked the beginning of an attempted democratic dispensation, and an 
important milestone in the political history of Nigeria. It also marked the beginning of a 
movement by the central government to interfere with the results of elections in Nigeria 
particularly with the annulment of the June 12 presidential election.4 Both the 
annulment of the June 12 [1993] presidential election by the Babangida regime, and 
the self-succession effort of the Abacha regime intensified ethnic, regional and 
religious mobilisation identities to the extent that, together with corruption in public 
office, these have become the most negative dominant features of Nigerian politics 
(Jega, 2002: 40). 
 Thus, the failed attempt to return to civilian rule in 1993 is regarded by some as having 
regional and religious connotations which have had serious implications for the 1999 
elections in Nigeria and beyond. This is because the suspension of the 1993 elections 
                                                          
4
  The 12 June 1993 election is an important milestone in Nigeria’s political history. Moshood Kashimawo 
Olawale Abiola (AKA M.K.O Abiola), a Moslem Southerner won the election under the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP). But soon after the elections, Gen Babangida annulled the election results.  
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convinced the people that elections can be a do-or-die affair for the regional and 
religious elite group capable of manipulating power and exploiting the Nigerian Federal 
system. Therefore, this research covers the period from 1993 to 2013 which 
encompasses the annulment of elections in June, 1993 by the Babangida regime, the 
last days of military regimes in the country and the beginning and establishment of the 
country’s fourth era of civilian rule. The choice of this period is also predicated on the 
fact that the growth of democratic processes, especially the elections from 1999 
onwards, has contributed to the emergence of ethnic and religious competition in the 
struggle for political and economic power and representation. Focusing on the way in 
which competition within succession of regime has had an impact on the everyday lives 
of women, the thesis explores the complex processes of gendered inequality and 
empowerment in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria and the Federal system as a whole. 
The next section provides an analysis of the way in which Federal competition 
contributes to gender inequality and how it disadvantages women. 
 
1.6 Federal Competition and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos and the Middle Belt: 
Review of the Literature and Summary of Existing Research 
1.6.1 Review of the Literature 
This thesis draws on diverse theoretical approaches, but its analysis is situated within 
debates about Federal competition, political manipulation and the politicisation of 
ethnic and religious sentiments in Nigeria, while at the same time maintaining a strong 
focus on gender. In the process of the struggle over Nigeria’s scarce resources, ethnic 
and religious differences have always been mobilised and also manipulated. Where 
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such competition has led to conflict, the practices and debates surrounding it have 
affected women’s everyday lives in many ways. As the grassroots gendered 
dimensions of ethnic and religious competition in Nigeria have not hitherto been 
explored in detail, a broad theoretical approach enables this thesis to explore how 
regional group struggles as well as individual struggles have shaped women’s 
experiences and livelihoods. 5 
As mentioned earlier, a large proportion of the studies on conflict in Jos, the Middle 
Belt and Nigeria have emphasized the humanitarian and symbolic impact of the conflict 
on the people who live there, including women. Such research tends to focus on the 
dramatic changes directly associated with conflict, such as loss of life and property, 
rape and displacement, and this focus is closely linked to NGO and foreign donor work 
that centres on providing material relief or psychological support to victims of violent 
conflict. Long term approaches that seek to understand how day-to-day lives have 
been transformed by conflict do not normally feature in such analyses. 
The general absence of everyday gendered concerns in the study of conflict in Nigeria 
has meant that gendered analyses of conflict and group competition receive little 
attention. Despite a large volume of contemporary literature on conflict in Jos and the 
Middle Belt (Gofwen, 2004; Sha, 2005; Shut, 2005; Best, 2007; Fukshiwe, 2010; 
Mavalla, 2014; Gwamna, 2010; Agang, 2011), the analysis of this conflict has not been 
concerned with women’s everyday experiences. Where women are mentioned in this 
literature (Best, 2007; Gwamna, 2010; Habu, 2012), they usually serve as examples 
to illustrate a point or support a wider argument, but without detailed analytical attention 
                                                          
5
 Scarce resources used in this context refers to, but not limited to political power, political position or 
office, land ownership, chieftaincy position, economic space and professional space.  
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to the degree to which their experiences reflect everyday gendered differences. By 
exploring and analysing the day-to-day experiences of women in Jos and other parts 
of the Middle Belt, the changing conditions of women in these societies, both as a direct 
and as an indirect result of conflict, can also be explored. Focusing on the impact of 
conflict on women’s everyday experiences in marriage, the market, politics and the 
public sector, this research goes beyond the existing literature on violence and conflict 
and emphasises the need to pay greater attention to understanding the indirect and 
everyday impact of ethnic and religious rivalry on gender relations.  
Focusing on the effects of ethno-religious competition, the theoretical perspective 
adopted in this study also relates to literature that offers an understanding of the 
workings of the Nigerian Federal system. The thesis follows the argument that the 
disbursement of the country’s central oil income through a system of Federal, State 
and local government institutions has intensified group competition over the control of 
local state institutions, and in turn led to the emergence of ever smaller areas seeking 
recognition from the state (Suberu, 2001). At each level, the elites of relevant groups 
fashion themselves in response to the resulting competition and mobilise support on 
the basis of ethnic and religious self-assertion. In an attempt to explain this scenario, 
Bayart (2009: 55) has pointed out that “ethnicity is almost never absent from politics in 
Africa…It exists mainly as an agent of accumulation – both of wealth and power.” 
Bayart’s reference to the tensions between the Yoruba and Hausa in Ibadan as well 
as similar conflicts in other African countries- Uganda and Zanzibar - reveals not so 
much disembodied linguistic or cultural opposition but instead a struggle for the control 
of the town and its resources in the first case, or for trade in the second. Ethnic 
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difference is thus a strategy aimed at the acquisition and control of resources of the 
modern economy (see Bayart, 2009: 55-58).  
As a result of elite strategies, not only has inequality between ethnic groups in the 
Middle Belt and Nigeria continued to widen but ‘within group’ inequality appears to be 
growing as well. This is because groups are willing to tolerate more ‘within group’ 
inequality because of what Horowitz (2000) called group worth. This can be said to be 
the situation in Nigeria, where ethnic nationalities focus more on group identity in 
relation to other groups, while condoning widening inequality between men and women 
within groups.  
As Kastfelt (1994) has illustrated in relation to Christian groups in Adamawa State, the 
practices and debates surrounding these local forms of self-assertion in turn re-frame 
both group identities and the way in which groups engage with each other. At both 
levels, women are subject to a wide range of threats and forms of social control 
because part of the way boundaries are maintained in society is through controlling 
them. In tribal associations and religious groups in Africa, for example, one way that 
some groups maintain their self-esteem is a focus on superiority or purity through 
maintaining the sanctity of the sexuality of the body of the woman (see Mahdi, 1989). 
Also both Christianity and Islam include many debates and traditions that centre on the 
control of women and female purity. So in situations of conflict, these forms of control 
and domination form a growing part of the perception and treatment of women. 
Given that this process has not been explored for conflict societies in Africa, and indeed 
Nigeria, in a detailed manner, this thesis rejects a grounding of its analysis in what 
Collins (2000: vii) refers to as a “singular theoretical tradition,” and instead depends on 
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a range of suitable approaches to capture the different aspects of the impact of conflict 
on women’s lives and lived experiences. The advantage of this approach is that it 
enables the research to focus closely on trends and processes at the grassroots that 
have hitherto received little attention in relation to conflict. Exploring the gendered 
impact of conflict from the bottom up, in order to re-think the wider structural dynamics 
highlighted in the existing literature on conflict, this thesis focuses on field research 
and primary sources such as narratives gained from interviews rather than on the 
discussion and testing of existing hypotheses taken from secondary literature. At the 
same time it relies on such literature in order to provide context to its own research and 
to support the arguments put forward. The next section looks at the impact of the 
colonial legacy of difference in Nigeria. 
1.6.2 The Colonial Legacy of Difference 
Violent conflict is perhaps a more usual part of human life than the literature on conflict 
sometimes suggests. While conflict in Nigeria certainly predated the expansion of the 
Sokoto Caliphate in the nineteenth century and colonial rule in the twentieth century, 
many contemporary conflicts, especially in Northern Nigeria, still reflect the structural 
imbalances reified by or created under British colonial rule which laid the foundation 
for the present day ethnic, regional and religious conflict (Nnoli, 1980; Turaki, 1993; 
Kastfelt, 1994; Falola, 1998; Logams, 2004).  
Thus, Turaki’s (1993) analysis of the British colonial legacy in Northern Nigeria gives 
a vivid description of the policies, practices and attitude of the Colonial Administration 
towards Muslim and Non-Muslim Groups (NMG) in Northern Nigeria which has partly 
contributed to the present-day problems in locations like Jos and other Middle Belt 
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areas.6 According to Turaki (1993:4), the ‘Colonial Administration was responsible for 
the institutionalisation of status and the fabrication of differences.’ As many NMGs 
were seen to have no centralised political structures, they fell under the political 
overlordship of the Fulani and Hausa rulers under the Indirect Rule System (see also 
Okpu, 1977; Kukah, 1994; Logams, 2004). In the colonial state, the NMGs were 
subordinated systematically to Hausa-Fulani political control. This system established 
or perpetuated the differential treatment and uneven socio-political development of 
ethnic groups, which often included their exclusion from political participation and 
stratified group inequality (Turaki, 1993). Such structural differences – today, many 
would say injustices – have continued to be sustained and re-produced within the 
Nigerian polity.  
 
1.6.3 Colonial Policy of Inclusion and Exclusion 
Adekunle (2012: 108) points out that the “divide and rule strategy adopted by the 
colonialist[s]” was intended to obtain control over Nigerians by setting them against 
each other. For example, after the British conquered Yola in 1901, they created a 
Fulani sub-imperialism by choosing the Fulani as their political allies. This situation 
subjected many of the non-Islamic groups which had been able to stay independent of 
the Fulani in the 1900s to Fulani hegemonic control. This situation in turn created long-
lasting conflicts between the Fulani hegemons and non-Muslim people (Kastfelt 
                                                          
6
 The British colonial legacy here ‘refers to the colonial philosophy of nation-state building which used 
racial, ethnic, tribal, religious and cultural values to create and establish a colonial social order.’ In 
Nigeria, colonial administrative policies used religion, culture and social status as a means of social 
stratification. This contributed to the animosity and mutual distrust amongst the various ethnic and 
religious communities in Nigeria and laid the foundation for the present day ethnic and religious clashes. 
See Okpu, (1977) and Turaki, (1993).  
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1994:13).7 Often headed by newly converted Christians, many non-Muslim peoples 
resisted the alliance between the British and the Fulani, and thus began the Middle 
Belt Movement (MBM) as a reaction to colonial and internal domination (Turaki, 1993; 
Logams, 2004).8  
The creation of ethno-religious difference and hierarchy was also achieved by 
separating linguistic groups from one another, particularly in residential areas (Nnoli 
1980: 3). In Northern Nigeria, it was official British Policy to separate the Hausa-Fulani 
from the Southerners. At first, Southern and Northern migrants to Northern cities lived 
together in harmony with their hosts.  This embarrassed the official view that only 
conflict characterised contact among African tribes, and was considered a potential 
threat to Indirect Rule which relied on Hausa aristocracy. Hence, the migrants were 
forced to set up in separate quarters called Sabongaris.9 Initially, both Southern and 
Northern migrants lived in the Sabongaris. Later, the Northern migrants were 
separated and compelled to live in yet another section of the city called Tudun Wada. 
Those who were favourably disposed to the migrants were reported as ‘not to be 
trusted on this question’ (Nnoli, 1980: 4). 
In this way the colonial administration complicated and controlled cohabitation among 
different Nigerian groups in many parts of Nigeria. It is likely that this policy also shaped 
                                                          
7
 These conflicts have re-emerged and increased in intensity since the annulment of the June 12 1993 
elections and the return of the country to democratic rule in 1999. 
 
8
 The Middle Belt Movement (MBM) began in 1949. The idea was generated in more strongly in 1949 
and came to the fore and became more prominent between 1950 and 1967. Top of the agenda was the 
creation of a separate Middle Belt Region separated from the Islamic society of the North. See Logams, 
(2004). 
 
9
 Sabongari is an Hausa word referring to ‘New Township.’ 
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views on social relationships more generally, and on inter-marriage in particular. If 
inter-marriage was considered an anomaly, this certainly affected women more 
strongly than men and made them the objects of suspicion both from members of their 
own groups and those they married into.  
 
1.7 Conflict and Antagonism Among Groups Within the System 
Conflict arising out of competition over access to the colonial and postcolonial state 
became a central theme in the political history of Nigeria. While local circumstances 
are often subtly different, similar trends have shaped the political landscape of other 
parts of the Middle Belt and Northern Nigeria as a whole (Turaki, 1993; Falola, 1998). 
Colonial strategies of exclusion and subordination led to an implicit institutionalisation 
of statuses that prevailed throughout the post-colonial period, with non-Muslim 
communities in Northern Nigeria usually occupying the status of religious as well as 
political outsiders. State policies concerning the separation of different ethnic groups 
also affected other forms of sociality and mobilisation. In many parts of Nigeria, ethnic 
associations began to form, and while political ties also reflected regional rivalries and 
class, ethnic and religious ties eventually constituted a driving force behind the 
foundation of most political parties. For instance, the Northern People’s Congress 
(NPC), founded in 1952 was dominated by the interests of the Islamic power-holders 
of Northern Nigeria. Its main opposition party, the Northern Elements Progressive 
Union (NEPU), reflected the political elite of Kano and was popularly associated with 
the commoner or talakawa. 10 In contrast, the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), 
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 ‘Talakawa is a Hausa word for meaning commoner or common citizen. The party ‘Northern Elements 
Progressive Union’ (NEPU) literarily stands for Government of the commoner.  
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also a minority party, was a party whose members were almost exclusively Christian 
(Kastfelt, 1994:71-72). The creation of parties based on ethnic and religious bonds 
accordingly resulted in inter-regional and inter-ethnic mistrust and political intolerance 
and protectionist politics in the regions (Bello, 1962). Ethnicity and religion thus 
became what Nnoli (1980: 10) refers to as “a mask for a privileged class,” which 
continued into the post-independence era. The politics and workings of the post-
independence era is discussed in the next section. 
 
1.8 Politics in Post-independence Nigeria 
This political trajectory has had a lingering effect on the politics of independent Nigeria. 
Thus, the Northern Independence politician Sir Ahmadu Bello referred to the 
Amalgamation of Nigeria which united the different ethnic and religious groups of North 
and South under one government as “the mistake of 1914” (Bello, 1962). His Southern 
counterpart, Obafemi Awolowo, referred to Nigeria as a mere geographical expression, 
again with the intention to underline how different its people and cultures were. Others 
have since opined that Nigeria existed only on paper (cf. Kirk-Greene, 1971). As a 
result, Nigerians continued to see themselves as separate people and often 
understood themselves to be members of what Benedict (1991) refers to as “imagined 
communities” on the basis of shared language or religion.  
Thus, the Nigerian Federal system became nothing more than an artificially 
constructed agglomeration of diverse ethnicities and other loosely united groups with 
little trust for the other (Falola, 1998: 52). In addition, the lingering regional competition 
and struggle led to the development of negative social values like elitism, greed, 
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dominance, aggressiveness, exploitation, parochialism, tribalism, regionalism and 
religious favouritism among those who had been relatively advantaged under British 
rule (Turaki, 1993). This led to mutual fears and suspicions among Nigerian groups, 
which ‘was heightened by the differential spread in the pattern of Western education’ 
(Elaigwu, 2011: 7), which in Northern Nigeria often privileged Christian groups. The 
extension of education to more women during the colonial and post-colonial era also 
highlighted gendered differences between competing groups. 
The negative social status ascribed to cultural and religious others, particularly women, 
within the “colonial economic and social structure” (Nnoli 1980: 10) has made it 
possible for those in power to take advantage of the weak. While the political leaders 
in each region continued to forge alliances whenever they deemed fit between  
themselves - as the saying goes, in politics, there are no permanent friends, only 
permanent interests - the main interest of the Nigerian elites has been to gain control 
of central resources which remain the chacteristic feature of the Nigerian Federal 
system. In such situations, fragile states like those of the Middle Belt of Nigeria are 
often vulnerable to conflict because their populations tend to see their governments as 
protecting the interest of a few and therefore as ineffective, illegitimate, or both. And 
as the elite has sought to exploit and deprive the population of control over their own 
lives by manipulating ethnicity and religion, it has not been concerned about providing 
a safe economic, social and working environment or ensuring that women are  
politically involved. Therefore, women as a group are deeply disadvantaged by a 
politics centred on the competition of regional or local elites.   
The resulting divisions have thus had an overall negative impact on women, whose 
wellbeing is systematically considered to be a secondary problem to the ethnic and 
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religious competition that structures inter-group struggles. Indeed, in many contexts, 
as groups defined their morality vis-a-vis each other, the secondary social roles of 
women even became part of an ideology of competition. Such competitive gendered 
ideologies shaped the opportunities of women in marriage, as well as in trade, politics 
and careers in the formal sector.  
Certainly, during the colonial and early postcolonial era, little effort was made to 
integrate women into the Nigerian economic, political and social systems. While 
colonial rule disenfranchised both men and women, women were more strictly 
excluded from local structures of the state, such as the Native Administration. Local 
opposition against colonial exclusion and the internal hierarchies ossified under 
colonial rule was not primarily concerned with addressing this gender imbalance. In 
the 1950s, despite strong support by women, and especially market women in general, 
for the nationalist movement, only three11 women were appointed to high political 
office. Thus the ethnic and religious rivalry encouraged by the colonial administration, 
as well as the early postcolonial state’s own explicit disadvantaging of women, has 
excluded women from politics and important sections of the public sector.  
But although women in the past were rarely given access to institutional power within 
various groups in the community, they have increasingly been able to withstand the 
pressure not to engage in political activities, and even to become highly militant when 
the need arises (UNRISD, 2005:17). According to Adekunle (2012: 116), the 
‘willingness of Nigerian women to be more involved in socio-economic and political life 
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 The three women include; Olufumilayo Ramsome Kuti, Chief Margeret Ekpo and Janet Mokelu.  
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in Nigeria led to the formation of Women in Nigeria (WIN) in 1983, with a militant 
approach to the mobilisation of women.12  
But often the mobilisation of women did not lead to political representation, as was 
evident during the 1999 elections when women constituted about 27 million out of the 
47 million registered voters, but only 1.6 percent obtained political office. (Agina-Ude, 
2003; Alubo, 2004). The overall percentage of women in positions of political 
leadership did not significantly increase in either the 2003 (Egwu, 2005; Alubo, 2004), 
2007 or 2011 elections. Closely associated with the insignificant presence of women 
is the politics of disorder, which is explained in the section below. 
 
1.8.1 The Politics of Disorder in Nigeria and the Middle Belt 
At independence, the Nigerian constitution encouraged ethnic competition not only at 
the grassroots but also between the parties that dominated the country’s three (later 
four) administrative regions. The increasing scale of this competition eventually led to 
the breakdown of political order in the Southwest and, in response to the Southeast’s 
secession, the Civil War (1967-70). Confronted with the escalation of violence, then 
Head of State Gen Yakubu Gowon (1966-75) and his successor General Obasanjo 
(1976-79) reformed the state’s political structure by introducing a centralised Federal 
system where most income went to the central state and was then disbursed to 
originally 12 (now 36) Federal states (and, today, a Federal Capital Territory). The 
introduction of a centralised Federal system contributed to a decline in inter-regional 
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 One of WIN’s objectives is to end the oppression and exploitation of women. See Adekunle, (2012). 
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competition. At the same time, it encouraged new forms of struggle directed at the 
centre.  
As in other Federalist nations such as India, Switzerland and Canada, Federalism in 
Nigeria was developed in order to accommodate the cultural and religious diversity 
within the country. Giving access to the local state to a larger number of local elites, it 
broke up the three ethno-regional monolithic blocs associated with the Regions. 
Offering greater inclusion, Federalism was meant to foster national unity by allowing 
new state-based elites to control their own administrations (Suberu, 2001; Eliagwu, 
2005). Thus Federalism protected important ethnic minorities from the direct 
hegemony of the bigger ethnic groups and ensured a more equitable spread of 
resources.  
However, as long as the responsibility for controlling and channelling central resources 
to the federating constituencies lay with the centre (Suberu, 2001: 7), the logic of group 
mobilisation in order to gain access to the local state remained valid. As Nigeria’s 
centrally managed oil income intensified the quest for the allocation of centrally held 
resources, ‘the centre became an increasingly big prize to win’ (Eliagwu, 2005: 15). 
‘Ethno-distributive pressures’ (Suberu, 2006:68) continued to shape the politics of the 
centre, with a growing number of states and similarly ethnic groups involved in an 
unending struggle to gain administrative recognition (Suberu, 2001; Eliagwu, 2005).  
Referring to this distributive logic, Bayart (2009: xxii) described Nigeria’s Federal 
income as the “national cake.” The desire to share in this scene set the centre stage 
for members of Nigeria’s different groups to invoke ethnic [and religious] differences in 
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other to gain their own administrative territory, whether at state or local government 
level, and by implication to gain access to the state’s resources (Bayart, 2009: 218). 
In the process of group differentiation and competition over access to the state, 
religious difference has played an important role. Often closely linked to ethnic and 
other forms of difference, religious boundaries have continued to be mobilised in the 
struggle over access to state and administrative power. As a result, religious and ethnic 
competition has increased as the units of the Federal system have become smaller 
under military rule. Further, the continuous agitation for State and Local Government 
creation suggests the possible gains to be derived from the emphasis on difference. 
But while state creation has come to a halt with the return to civilian rule in 1999, the 
liberalisation of political competition has nonetheless contributed to an increasing 
mobilisation of ethnic and religious difference in the attempt to capture state power. 
Bayart (2009: xxii) has shown how the “democratic transition [return to civilian rule] 
was widely experienced as a new form of access to what has been referred to as the 
national cake in Nigeria.” Reflecting on the assertion of politics of the belly (Bayart, 
2009) and the ongoing process of the division and factionalisation of local and regional 
elites focused on the control of community, local government, state and Federal 
politics, Nigeria continues to mobilise along ethnic and religious lines (cf. Kukah, 1994; 
Falola, 1998) as a broader strategy of control and exclusion.  
Since Federalism was introduced in Nigeria, and since the advent of democracy in 
1999, religious and communal crises have been on the increase. Religious and ethnic 
sentiments are deliberately mobilised to fuel these crises, not only in Jos and the 
Middle Belt, but Nigeria as a whole (Best, 2004; Gwamna, 2010; Boer, 2004). It has 
been argued that these crises are often the result of a deliberate manoeuvring of the 
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polity by the political class and its religious zealots (Usman, 1987; Boer, 2004; 
Gwamna, 2010; Kaigama, 2012).  
Thus, ethnic and religious loyalties and differences are responsible for most of the 
contentious issues in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. Further, Ter Haar (2005) is of 
the opinion that the real issue in conflicts is the pressure to share resources with others 
which most groupings are unwilling to do. She also notes that the politics of domination 
has come to influence relationships between various groups (Ter Haar, 2005: 4). In 
such situations, political violence becomes legitimised through ethnic and religious 
ideologies.  
It is important to note that the Middle Belt region has been recognised as 
accommodating the largest number of Nigeria’s ethnic minorities. These ethnic groups 
have different images of their histories, cultural identities, ancestral heroism, and a 
sense of originality and indigeneity over areas of land occupied by them creating strong 
tribal loyalty. This loyalty is fundamental to most residents of Jos, but this alliance is 
somewhat cross-cut by political and religious differences (Plotnicov, 1967). In this 
context, ethnic communities that believe they have been the first to settle in a place 
see all others that arrive after them within the same territorial space as settlers or 
“indigenes versus migrants or non-indigenes” (Best, 2004: 8). Arguing self-defence, 
Northern Christians, usually settlers, have begun to justify violence as a way of 
protecting their lives and faith against non-indigenes.  
Emphasis on the size of groups also shapes public debate. Thus the predominantly 
Christian Beroms and Tivs claim they are the majority in Plateau State and Benue 
State respectively. In contrast, the Muslim Fulani, Hausa and Kanuri claim to constitute 
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the majority in Nasarawa State. These numerical issues have bred terror and insecurity 
among ethnic communities especially during political contestations, because they are 
linked to the ability to mobilise violent groups. In the Middle Belt, ethnic and religious 
competition has led to the creation of many ethnic militias, for example in the Ombatse 
in Nasarawa and the Akwat Atap in Southern Kaduna. The emergence of such militias, 
has deepened the divisions between the various ethnic and religious groups due to 
feared and experienced violence (Salawu, 2010: 345; Higazi, 2007).  
The contestation of numbers is also linked to religious competition. For instance, during 
the appointment of Ibrahim Dasuki as the Sultan of Sokoto in 2014, both the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Voice of America (VOA), reported that the 
Sultan was the spiritual head of the Muslims in Nigeria, a group which comprises 40 
percent of the population. Within a week, letters about official condemnation of such a 
low percentage followed. Depending on the source of the responses, it was then stated 
that 70 percent and 80 percent of the population were supposed to be Muslims. In 
1986, Abubakar Gumi13 said that the Nigerian population comprised 80 percent 
Muslims, five percent Christians and 15 percent others. When he received the King 
Faisal prize in 1987, he claimed a Muslim population of 70 percent for the country 
(Gumi, 1992). 
Similar claims were made during the 1999 and 2003 elections in Jos. The Muslims, 
claiming that they constituted 80 percent of the population of Jos North Local 
Government, automatically expected to win elections as the chair of the Local 
Government at all times. Similar events have taken place in Kaduna, Benue and some 
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 Sheik Abubakar Gumi was an outspoken Islamic scholar and Grand Khadi of the Northern Region of 
Nigeria from 1962 to 1967. 
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parts of Nasarawa State, where widely held beliefs about local majorities did not lead 
to electoral success. These expectations illustrate the potential for conflict in Nigeria 
as groups lay claim to the control of access to Federal resources based on the politics 
of number (see Suberu, 2001).  
Summing up the post-colonial politics which characterise the Middle Belt of Nigeria, 
Chabal and Daloz (1999) explain how post-colonial experiences have contributed to 
the sedimentation of a political disorder. As the state is informal and deeply involved 
in the manufacturing of differences, it offers little alternative to the powers of local 
leaders and cliques who claim superiority. Given the ubiquity of violence and the 
absence of an institutionally autonomous and relatively impartial state affording 
protection for its citizens, it is imperative for ordinary people to maintain links with those 
who have power. This need confirms the apparent importance of primordial solidarity, 
on which people draw in order to establish themselves as clients of powerful leaders. 
By both benefiting from, and confirming, the importance of ethno-national difference, 
political disorder has become a resource for clientelist politics (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: 
20 & 162).   
But while Chabal and Daloz offer a convincing model, they do not explore how the 
historical and cultural processes associated with conflict and disorder operate at the 
grassroots level. As a result, the gendered nature of disorder remains irrelevant to 
their, and others, analysis. 
 
1.9 The Missing Gender Dimension 
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As this thesis illustrates, the federally-inspired dynamics in Nigeria affect the life 
chances of women on different levels. At the political level, the desire for ever smaller 
groups to be recognised works against the representation of women. At the private 
level, the growing importance of group boundaries means that women’s life choices 
are increasingly subject to control. An example of this is an increasingly felt need to 
control women’s marital choices. Further, as married women are regarded as 
mediators or links between families, their own and that of the family they marry into, 
they stand in-between their kin and in-laws. This in-between position challenges group 
boundaries by creating and affirming links between ostensibly different communities. 
Beyond the private, the growing importance of group boundaries makes it increasingly 
difficult for women to participate in the informal sector, and especially in typically female 
activities such as trading and selling, because many trading networks historically cut 
across ethnic and religious differences. As existing networks are replaced by parallel 
ethno-religiously based economic and political structures, the increased violence and 
insecurity of change, as well as the growing control of female activities, is often 
associated with a relative empowerment of men vis-à-vis women.  
In the public sphere, competition and conflict exclude women partly because of their 
greater – perceived or real – vulnerability to violence. In addition to this, the fact that 
local debates about inclusion and exclusion centre on ethnic and religious boundaries 
rather than on different social groups means that women are less likely to be included 
in the local political elite. Given the association of women with the transcendence or 
transgression of group boundaries in private life, they are, in the Nigerian context, seen 
to be much less capable than men of representing overall group interests. Moreover, 
the privileging of ethnic and religious difference in political discourse means that the 
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representation of different social groups, including those defined by gender, appears 
to many people as having secondary importance.  
In addition to the question of representation, the struggles over the control of resources 
at the local government level mean that the public sector is increasingly divided and 
subject to scrutiny from below. The increasing division of the population into separate 
factions means that even within the formal professional environment of public sector 
workers, ethno-religious difference is the starting point for suspicion and discrimination. 
Given the importance of gendered differences in the Muslim-Christian competition 
shaping Jos, this means an increasing focus on, and control of, female behaviour and 
dress within the sector. Such scrutiny, fuelled by the widespread sense of alienation at 
the communal level from those public sector workers who belong to another group, 
also increasingly shapes the interaction of public sector workers with the public. In 
professions dominated by Christian women, such as education, this can lead to 
particular forms of gendered aggression and alienation. 
Where violence and disorder become the norm and shape practice, even in 
government institutions, they not only directly affect but also transform all aspects of 
the public and private order. Importantly for this thesis, Galtung (1990: 292) describes 
violence as having two dimensions, namely direct violence or ‘intentional acts aimed 
at hurting another human being or the environment’ and structural or indirect violence, 
i.e. ‘those [acts] that hinder the acquisition of a person’s basic needs for identity and 
freedom’ (Khoja-Moolji, 2012: 2). The notion of structural violence is important because 
it describes the everyday forms of exclusion and disadvantage suffered by all women, 
not just as victims of direct violence, in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, but also the everyday 
form of control and cultural domination.   
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Therefore, as group boundaries are hardened and affirmed, women are increasingly 
seen, in all areas of life, not as potential links between groups but as intruders and 
threats. As political leaders even at the lowest level of government invest great energy 
in maintaining exclusive control of their political territory, women are increasingly 
treated with suspicion by the community and family they live in because their loyalty is 
to both their kin and in-laws. As the exclusion of women is gradually becoming the 
norm in Nigerian politics, one can also understand the politics of disorder as an ongoing 
gendered struggle, in which women and other social groups are disadvantaged. As 
political leaders mobilise their supporters through a focus on shared religious and 
ethnic identities, the implicit disadvantage of this discourse to women is indirect and 
not always clear to their audience. Despite the fact that the increasing political 
competition disadvantages them, some women may be as convinced of the need to 
patrol group boundaries as men. Even so, the in-between position associated with 
women on the basis of their gender also encourages some of them to try to overcome 
these growing social divisions.  
Focusing on the Middle Belt, some authors (Best, 2004, 2007; Sha, 2005; Egwu, 2003; 
2004; Jibo, Simbine & Galadima, 2001; Tyoden, 1993) have looked at the impact of 
the conflicts on women. Sha (2005) explains that women, children and other weak 
groups are seriously affected by conflicts in Jos and the Middle Belt and thus 
recommends the creation of a forum that brings women together to empower them. 
However, as Sha does not acknowledge the way conflict affects women’s everyday 
lives, he remains silent on the experiences and structures that prevent them from 
coming together and seeking empowerment.  
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Best (2008) stresses that while women are impacted by the conflict in obviously 
negative ways, they have been unable to set up networks and support groups to 
enhance their empowerment in the aftermath of the conflict. But Best also points out 
that while women were unable to do this, their voices are usually heard through the 
voices of men or proxy groups. It is important to note that the intention of those who 
discuss the voices of women is often to make a point that is of interest to their groups 
and not to women as a section of society. Frequently they use women’s voices to the 
apparent disadvantage and loss to the groups they represent. But while it offers some 
insights, this approach does not take the reality of gendered experiences seriously, 
because the analysis is often centred on economic loss.  
We have argued that Federal competition in Nigeria, the colonial legacy and the 
intersection of ethnicity and religion have continued to fan hatred as various regions 
and ethnic groups struggle for space and access to the national cake. Fears and 
continual suspicion accompany all forms of interaction among the different ethnic, 
regional and religious groups in Nigeria. In their struggle for a piece of the national 
cake (Chabal & Daloz, 1999), the stronger people within the ethnic and religious groups 
continue to take advantage of weaker groups, especially women, in an unending circle 
of elite-resource-war.   
While the political actors in Nigeria continue to manipulate religion to advance their 
goals as profiteers from ethnic and religious violence, the divisive colonial policy and 
leadership style is considered to be responsible for the institutionalisation of such. 
Further, colonial masters aided in the fabrication of differences through their system of 
administration, which later became an enduring part of the Nigerian Federal system. 
And in order to maintain the status quo, ethnic, regional and religious groups 
28 
 
particularly the elites, justify conflict in the name of religious or ethnic discrimination, 
marginalisation, neglect, exploitation and victimization. All of which relate to the 
victimization of weaker groups, particularly women, in their competition over the 
nations scarce resources and the protection of the political space from competitors 
within the Nigerian Federal system. 
 
1.10 Structure of the Research  
As already stated, this study explores, describes and analyses how the recent ethno-
religious conflicts in the city of Jos and other parts of the Middle Belt affects women’s 
lives and gender relations. The thesis spreads across eight chapters including the 
conclusion.  
Chapter one contains the introduction, statement of the problem, objective, 
significance and the scope. It also shows how the colonial legacy of difference and the 
politics of disorder have shaped interactions in Nigeria. It discusses how the struggles 
over the control of Federal resources at various levels of government have created the 
suspicion and discrimination that have disadvantaged women. 
Chapter two gives a detailed overview of the Middle Belt and Nigeria’s ethnic and 
religious landscape. It discusses how the struggle for a politically recognised identity 
has been used by a privileged self-interested elite who employ the instrumentality of 
ethnicity and religion to negotiate political patronage for themselves, their families and 
friends. Often in these struggles, women are left out of political discussions or are 
threatened directly or indirectly by an insecure environment, directly aimed at excluding 
them.  
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Chapter three provides an explanation of the various ways in which data for this 
research was collected and analysed. It explains the methods used in sampling and 
the sampling technique. In addition, it presents some of the challenges and 
experiences in the field to offer an insight into the actual processes of data collection 
and to enable the reader to better understand the environment in which the research 
was carried out. The chapter stresses the importance of trust, sensitivity and the use 
of field assistants who are familiar with the terrain, as critical factors when doing 
research in communities affected by conflict. It also points to the importance of 
considering the more limited social agency of many women in societies like Jos. 
Chapter four explores the impact of conflict on women in inter-faith marriages in 
Nigeria’s Middle Belt. It explains that while women face a lot of discrimination and 
rejection in society, those who are in inter-faith marriages face additional forms of 
discrimination and oppression especially as ethnic and religious boundaries become 
hardened. The chapter highlights how married women in particular have to be loyal to 
both their natal family and their in-laws and how, as a result, they are often caught in-
between in terms of religion, marriage and their relationship with their immediate 
families, religious bodies and the community. Consequently, their structural position of 
knowing the inner workings of two families has resulted in women being widely 
recognised not only as mediators but also as potential enemies within, and that as a 
result they suffer isolation which also affects their children. This chapter also 
emphasise the need to look at the personal dimension of politics.  
Chapter five analyses the impact of ethno-religious conflicts on economic activities 
particularly those that characterise interactions and the utilisation of public spaces in 
the markets in Jos and other parts of the Middle Belt. It shows how the conflicts have 
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shaped the socio-economic space and market interactions and how the displacement 
and separation of markets makes trading more difficult for women due to the mistrust 
created by the conflict. The chapter explains how the declining sense of social trust 
due to the conflict has affected many potentially cooperative relationship  
Chapter six discusses some of the reasons for there being a limited number of women 
in politics and how conflict serves to magnify and strengthen some of these issues. It 
presents the experiences of women as they aspire to political representation in 
situations of extreme and intense political competition. The chapter highlights how 
firmly established ethnic and religious divisions in the Middle Belt and Nigeria narrows 
social integration making it very difficult for female politicians to establish political, 
economic and social connections and maintain trust due to their structural positions. 
Chapter seven explores and analyses the implications of the religious and ethnic divide 
on professional relations in Jos and the Middle Belt, with particular reference to the 
education sector (the teaching profession). This chapter shows how the high number 
of female Christian teachers at the primary school level face undue pressure and how 
female teachers in higher institutions of learning continue to face discrimination as 
more healthy forms of competition. It explains how professional conduct, merit and 
respect gives room to unhealthy competition and thereby implicitly institutionalising 
structural violence used to frustrate women.  
Chapter eight, which is the concluding chapter, summarises the findings of this 
research, and makes recommendations for further research. 
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 CHAPTER TWO  
 CONFLICT AND THE NIGERIAN ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the Nigerian multi-ethnic and religious landscape 
with specific reference to the Middle Belt Region and Jos. It also describes the struggle 
of various ethnic groups and religious communities within Nigeria and the Middle Belt 
Region to gain and maintain control of the economic and political landscape. As 
discussed in the later part of this chapter, ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged 
groups, including women, have had to struggle with larger ethnic groups in order to 
gain recognition and dominance. Further, the unequal and regional disparity in the 
composition of the Federal State has created the assumption that the three major 
ethnic groups - Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba - are meant to rule and dominate the 
economy of the country. As a result, ethnic and religious groups continue to contest 
census figures in a bid to show numerical strength, and ethnic minorities continue to 
oppose the notion of numerical inferiority (See Suberu, 1999), thereby setting the 
foundation of most conflicts in Nigeria.  
The unequal treatment of minority communities by dominant groups, competition with 
other groups for access to power in new states, and ethno-political and politicisation of 
religion continue to dominate relationships in response to this competition. And 
religious forms and practices have continued to evolve and disadvantage many 
groups, who resort to violence especially since the return of the county to civilian rule 
in 1999. Suberu (1999: xi) contends that, “these processes have operated not only to 
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foster and institutionalise the oppressive hegemony of the country’s three major 
ethnicities of Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, but also to legitimise the inordinate 
exportation of the resources of the oil-producing communities as part of an official 
strategy of centralised national cake-sharing.” With the centre retaining overwhelming 
power, the capacity of women to excel in relation to other competing groups becomes 
more difficult. Opposition continues to be directed at women who dare challenge the 
status quo and the highly conflictual environment, and thus face discrimination and 
violence daily, both in their private and public lives.  This chapter will also discuss how 
the ethnic and religious situation has affected women and give some specific 
examples.  
 
2.2 The Ethnic and Religious Landscape in Nigeria 
Nigeria, popularly referred to as the giant of Africa, is Africa’s most populous state. It 
is very diverse ethnically and linguistically, and historians and scholars have struggled 
to summarize this ethnic and linguistic variety. Amongst them are Oshomha (1990: ix) 
who claims that there are over 300 hundred ethnic and linguistic groups and 
Onwuejegwu (2002: 4-5) who explains that Nigeria is the only country in the world that 
has about 480 ethnic nationalities. Meanwhile Ostien (2009: 1) believes that there are 
between 400-500 mutually unintelligible languages spoken in Nigeria. Similarly, 
Professor Otite (1990) who has done more work on Nigeria’s ethnic groups than any 
Nigerian scholar, puts the number of ethnic groups at about 370 (Best, 2010: 5).14  
                                                          
14
 Nigeria has three major ethnic groups; the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, accounting for 68 percent 
of population according to the World Fact Book of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The official 
population count of each of Nigeria's ethnicities has always remained controversial and disputed as 
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These ethnic groups are unequally distributed from one region to another and from one 
state or even local government to the other within the country. While some states are 
dominated by one large ethnic group, the living together of numerous diverse groups 
is typical of the Middle Belt,15 a region that has been recognized as accommodating 
the largest number of Nigeria’s ethnic minorities (Best, 2004: 8) 16 The only Middle Belt 
– and indeed Nigerian – state with a larger number of ethnic groups is Adamawa which 
has approximately 80 (Best, 2010: 5). Best (2007: 4) also noted that Plateau State has 
one of the largest  concentrations of  ethnic minorities in the Nigerian Federation, with 
over 58 relatively small ethnic communities spread across its 17 local government 
areas. While some of the smallest ethnic groups such as the Berom, Mwaghavul, Ngas 
and Pyem in Nigeria can be also found in Plateau State. Blench (2004) put the number 
of ethnic groups at 37, and the Plateau Indigenous groups report listed up to 50 
recognised ethnic groups in the state (See Appendix 1). 
Similarly, Nigeria’s religious composition has been a much contested issue. For 
instance, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) estimates the population to be 45 
percent Muslim, 45 percent Christian, and 10 percent practitioners of Indigenous 
                                                          
members of different ethnic groups believe the census is rigged to give a particular group numerical 
superiority. 
 
15 See Best, (2004). The differences between groups often include more than language. Many groups 
have different myths of origin and different customs. Importantly, many groups have very different ideas 
about gender roles, including marriage, divorce and widowhood, but also the possibilities of women 
holding property and power. 
 
16 Most ethnic groups have different images of their histories, cultural identities and a sense of originality 
and indigeneity over the areas of land they occupy. In the sense, they have come to define who settlers 
are within the context of their interpretations of history, and how to keep such settlers out of their 
domains. They do so to preserve culturally and historically defined spaces against infiltration and 
takeover by the perceived settlers. The complication arising from this has led to conflict in many cases. 
See Best (2004). 
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Religious Beliefs (referred to as African Traditional Religion- ATR) (see Danfulani, 
2001: 35). Falola (1998: 306) points out that “representatives of both Islam and 
Christianity have” contested these figures. For instance, CAN states that “the number 
of Muslims does not exceed the number of Christians in the country” (Falola, 1998: 
306). He concedes that Muslims predominate only in three Northern states (Katsina, 
Kano and Sokoto) but nowhere else in the region, and claims that Benue, Plateau, 
Gongola, Kaduna, Kwara, and Bauchi are predominantly Christian. In contrast, 
Abubakar Gumi, who was an outspoken Islamic scholar and Grand Khadi of the 
Northern Region of Nigeria (1962–1967) claimed in early 1986 that Nigeria was 80 
percent Muslim, five percent Christians, and 15 percent others. In another statement, 
made when he received the King Faisal Prize in 1987, he claimed a 70 percent Muslim 
population for the country (IPA, 1987).17 Based on recent survey work on the size and 
distribution of the world’s Muslim population of 2009, the Pew Forum (2011: 5) 
suggests that out of Nigeria’s 144.7 million inhabitants, there are 78.056 million 
Muslims, representing 5 percent of Islamic adherents in the world and just over 50 
percent of Nigeria’s population. 
In the far North of Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani18 and Kanuri ethnic groups are 
predominantly Muslim and in the same region a “significant Christian community had 
                                                          
17
 Alhaji Abubakar Gumi was considered to be a very controversial person who created tension and 
destruction. Alhaji Yahaya Gusau in an interview with Mathew Kukah said -His problem is that anytime 
he opens his mouth to speak, he becomes a very confused person. Kukah (1994). Based on such public 
notions about Gumi’s personality, it becomes difficult to accept any of his claims. 
 
18
 The Fulani is Fulbe in plural or pullo singular, speak fullata or fulfulbe.There are two categories of 
Fulani, the Fulani Gida or Fulanin Zaure- Town Fulani and the Fulanin Daji- Pastoral Fulani. One 
interesting discovery is that some Fulanis in Plateau State have recently objected to the use of the term 
Hausa/Fulani, believing that they are being lumped together. The Hausa elite have no problem with the 
use of the term which, they argue, dates back to the period after Dan Fodio Jihad.  Refer to Best (2007). 
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resided and inter-married with Muslims for more than 50 years” (Best, 2007: 5). While 
“Christianity is widespread” (Falola, 1998: 306) in the Middle Belt, and both Muslims 
and Christians reside in approximately equal numbers in the Southwest, where the 
Yoruba ethnic group predominates. The percentage given by the Pew Forum and other 
scholars above cannot be accepted as final or conclusive; first, because of the 
significant margins of error highlighted by the Pew Forum itself, and second, and more 
generally, because the 2006 Nigeria Population Census does not provide data on 
religion. 
To complicate matters, religious forms continue to evolve, each seeking meaning to 
better understand life and control environmental forces. These religious groups seek 
inclusion and dominance through ensuring that their interest is represented at all levels 
of governance. According to a report by the BBC on the 2006 Nigerian election:  
The relative strengths of every ethnic and religious group must be taken into 
consideration in determining appointments in the civil service, the armed forces 
and political institutions in line with the Federal Character principle. Political and 
community leaders study the personnel composition of every institution of 
government with a microscope to find a breach of the principle19 where they are 
not favored (BBC, 2006). 
This quote highlights the complex situation with regard to ethnic and religious groups 
in Nigeria, where ethnic and religious ideologues and intellectuals watch assiduously 
                                                          
19
 Refer to Nigeria’s 1979 Federal Character. The Federal Character Principle has been enshrined in 
Nigeria's Constitution since 1979. The principle seeks to ensure that appointments to public service 
institutions fairly reflect the linguistic, ethnic, religious, and geographic diversity of the country. 
36 
 
the pattern of distribution of resources, often emphasizing the neglect of their group, 
thereby fanning the embers of inter-ethnic and inter-religious prejudice and hostility 
(Nnoli 1980: 218). The negative impact of this inter-ethnic and inter-religious hostility 
on Nigerian society is that it limits the extent and degree of association between groups 
and various regions across the country, by extension limiting the degree of association 
between women and their counterparts across the country, especially when ethnicity 
and religion is a big factor in political empowerment (Suleiman, 2002: 194).  
Further, in a bid to maintain and improve their ability to control and exclude others 
within the Nigerian system, religious groups have continued to evolve and reinvent new 
strategies in order to assert their presence. It is in this vein that Pentecostal Christianity 
is growing rapidly in the Southern part of the country and the Middle Belt respectively, 
and members of the Muslim Ahmadiyya movement and some forms of what is often 
referred to as Pentecostal Islam (NASFAT,20 Ikhwan and Darul Islam) are increasing 
among Muslims (Danfulani, 2009: 3).  
Also, one might argue that not all the survey responses that I obtained in my fieldwork 
offer a full picture of local practices since religion continues to offer not just avenues 
for religious groups to acquire an understanding of self and society, but also a means 
for access to and acquisition of local, state and Federal resources. Peel (2000) 
captures aptly the reason behind the acceptance of religion in Africa. According to him:  
The 19th Century rulers in Africa accepted European religion [Christianity] for 
two reasons: A search for allies in the ongoing regional power struggle, and a 
desire for cultural enhancement... They wanted not only allies and technology, 
                                                          
20
 Nasrul-lahi Fathi Society of Nigeria (NASFAT). 
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but also access to the hidden sources of the white man’s power… (Men who 
professed expertise in the world of spirit) comparable with the religious 
specialists they already knew; such as diviners and Muslims (Peel, 2000, 123- 
124). 
Peel (2000: 213-214) explains how the Yoruba struggled to hold onto Islam and 
Christianity for the following reasons: “for Islam, it was the appeal of the spiritual 
techniques of the alufa –their prayers and charms, backed by the prestige of Islam’s 
trans-regional networks and its politico-military clout – and for Christianity, it was the 
appeal of Christ as mediator; and its association with the technological power of its 
European bearers, eventually to be diffused through the colonial order.”21 In the 
Southeast, where the Igbo ethnic group is dominant, Catholics, Anglicans and 
Methodists constitute the majority and many Igbos continue to observe traditional rites, 
such as marriage rites, ceremonies, and other cultural forms in tandem with 
Christianity. For example, the Igbos have strict traditional rites that have to be 
performed when giving their daughters in marriage. These customary marriage rites 
are observed even if they are dealing with a different ethnic group and are sometimes 
given precedence over their Christian faith and practices with, for example, traditional 
marriage (Igbankwu) ceremony being performed alongside Christian marriage (Isichei, 
1976; Njoku, 1990). Religion in this context is a practice meant to satisfy a need 
whenever one arises. It can also be an apparatus for the control of the other, and most 
                                                          
21
 Read Peel, (2000). The study exposes how individuals approach religion- as a source of 
empowerment. This can be analyzed within the context of current happenings in Nigeria, especially as 
it relates to the manipulation of religion for personal gain. 
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especially women. The relationship between religion and the role of women will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
2.2.1 The Position of Women Within the Context of Competition 
Throughout Nigeria, the roles of women in different ethnic and religious communities 
often exist in some contrast to each other. For example, the women who inter-marry 
often recall painful experiences. In cases where women are the link between two very 
different families, they usually face the dilemma of choosing where to belong as 
daughters, wives, mothers and in-laws. This is particularly so when they marry into 
families that are of a different faith to theirs.  
For instance, the Christian women living in Jos who married Muslim men and Muslim 
women who married Christian men that I spoke to informed me that religion and 
traditional practices have made life difficult for some women. They told me that in some 
cases parents actively encouraged and persuaded their daughters to walk out of their 
marriage, especially after the recent ethno-religious conflicts in Jos and its environs. 
Their communities felt that the women in inter-faith marriages were no longer safe as 
they were regarded as informants and objects of suspicion by their husband’s relatives 
and other friends within the community.22 This suspicion that they could not be trusted 
not only affects their marriage life but also their economic, political and professional 
life.  
                                                          
22
 This was a result of personal discussions with women on their experiences in the Jos conflict during 
fieldwork for this thesis at the Institute of Governance and Social Research (IGSR). Field notes 2012-
2013.  
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In another instance of the ethnic struggle that women face, and echoing the quote from 
the BBC report noted earlier, a former Director General of the Joint Admissions and 
Matriculations Board (JAMB), Dr Lami Hamza from Plateau state, married to a Muslim 
man from Kaduna State, had her appointment queried by parties from both her own 
state and her husband’s state. They claimed that she was taking up the quota of the 
real indigenes from Kaduna while being from Plateau, which she refuted (Tyoden, 
2006: 6-7). That is to say, while the public debate ostensibly centred on her claim about 
her state of origin the controversy mainly centred on her religious beliefs and on her 
gender. 
The problems that women face in both their private and professional lives undoubtedly 
contribute to their under-representation in Nigerian public life. Despite the fact that 
women constitute just under half of the country’s population, their representation in 
elective and appointive positions still stands at between 1.6 percent and 8.0 percent. 
For example, out of 49 ministers and advisers at that time, only 6 were women, and 
only 4 out of 52 ambassadors were women (IDEA, 2005: 8-9; Alubo, 2008:17; 2011: 
90).  
Despite a slight trend upwards since 1999, women still hold fewer than 10 percent of 
political offices at all levels of national politics. However, this distribution is subject to 
variation throughout the country. While women in some parts of Nigeria such as the 
East and West are relatively better represented compared to the North, they have very 
little influence in other areas and their representation is quite low in the Middle Belt 
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area. This may be partly linked to the ubiquity of local conflicts23 and ethnic/religious 
issues.  
It could be noted at this point that often in these struggles, women are left out of political 
discussions or are threatened directly or indirectly by an insecure environment, and so 
they stay out of the public domain, while those women who brave the harsh political 
competition come face to face with life threatening danger. For example, on 3rd May, 
2003, during the Nasarawa State Assembly elections, Mrs Maimuna Joyce Katai, then 
a commissioner in Nasarawa State, was beaten to death and shot twice by youth militia 
groups24 while trying to protect the ballot box in her polling unit (Best, 2004).25  
While political assassinations are also directed at men, the fact that women, already 
marginalised, face even more threats than men contributes to their under-
representation in the political sphere. For example, the dominant forms of Islam and 
Christianity in the Middle Belt suggest that the purity of women is guaranteed by their 
staying out of politics and public life. Thus the women in the Middle Belt face many 
dilemmas: the highly conflictual environment in which they live exposes them to a 
disproportionate threat of discrimination and violence, both in their private and public 
lives; that they live in a generally patriarchal culture which takes little account of their 
                                                          
23
 Refer to Arowolo & Aluko, (2010). 
 
24
 Her murderers were suspected to be Egbura Youths who may have been hired to disrupt the 2003 
State Assembly Elections. Others versions of the incident indicate the insecurity and restiveness that 
sometimes pervades the Nigerian political landscape, thus, leading to militia groups taking the laws into 
their hands and threatening both life and property. The works of Best (2004) provide more insight into 
the incident. 
 
25
 This is one out of many examples of insecure environments, which makes it quite difficult for women 
to engage in politics and it also signifies to some extent the failure of the state in conducting free and 
fair elections. Refer to the works of Best (2004) on the Bassa-Egbura Conflict in Toto Local Government 
Area. 
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needs; and lastly, their religious identities – politicised locally – discourages their 
engagement and participation in public life. Affected disproportionally by local conflict 
due to local interpretations of custom and religion, as well as family pressure and public 
hostility, these same factors prevent them from addressing the problems with which 
they are faced.  
 
 
2.3 Ethnic Minority Issues and Conflict in Nigeria 
Ethnic and communal conflicts have been part of the Nigerian polity since 
independence. Deeply rooted in the political system is the “competition amongst the 
big three - Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba - with the ethnic minority groups being used 
as pawns in this three-player ethnic game” (Suberu, 1996: 12). For instance, “ethnic 
minority issues occupied the minds of all politically involved Nigerians in Adamawa in 
the forties and fifties. To groups like the Bachama, the Kilba or the Chamber, the basis 
of ethnic politics was their wish to maintain their cultural identity and political 
independence in relation to other ethnic groups” (Kastfelt, 1994: 75). In a bid to 
incorporate the ethnic minorities into Nigeria’s Federal system, new states were 
established beginning with General Gowon’s creation in 1967 to the late General 
Abacha’s administration in 1996.  
Another minority issue is the fact that a “religious divide separates Christians and 
Muslims, and … further divides the people” (Falola, 1998: 1). More worrisome is that 
since the return of the country to democratic rule in 1999, the nation has been beset 
by some of the most deadly conflicts to occur among several ethnic and religious 
communities in different regions and states of Nigeria. The “larger proportion of such 
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conflicts has occurred in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, with Plateau State as its 
typical example” (Best, 2007: 3-4; Gwamna, 2010:7). Karl (2010: 87) rightly noted that 
“since independence, the Middle Belt has been the scene of frequent flare ups, rooted 
in minority attempts to free themselves from [the] Hausa-Fulani establishment.” Dike 
(2001: 87) concurs that “ethnic and religious disputes are common currency in the 
volatile Middle Belt region.”  
Many of these conflicts affect the lives and possibilities open to women in various ways 
and the volatile conditions mean that the livelihoods of women in the Middle Belt are 
constantly under threat. For example, the insecurity of the state has made it difficult for 
women to go to both the general markets and the vegetable and yams markets as they 
normally would, due to fear of conflict or attack. Because women are traditionally 
responsible for food shopping for the family, for which they receive an allowance from 
their husbands even if they earn money themselves, this has put greater financial 
pressure on many professional women. For those who sell in the markets, as many 
less well educated women do, the effects of conflict have been much more devastating. 
For instance, I happened to meet a Christian taxi driver during my pilot study in August 
2011 at Tudun Wada, Jos, who told me that his wife who used to have a small stall at 
the Dilimi yam Market no longer did so since she is a Christian and the area is now a 
no-go-area for non-Muslims. In such families, the economy of the family is strongly 
affected by one partner losing their source of livelihood.  
Similarly, in addition to the increased threat of violence, women’s loss of earnings and 
income has negative consequences beyond their personal lives. For example, as 
women are usually partly responsible for paying their children’s school fees, their 
declining financial status might mean that children are taken out of school or moved to 
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a less expensive one. In the worst case, their financial decline could affect how they 
feed their family because they would no longer be able to afford adequate quantities 
of nutritious food. And because they are sidelined in local party politics as minors within 
minority groupings, they are often unable to voice these and other issues that affect 
them, and by extension their families and especially their children.   
 
2.4 The Middle Belt Ethnic and Religious Landscape 
The Middle Belt region of Nigeria is sandwiched between the predominantly Christian 
Igbo and Yoruba South and the Muslim Hausa North (Okpeh, 2007: 229; Warren-
Rothlin, 2010:14). It has been argued that one of the factors that distinguishes it from 
other minority areas in Nigeria is its geographical contiguity coupled with the large 
concentration of Nigeria’s ethnic minority groups who live there. Formally, the area that 
is considered to encompass the Middle Belt is the North-Central Geo-Political Zone of 
Nigeria, which consists of the present Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa, Kogi, 
Kwara, Niger, Taraba States as well as the capital Abuja (Federal Capital Territory- 
FCT). The North-Central Geo-Political Zone of Nigeria coexists with five other zones, 
of which three are dominated by one of Nigeria’s majority ethnic groups,26 and two 
more are clearly identified with a majority religion.27 As a result, the religious and ethnic 
variety of the North-Central Geo-Political Zone, and additionally Southern Kaduna, 
                                                          
26 The South West Geo-Political Zone is dominated by the Yoruba, the South East by the Igbo and the 
North West by the Hausa. 
 
27 The North East Geo-political Zone is predominantly Muslim, while the South-South is predominantly 
Christian. 
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Adamawa, Bauchi, Niger, Kebbi and Taraba states acutely reflects Nigeria’s 
diversity.28 
With regard to the political zoning of the Nigerian state, scholars hold divergent views 
of the exact boundaries of the Middle Belt while acknowledging that it  occupies the 
territory that lies between the predominantly Muslim North and the mainly Christian 
South. A view of the map of Nigeria shows the Middle Belt states lying geographically 
at the centre of the country (see map 2), thus acting as a geographical buffer zone 
located in the middle between Northern and Southern Nigeria (Okpeh, 2007 : 229). 
Some observers refer to the Middle Belt region of Nigeria as comprising Adamawa and 
Taraba, Plateau and Benue States as well as the Southern parts of Kaduna, Bauchi 
and Gombe States. They do this with reference to contemporary Nigerian politics, 
excluding Kwara and Kogi due to their relative peacefulness and cultural affinity to the 
Southwest, and including Kaduna, Bauchi and Gombe States because of the recent 
conflicts in these areas between smaller ethnic groups who have often been divided 
by religion (Logams, 2004). Others also describe the area as encompassing Kabba, 
Ilorin, Niger, Benue, Plateau, Adamawa, Southern Zaria and Southern Bauchi 
provinces (Tyoden, 1993:14; Gwamna, 2010: 20-21), because these states comprise 
several ethnic communities that share many cultural, historical, economic and political 
characteristics apart from their geographical location.  
                                                          
28 The South West Geo-Political Zone also has a clear Muslim-Christian divide, and the South-South 
has great ethnic diversity. But particularly the North Central Zone is the most ethnically diverse. I have 
to make it clear that the Zoning system here is more so for electoral parity and representation. It, 
however, does not capture all the areas of the Middle Belt Region and its non-Muslim minority struggle 
for emancipation.  
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The two maps below illustrate the controversies arising from the debate on the Middle 
Belt in juxtaposition to the North Central Geo-Political Zone of the country and at the 
same time present it as a region comprising Nigeria’s ethnic minorities. 
Map 1: The Minority Commission of 1957 Map Showing Minority Areas 
 
Source: Willinks’ Report of Nigeria and the Minorities Commission of 1957. 
Map 1 shows the areas occupied by ethnic minorities. These states include the Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, Nasarawa, Plateau, and the Southern part of Kaduna, 
Bauchi and Gombe State. However the map does not capture all the minority areas 
especially the Tiv (see the alphabet T & t on map 1) and the Nupe (see the alphabet N 
& n on map 1) who are also a minority tribe in Nigeria and identify themselves as Middle 
Belters. If this map is taken to represent the Middle Belt, it neglects the entire Benue 
46 
 
state, Southern parts of Kaduna, Taraba, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe and Kebbi States. 
These are areas with a large concentration of ethnic minorities and at the same time a 
predominantly Christian population who identify themselves as Middle Belters. 
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 Map 2: Map of Nigeria Showing Proposed Middle Belt Region
 
Source: Adopted from Uduma & Jimoh (2014). World Journal of Agricultural Research. 
Vol. 2(1), 5-11. 
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In contrast with map 1, map 2 includes a delineation of areas that date back to colonial 
times where the people who live there identify themselves as ethnic minorities,29 and 
have been involved in the struggle for emancipation from those perceived as Northern 
Jihadists and from the Hausa or Fulani cultural assimilation. This map captures the 
areas often referred to as the Middle Belt and the region of the minorities. It includes 
Niger, Kwara, Kogi, FCT, Nasarawa, Benue and Plateau States, as well as the 
Southern parts of Kaduna, Taraba, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe and Kebbi States. It is 
also visibly central on the underlying map of Nigeria.  
These maps show that the Middle Belt has fluid boundaries which are linked to different 
minority and majority communities. Ostien (2009: 2) explains that because the Middle 
Belt is not firmly established, its geographical definition is often subject to great debate 
among academics. This is partly due to the presence of a significant number of ethnic 
Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri groups in this area. As explained above, the Yoruba of Kwara 
and Kogi states have a strong affinity with the main Yoruba community in Ekiti, Lagos, 
Ogun, Osun and Oyo Sates. They frequently identify with the South-West rather than 
with the Middle Belt, because they want to be regarded as one of the majority tribes of 
Nigeria on the one hand and also because they would not want to be seen as subjects 
of Northern Nigerian influence on the other.30 
Part of the problem with the conceptualisation and struggle for a politically recognised 
identity is the fact that the Middle Belt is betrayed by its privileged elites who employ 
the instrumentality of the Middle Belt consciousness (See Okpu, 1977: 121) to 
                                                          
29
 Reference is made here to Nigeria and the Willinks’ Minorities Commission report of 1957.  
 
30
 This is a complicated issue, and the self-identification of northern Yoruba (and related) groups remains 
very much in flux. Unfortunately this topic cannot be explored in depth in this dissertation. 
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negotiate political patronage for themselves, their families and friends, (cf. Bayart, 
2009). This process can work against the overall interest of the people as the struggle 
for the Middle Belt identity is misinterpreted as a struggle for the national cake (Bayart, 
2009). That notwithstanding, the Middle Belt is always understood as a concept, 
movement and philosophy that seeks to forge a separate identity from the erstwhile 
Northern region, into a distinct emancipated region that is independent and self-
asserting (see Kastfelt, 1994).  
Despite minimal success associated with the Middle Belt consciousness, Gwamna 
(2010:19-20) explains that this concept is politically relevant to the oppressed ethnic 
minorities, non-Hausa-Fulani and non-Hausa-Fulani Muslim people of the North East 
and North Central Nigeria and to the people of Plateau State, in particular, who have 
constantly experienced conflicts over issues relating to ownership and control of the 
state in the recent past. It has been mentioned earlier that the Middle Belt region of 
Nigeria has been recognised as accommodating the largest number of Nigeria’s ethnic 
minorities (Tyoden, 1993; Best, 2004: 8; Okpeh, 2007). Egwu (2001:11) adds that the 
major denominator of the Middle Belt is “a shared collective minority identity in relation 
to the Northern power system,” and the larger Nigerian state. Because they see 
themselves as lacking in power and voice within the larger Northern region, the 
struggle of this collective minority has been centred around colonial politics, which set 
the so-called dominant ethnic groups against the smaller nationalities on terms which 
were conceived and understood to be oppressive, exploitative and marginalising 
(Gwamna, 2010: 32) and an attempt at neglect in order to further under-develop the 
region.  
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In a more diplomatic vein, the Governor of Plateau state, Jonah Jang, provided a broad 
definition of the Middle Belt.31 Gov Jang describes the Middle Belt as: 
Not just what in Nigerian politics is called the North Central Geo-Political Zone 
(Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger and Plateau States plus the Federal 
Capital Territory of Abuja), but also Southern Kebbi, Southern Kaduna, Southern 
Borno, Southern Bauchi, Southern Gombe, Adamawa, Taraba, Benue, Plateau, 
Nasarawa, Kogi, the Federal Capital Territory, Kwara and Niger (Ostien, 2009: 
19).  
 
Jang (see Ostein, 2009) stresses further that because the Middle Belt is in central 
Nigeria it is always in the best position to interpret the North to the South and the South 
to the North. Further, it remains central to the geo-political calculation of both the ruling 
class in the North, and that in the South, with each making claims on a different basis 
which is that in the politics of Nigeria, the Muslim North claims the area on the basis of 
geographical contiguity, while the South appeals to a shared religious – Christian – 
brotherhood (Kukah, 1994: xiii).  
It should be noted, however, that the Middle Belt area is not a homogenous zone. Its 
religious and ethnic diversity also results in different local constellations of power. In 
Plateau State, for example, the Berom, Ngas, Taroh, Mwaghavul and Goemai are 
predominantly Christians, while the Jarawa, Bogghom, and Pyem are a significant 
Muslim population. In Nasarawa State, the Eggon, Mighili, Gbagyi, Bassa and Yeskwa 
are predominantly Christians, while Alago, Igbirra, and Gwandara have a large Muslim 
                                                          
31
 See Ostien (2009) for a report on the Muslim Christian Relations in Africa. Especially the interview 
with Governor Jonah David Jang. 
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population along with Christian adherents.  In the FCT, the Gbagyi are in the main 
Christians, while the Gwandara and Igbirra are predominantly Muslims with a small 
Christian following. In Kaduna State, Bajju, Kaninkon, Ham and Atyab (Kataf) are 
predominantly Christians with a Gbagyi population that is both Muslim and Christian. 
In Taraba State, Jukun, Chamba, Kuteb and Tiv are mostly Christians with a small 
Muslim population. In Bauchi State, the Sayawa are mainly Christians with a small 
Muslim population. In Kwara state, most ethnic groups have both Christian and Muslim 
populations. In Kogi State, Igbirra and Igala have a Muslim and Christian population, 
while Okun and Bassa have a predominantly Christian population with a small number 
of Muslim adherents. In Adamawa State, Mbula, Byatiye (Bachama, Bata), Chamba 
and Higgi have a predominantly Christian population, while Kilba and Marghi have both 
Muslim and Christian populations (Gwamna, 2010: 21 & 22).  
In some areas of the Middle Belt it is common to have families within which are 
adherents of Christianity, Islam and the African Traditional Religion (ATR) and thus 
these three religions can be represented in one group or even community. Ali Mazrui’s 
(1980) observation of the religious scenario of the typical African milieu applies quite 
rightly in the Middle Belt case where many African families are multi-religious in 
composition without strain. One brother could be Muslim, another Roman Catholic, a 
sister Protestant and the father a practising member of the African Religion. Mazrui’s 
idea that Africa is a Triple Heritage means that Africa is a product of her traditional 
religions, Islam and Christianity. What became contemporary Africa is either a 
synthesis or the compromise among these three influences. Whether the synthesis is 
smooth or not is another question.  
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2.5 A History of Jos and Plateau State 
Plateau State derives its name from its geographical landscape, being a tableland 
dominated by lofty hills and mountains some 4,200 feet above sea level lying close to 
the geographical centre of the Northern Province of Nigeria. It is celebrated as the 
Home of Peace and Tourism, an image that has been dented in recent years by 
religious clashes. It has a population of around 3.5 million people and about 50 ethnic 
nationalities, spread across 17 Local Government Areas (Larab, 2008: 145) 32(See 
Map 3). Its capital is Jos which appears to be located at/near the centre of the country. 
Technically, its strategic location has made it a communication centre of the country. 
Regularly, highways connect it with most of the major cities of the North33 (Plotnicov, 
1967:28) and it is the twelfth largest state in Nigeria, with an area of 30,913km.  
Jos North and Jos South Local Government areas (indicated in Map 3) have over the 
years attracted settler, due to their strategic location as the administrative and 
commercial centers of the state. In addition, the weather is quite embrasing and 
supports agriculture during the rainy season and dry season gardening. Thus, the 
influx of buyers and sellers to these location have in some instances added to the 
dynamics of the conflictual environment. 
                                                          
32
 Refer to Appendix 1. It provides a comprehensive list of the 50 officially recognized ethnic nationalities 
in Plateau State.    
 
33
 The State also connects the far North to other parts of the country by road transport. For instance 
going to Sokoto from Nasarawa, Bauchi or Gombe, you have to drive through Jos. This might not be 
necessarily significant to our work, but it just shows how the state witnesses on a daily basis an influx 
of people on the move and that might also indicate how porous its borders are. 
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Map 3. Map of Plateau Showing the 17 Local Governments and Study Areas 
Source: Adopted from Uduma & Jimoh (2014). World Journal of Agricultural Research. 
2(1), 5-11. 
As mentioned above, the temperate climate in Jos makes it one of the coldest in 
Nigeria and therefore suitable for specialised agricultural (vegetables) production. Like 
other Middle Belt states, Plateau has often been referred to as belonging to ‘the food 
basket of the Nation,’ and it contributes significantly to the production of vegetables, 
fruits, roots, maize, millet and sorghum consumed in the country (Odey, 2008:179). 
Women have long played active roles in the cultivation of these food crops and sales. 
However, they very rarely own land themselves, and mainly only cultivate farmlands 
which belong to either their families, their husbands or which they rent from other men. 
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Its scenic beauty has contributed to Jos’ status as a minor tourist attraction within 
Nigeria. Plotnicov describes Jos as “one of the healthiest places in West Africa” 
(1967:30). Its bracing atmosphere also attracts residents within the country who 
normally find the weather elsewhere quite hot. It is common for youths on the 
compulsory National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) posted to Jos to prefer to remain 
there after their service year.34  
The city experienced an increase in population in the early 19th century when non-
Muslim ethnic groups fled to its hills to escape the ravages of the Fulani Jihad. To this 
present day, Jos has continued to be home to non-Muslim Northerners displaced by 
the ongoing Boko Haram massacre in the North-east and North-west regions of 
Nigeria. The indigenous ethnic groups in the state were never organised into a 
traditional state and were majorly animist. A large proportion of the indigenous ethnic 
groups are now Christians due to the presence and activities of missionaries. Today, 
church missions and foreign commercial firms maintain rest houses in and around Jos 
for their staff members on local leave, and before the increase in local violence in the 
late 1990. European expatriates stationed elsewhere in Nigeria would often visit Jos 
to spend a holiday. The West African headquarters of several missionary societies, 
including large American organisations, are located in Jos, and their staff form a 
considerable portion of the local European residents.  Jos is also an old mining town 
with huge deposits of tin, as well as columbite, kaoline, limestone, salt, precious stones 
and barites. Colonial miners established and commenced large-scale operations in 
                                                          
34The compulsory NYSC scheme was introduced in Nigeria in 1973 with a view to promote national unity 
through the encouragement and development of common ties among the youth.  My interaction with a 
young woman from the South West in 2012 in Jos reveals this fact. She said that as soon she arrived 
in Jos for her NYSC, she fell in love with the city. She said “I knew I will not be going back after the 
service year and I knew I will marry and settle here.” She has since married a man from Plateau.      
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1904, with mining camps around Naraguta, Bukuru Metropolis, Barkin Ladi and 
Bokkos. Historically, the area has experienced a lot of immigration particularly from 
Northern Nigeria- Shuwa Arabs, Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and its Northern neighbours, 
where communities are often threatened by desert drought and tsetse fly. As a result 
of such threats, many people migrated southwards to find grazing areas and also jobs 
in the tin mines (Shut, 2007: 93), including the herdsmen who find the savannah 
grassland, especially around Kurra Falls area attractive.35 Because of its favourable 
climate, its role as an administrative centre, and its mining activities, Jos attracted large 
numbers of migrants and their families during the colonial period.  Ploticov (1967:32) 
illustrates its attraction in the late colonial and early independence period: 
In 1951 the European community of Lagos was 4,200. Outside (Lagos) the largest 
European community is that of the Plateau province; here, in a climatic environment 
unique... [it] support[s] a total of 1,200 Europeans... Government census figures do 
not distinguish between temporary and permanent European residents, but from the 
large number of homes privately owned by Europeans in long continuous residence, 
it may be concluded that while the total European population of the Jos Plateau is 
second to Lagos, the Plateau has a larger number of permanent European 
residents. 
In addition to the ethnic diversity of the state (as already mentioned above), Plateau 
State is a proud example of religious plurality. Historically, Jos, the state capital, is 
home to the headquarters of major religious organisations from both Christian and 
                                                          
35
 Kurra Falls is located 77km Southeast of Jos. It is the state’s first hydroelectric power station. The 
area is surrounded by a vast expanse of green land. 
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Islamic constituencies (Best, 2010:5).36 In particular, it has been home to the 
headquarters of many of the Christian missions which dominated Nigeria in the colonial 
era. In recent times, newer Christian organisations have also preferred to locate their 
headquarters here (Best, 2008:8). The establishment of these organisations has also 
served to pull more people into the state, contributing to its population growth.  
The dominant presence of Christian mission agencies, educational institutions and its 
former peaceful status have helped Jos to assume the status of a missionary centre. 
It is the location of the national headquarters of major Christian agencies such as the 
Sudan Interior Mission (SIM), Evangelical Church of Winning All (ECWA), Sudan 
United Mission (SUM), Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN), Ekklesiyar Yan’uwa a 
Nigeria (EYN), and Tarayar Ekklesiya a Nigeria (TEKAN). It also hosts the national 
headquarters of the Fellowship of Christian Students (FCS), Nigerian Fellowship of 
Evangelical Students (NIFES) and Christian Corpers Fellowship of Nigeria and three 
theological seminaries including Jos ECWA Theological Seminary (JETS), and 
Theological College of Northern Nigeria (TCNN) (Gwamna, 2010: 32-33). And most 
recently the Nigerian Pentecostal and Charismatic Research Centre (NPCRC) were 
established in Jos, despite the 2010-2011 Jos crises.  
Furthermore, Jos is also home to a growing Islamic presence and activity. It hosts the 
National headquarters of the Jama’atu Izalatu Bidiah Ikamatu Sunna (JIBWIS), often 
                                                          
36
 Many religious groups therefore have different forms of emotional and mental affiliation to Jos, making 
any conflict there a phenomenon beyond Jos itself. Thus, it has acquired what it takes to be a boiling 
pot of ethnic and religious mayhem of late. However, the trouble in Jos has been aggravated by the 
migrant population and the nature of its political economy as well as the cultural and religious 
incompatibility; rather than by the problems generated by its many indigenous ethnic and religious 
groups who generally coexist in peace. 
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referred to as a radical Islamic evangelical organisation. JIBWIS comprises two 
opposing factions; JIBWIS A and JIBWIS B. 37 The former has its headquarters in Jos, 
while the latter has its headquarters in Kaduna. The Jama ‘atu Nasrill Islam (JNI), is 
the central coordinating body of all Islamic Organisations in Nigeria also has a strong 
presence in Jos. Other Islamic organisations present in Jos include the Satyan Ul 
Islam, the Kadirayya, the National Council of Muslim Youths and the Federation of 
Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN). Jos has therefore attracted 
attention to itself from diverse religious groups (Gwamna, 2010: 33; Best, 2008: 10). 
This partly explains the strong interest in the control of Jos by members of these faiths, 
in addition to the ethnic tensions there. 
Today, however, the ownership of Jos town is hotly contested among three main 
indigenous groups, the Berom, Naraguta and Afizare, whose traditional land meets on 
an unmarked borderline in Jos town and the descendants of Hausa-Fulani settlers who 
initially settled in Jos as traders and tin miners.38 While cooperation links between the 
indigenous groups and the Fulani settlers may exist at the local level, there is little 
evidence of any more general collaboration (Campbell & Harwood, 2013) due to the 
ownership contest. Today, these settlers refer to themselves as the Jasawa, a 
Hausanised term for a Jos man (Gwamna, 2010:31). These conflicts are best 
understood in the context of the history of Jos. 
                                                          
37
 This controversy between JIBWIS A & B faction has been partly resolved and a substantive chairman 
emerged from Kaduna. So by implication the national headquarters is now in Kaduna. 
 
38
 Plateau State founded at the dawn of the twentieth century (about 1902) as a tin mining city Nigeria 
became the sixth largest world producer with the greatest part of this output coming from the Jos-Plateau 
minefields. See Bingel, (1978) and Gwamna, (2010). 
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2.6 The Growth and Expansion of Economic Activities in Jos 
The commencement of tin mining in Jos attracted settlers from all over the country. In 
March 1902, Nicolaus, a European mining engineer, undertook a successful expedition 
of the Plateau for the colonial masters who were determined to investigate whether 
there was tin in Jos. By early 1904, Europeans established a permanent mining camp, 
using a set of military campaigns by the West African Frontier Force (Bingel, 1987)39 
to subdue the hostile local groups. By the middle of 1905 an administrative section was 
opened in Bukuru, on the road between Keffi and the tin mines in Naraguta, in order 
to quell the periodic uprisings of local groups which were opposed to the camp. Hausa 
and Yoruba contingents of the West African Frontier Force armed with Maxim guns 
were called in as warriors. However, Plateau natives continued firstly, to obstruct the 
routes along which processed tin was transported, and secondly, to harass the mining 
operations as a means of securing and defending their lands from the devastating 
effects of mining. 
The local policy of mineral exploitation followed the loss of Malaya to Japan by Great 
Britain in 1942 which deprived Great Britain of its most important source of tin at the 
time she most needed it and so she turned to Nigeria to compensate for the lost tin 
supplies. In the early 1940s, the colonial state recruited forced labour from Bauchi, 
Benue, Borno, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Plateau, Sokoto and Zaria provinces to work in 
the mines.40 
                                                          
39
 The West African Frontier Force consisted of native African Soldiers who were under the control of 
British Officers. Check Plotnicov, (1967). 
 
40 From 1944, the highest number of migrants came from Zaria, Sokoto, Bauchi, Benue, Borno with 19 
percent, 16.1 percent, 15.8 percent, 12.9 percent, 11.4 percent respectively, with Kano which came 
lowest with 2.1 percent out of the 92,703 workforce recruited between 1942-1944. Refer to Sha, (2005). 
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By the end of December 1942, 14,880 permanent employees and voluntary labourers 
from various regions adjacent to the Plateau province were absorbed in the 85 
European companies operating mines at different places on the Jos Plateau; Bukuru, 
Dilimi, Gurum,Warrang, Barkin Ladi, Ropp, Rayfield, Federe etc (Kudu, 2008:124). 
There is no readily available data on the gendered composition of the workers in these 
minefields, but scholars and historians have often referred to the mine labourers as 
men. While mining was not an exclusively male occupation, it is probable that most 
miners may have been men. Many of these men were either migrants from 
neighbouring communities or those who were forced to work in the tin mines by the 
colonial masters. Due to the heterogeneity of the surrounding communities, it is likely 
that the early miners were of different religious beliefs, including both Christians and 
Muslims.  
With the expansion of mining activities came the creation of markets and the expansion 
of various economic activities in Jos. This included the building of markets like the 
central market at Terminus, the building material market in Bukuru, and the Zaria road 
mechanics market among others (Sha, 2005: 40). The development of these markets 
illustrates the importance of more typically female economic activities. In the mining 
areas women and girls were sometimes involved in mining work but they mostly 
appeared around the minefields selling snacks and food items in little stalls or at the 
door to their compounds. Once markets were in place, women were able to further 
increase their options in terms of their economic activities and these local markets 
offered them a comparably safe and regulated environment to trade in. 
Ngo Mary Princewells was one of the women who participated in the colonial mining 
economy of Jos. Born in 1929 in a family of seven children in the Du District of Zawan, 
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she started work on the mining fields at the age of nine to support the family after their 
father’s death in 1935. She first scavenged for tin along river banks and at the foot of 
yam ridges where the tin was exposed when it rained.  She later abandoned her mining 
work to trade in foodstuffs and subsequently sold local beer, probably at Zawan and 
Kuwuri (now referred to Angwan Soya) (Nyam, 1999: 18-19). Thus, like many other 
women of her time, she took advantage of the expanding economic activities and the 
establishment of markets in Jos. 
The people that came to work in the tin mines later settled in Jos and its environs, and 
many descendants of these early settlers still live in Jos today.41 Gwamna (2010: 32) 
noted that traders, butchers, Quranic teachers and other artisans also followed the 
mining population and have remained in Jos since then. Other wider Plateau 
indigenous ethnic groups came into the city for either commerce or to join the tin mining 
industry. These include Plateau groups like the Ngas, Ron, Mpun and Mwaghavul 
(Best, 2007: 25). As mentioned earlier, it is not clear how many people migrated to the 
minefields in terms of gender, we can only assume that some men might have migrated 
with their wives, and that some young women might have migrated in search of a better 
life outside the village, as illustrated by the case of Ngo Mary Princewell above.42 In 
time, Jos became a commercial merchant capital. The United African Company (UAC), 
supported by the colonial state, was the first to engage in commercial activities such 
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 The tin fields in Jos attracted Nigerians from across the country who settled for tin mining activities 
and/or businesses. See Plotnicov, (1967). 
 
42
 It is unclear to me at this point in my write up as to whether any documented evidence of women 
coming to Jos with their husbands or wives coming on their own or in both cases with the children. But 
few cases do exist of men who came as a family and others who came and married women from Jos. 
And the case of Mr PrinceWell and Ngo Mary might well be an example of men who came to Jos in 
search of jobs and also married in Jos. 
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as the selling of food items and installed its outlet in Jos and its environs alongside 
other European commercial companies including Paterson Zochonics (PZ), CFAO and 
Mandillas (in the minefields). As commercial activities expanded, Jos became the 
commercial centre serving as a market for areas like Bauchi and other neighbouring 
(Sha, 2005: 40 & 41). Plotnicov (1967: 52) noted that once these industries had settled 
in Jos, informal economic activities grew to service this indigenous and migrant labour 
population; for example, women started selling tinned food, cigarettes, gari (cassava 
flour), soap, cosmetics and similar items from small stalls and near the entrances to 
house compounds.  
The expansion of Jos also attracted Fulani herdsmen who came to sell cattle to service 
the growing population by providing meat in the markets, and most noticing that the 
climate and grazing were good for their cattle, decided to settle around Jos and its 
neighbouring villages. Better grazing meant that the cattle produced more milk which 
meant that the Fulani women, who mostly sell Fura da Nono (corn balls and yogurt), 
found it easier to make more money.  
The decline in the tin industry in the 1960s and 1970s meant that the labour force 
engaged in the mines had to retrench. The informal sector accommodated this labour 
force which consisted mainly of the ‘migrant’ population. Former miners engaged in all 
sorts of small-scale production and commercial ventures as a means of meeting the 
livelihood challenges within Jos and its environs (Sha, 2005:38-39). Many of them 
became dry season farmers, petty traders, taxi and bus drivers, sales commission 
agents, retailers and pool agents, while women lost out immediately in the service to 
the minefields population and had to search for other ways to establish a livelihood. In 
effect, even after the collapse of tin mining, most artisans and traders remained in Jos 
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and made it their permanent home. The implication of this for women was that they 
lost out in the little business ventures they had started while at the same time facing 
an expansion of the informal economy. All the same, many of them were unwilling to 
go back to the rural areas, and thus had to find a way of being absorbed into the new 
urban economy. 
Since the days of tin mining in Jos, the growth of Jos city has been phenomenal. The 
creation of Benue Plateau State in 1967 with Jos as the headquarters led to an influx 
of civil servants and other businessmen. Due to the Federal Character Principle, which 
guarantees an equitable distribution of Federal resources between the Nigerian states, 
Jos and Plateau State have also attracted other national institutions such as the 
prestigious National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in Kuru (NIPSS) as well 
as the National Roots Crops Research Institute (NRCRI), the National Institute of 
Veterinary Research (NVRI) and the Headquarters of the National Industrial Training 
Fund (ITF), and the University of Jos among others. It has become clear that women 
who were displaced from the tin mine economy had an opportunity to get lower cadre 
jobs (cleaning, cooking) in these institutions and were also able to start other 
businesses on the premises of these institutions. These organisations have attracted 
employees and workers from beyond the boundaries of Plateau State, thus 
contributing further to immigration and the local diversity of ethnic groups associated 
with various businesses. Businesses and interactions went on smoothly until recently, 
and, perhaps due to the conflicts, workers in these institutions now sometimes collect 
statistics of their employees based on religion and ethnicity as a means of monitoring 
other and their groups’ progress as mentioned earlier.  
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Even after the decline of mining and the rise of other sectors, Jos’ tin mining history 
has continued to shape the livelihoods of its population because the mining has had a 
devastating effect on the land. For example, this meant that women who were engaged 
in vegetable farming could no longer do so. While women traditionally do not own land 
or inherit it within their natal families, they are regarded as good workers on their family 
and husband’s farm. Thus, if a man’s farmland is devastated, his wife’s source of 
livelihood is likewise destroyed.  
Furthermore, the former miners were not ready to go back to the village to farm after 
experiencing the relative comfort of the city and they found work in a variety of 
businesses such as; yan-dako (load carriers), yan-paskare (wood splitters), yan-
kwalabe (bottle sellers), and the yan-bidabidi (Road construction labourers) (Kudu, 
2008:130). An immediate view of these categories of workers suggests that these 
businesses are gendered as the writer did not come across any females working in 
dako, kwalabe, bidabidi or even paskare. Women who split wood (paskare) do this only 
at the domestic level for home use or, sometimes, at the retail level to supply to other 
women in the neighbourhood. The foregoing shows that some level of religious 
tolerance must have existed between the migrant and indigenous populations 
(Christians, Muslims and Pagans) who interacted and intermarried. Examples of such 
a marriage are those of Mrs Muktar43 which I discussed in chapter four and that of Ngo 
Mary PrinceWell for whom religion and ethnicity were not an obstacle. Similarly, I have 
also not come across any records indicating that buying and selling in the mining 
camps, markets and elsewhere was based on religious or ethnic associations. Women 
                                                          
43
 Mrs Matyen Muktar worked with the Plateau state government and was retired prematurely probably 
as a result of the ethnic and religious conflict. She is married to a non-indigene.  
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who intermarried during the mining period might have enjoyed a peaceful relationship 
with their spouses until the recent escalation of ethnic and religious conflicts. With the 
defined settlement pattern based on religion and sometimes ethnicity, tension and 
suspicion started to pervade professional and political relationships. And this has 
significant consequences for market relationships as well as other networks, as shall 
be examined later. 
 
2.7 Patterns of Conflict in Contemporary Jos and the Middle Belt 
The diversity of Jos notwithstanding, Plateau state does not have a long history of 
conflict. While the rest of Nigeria was affected by violent conflict in the 1980s and early 
1990s,44 Plateau state remained peaceful, calm and reassuring to other Nigerians 
looking for a safe haven from the insecurity that was associated with many of the far 
Northern States. By then, however, the cosmopolitan nature of Jos, coupled with its 
large concentration of different ethnic and religious groups meant that Jos became 
increasingly central to the struggle by various ethnic and religious groups for access 
and control over scarce economic resources. It is very likely that Government 
interference in the local political economy increased the propensity towards violence. 
The conflict in Plateau state is economic and ethnic with a religious dimension as 
residents accuse local and state government personalities of fanning identity-based 
divisions to advance their own political agendas (Campbell & Harwood, 2013). The 
                                                          
44
 Nigeria has experienced ethnic conflict since its creation, and the civil war was an important aspect 
of this, but as Falola argues, religious tensions have increased in Nigeria since the 1970s and 1980s. 
And now most of these violence has taken place in the Middle Belt. Refer to Falola’s (1998) work on 
Violence in Nigeria. Collis (1970) also has a similar opinion in his write up on Nigeria. 
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episodic conflict in the state dates back to 1945 with the economic and trade rivalry 
between the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba (See Plotnicov, 1971), and the anti-Igbo violence 
around the tin mines in 1966. An example of the conflict in the mid 1990s is the Jos 
riot of April 1994 resulting from the naming of a Hausa-Fulani candidate as caretaker 
committee chairman of Jos North Local Government Authority and the subsequent 
rejection of that appointment by the indigenous groups of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom. 
Since the mid-1990s, local struggles for material resources have often bred conflict. In 
most cases, this is between indigenous Christian groups and Hausa-speaking Muslim 
immigrants. This rivalry has intensified since the 2001 September riot45 and there has 
since been a series of conflicts from 1994 to date. The table below shows some 
selected cases of conflicts in the Jos and other parts of the Middle Belt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45
 The September 2001 violence was as a result of the appointment of another settler, Mukhtar Usman 
Mohammed, by the civilian government of President Olusegun Obasanjo, on 20 June of that year, to 
the office of National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) coordinator and as chairman of the 
Local Government Monitoring Committee (LGMC) for the council. 
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Table 1: Selected Cases of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in the Middle Belt 
 
Date Location Nature of Conflict and Principal Actors 
1 5 April 
1994 
Jos, Plateau Indigenes staged a protest over the appointment of Aminu Mato a 
Hausa-Fulani as the Chairman of Jos North. Violence erupted few days 
later when the Jasawa youths took to the street. 
2 28 
February 
2000 
Kaduna, Kaduna Kaduna city exploded in violence as Muslim and Christian extremists 
and other hoodlums clashed over the proposal to re-introduce Sharia. 
3 14 April 
2000 
Agyragu, 
Nasarawa 
Communal clash that started with a protest against the location of Local 
Government Council Headquarters. The militant youth group started the 
riot and later took to the streets killing and destroying. 
4 7 
September 
2001 
Jos, Plateau A violent ethno-religious crisis between the Muslim/Hausa-Fulani and 
Christian/indigenes. The subject of discord between the Jasawa 
Development Association and Plateau Youth Council was over political 
appointment in Jos North LGC. 
5 2 
November 
2001 
Gwantu, Kaduna A clash that started on a political ground (over the relocation of LGC 
Headquarters) later took on ethno-religious dimension. Several places 
of worship were destroyed. 
6 30 
December 
2001 
Barikin Ladi, 
Plateau 
A violent communal conflict in Vwang district between the indigenes and 
non-indigenes exploded at the backdrop of the September 7, 2001 Jos 
crisis. It started when an illegal group of 40 men attacked the District 
Head of Vwang. It also had religious colouring. 
7 6 June 
2002 
Yelwa-Shendam, 
Plateau 
A religious/ethnic fracas between the native people (predominantly 
Christians) and Hausa settlers (predominantly Muslims). This violence 
extended to about 14 LGCs in Southern Plateau. 
8 March 
2003 
Langtang North, 
Wase and 
Kanam LGC of 
Plateau 
Fresh ethno-religious conflicts in the three neighbouring LGCs which is 
an extension of the crisis in southern Plateau. 
9 1 May 2004 Yelwan 
Shendam, 
Plateau 
A fresh ethno-religious mayhem that claimed over 650 lives and over 
250 women abducted by suspected Taroh militia. 
10 3 May  
2005 
Buruku/Katsina-
Ala, Benue 
A violent clash between Kursur and Ikyurav communities over 
ownership of piece of land. Several houses and farms were destroyed, 
and several women were abducted. 
11 28 
November  
2008 
Jos, Plateau Ethno-religious clash between largely Hausa/Fulani-Muslims and 
Indigenous groups-Christians following a local government election. The 
Hausa/Fulanis are considered ‘settlers’ by other indigenous groups as 
both groups struggle for political space and control of the Jos-North 
LGA. Over 500 lives were lost in the conflict. 
12 7 April 
2009 
Guma, Benue Violent communal clash between Mbagen and Mzoron communities in 
Guma LGA over ownership of disputed farmlands. Eight people were 
reported killed while several houses and farmlands were destroyed. 
13 19 
December 
2009. 
Nasarawa, 
Nasarawa 
A violent farmers/herdsmen clash in Uden Gida village over allegation 
of destruction of rice farm by cattle. Conflict was reported to have started 
on December 6, 2009 when farmer protested against destruction of his 
rice and got killed in the process. Over 30 people lost their lives in the 
latest orgy of violence. 
14 26 January 
2011 
Jos, Plateau 
State. 
Hundreds of aggrieved women staged a public protest against the 
continued presence of soldiers at the central abattoir, alleging that the 
soldiers were aiding and abetting attacks on the people of the state 
15 11 June 
2013 
Rukubi village, 
Doma Local 
Government 
Area of 
Nasarawa State. 
No fewer than 50 people were killed in renewed clashes between 
Tiv/Agatu famers and Fulani herdsmen. 
Source: Institute of Governance and Social Research (IGSR) (2011). Updated  
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Table 1 above indicates that conflicts in Jos and the Middle Belt is recurring. These 
conflicts have been labelled ethnic and religious because they involved the Hausa-
Fulani who are mainly Muslims and the Berom and other ethnic groups who are mostly 
Christians. However Campbell & Harwood (2013) noted that rivalries between ethnic 
groups, settlers and indigenes, herders and farmers, and religious groups overlap. This 
is so because in many cases religious identity and ethnicity coincided with or 
contradicted each other, depending on the context (Best, 2008: 9). As Kastfelt (1994) 
suggests, the ethnic groups have often used religion as a mobilising force and even 
manipulated it to suit their political projects (see also Sha, 2004: 2),46 and the case in 
Jos and the Middle Belt is no exception. 
 
2.7.1 Immediate and Remote Causes of the Conflict in Jos 
Other causes of conflict in Jos include the struggle over the traditional rulership of Jos, 
struggle over political office, the indigene versus settler dichotomy, the culture of 
belittling, religious intolerance and the struggle over access to pastoral and arable land.  
For example, the arrival of the Muslim Fulani herdsmen in Plateau, mentioned earlier, 
brought them into direct land-use competition with the Christian Berom47 (Campbell 
&Harwood, 2013), which created long lasting tension. Similarly, Shut (2007) notes that 
the politics of participation in government has also bred what is referred to as the 
                                                          
46 Any description of contemporary manipulation of religion and politics for personal gain will benefit 
from Kastfelt’s (1994) work on Religion and Politics in Nigeria. 
47
 The Governor of Plateau state is Berom. Berom is presumably the largest ethnic group in Jos. 
Governor Jonah David Jang has since assumption of office been accused of favouritism in the 
appointment and issuance of government contracts. This attitude is said to have contributed to fanning 
the conflict. 
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indigene versus settler syndrome in Jos. Political offices are hotly contested amongst 
indigenes who are often resistant to non-indigenes (settlers) taking part in the process 
as noted earlier. Such contest and rivalry between the ethnic and religious groups in 
Jos and the Middle Belt triggers intolerance for inter-faith marriage. 
 
2.7.2 Inter-faith Marriage and the Conflict in Jos 
A social dimension of the conflict, particularly when it comes to marriage, is that 
although indigenes and settlers inter-married, a majority of the ethnic groups did not 
approve of marriage between their women and the Fulani.  For example, there were 
instances of this disapproval in Tiv land that led to couples having to separate (Okpu, 
1977:23). Likewise, the Muslim Hausa community is intolerant of their daughters 
marrying Christians, demonstrating an unwillingness to fully integrate into the Jos 
Plateau society, and creating resentment which we will deal with in more detail in 
subsequent chapters.  
 
2.7.3 Culture of Belittling and the Conflict in Jos 
Christians refer to Muslim men’s disapproval of their women marrying Christian men 
as raini (Hausa- culture of belittling) and also an exhibition of total disregard for their 
own religion and traditional community (Danfulani, 2006: 4). This attitude not only 
reflects the ongoing political conflict, it also illustrates the subordinate role of women 
in local ethnic and religious relations, as both ‘indigenous’ Christian and ‘migrant’ 
Muslim leaders are concerned about maintaining control over their daughters.  At the 
same time, the fact that emotions over marriage practices run so deep illustrates the 
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centrality of women to local understandings of conflict and violence not only in Jos and 
the Middle Belt but elsewhere.  
 
2.7.4 Religious Intolerance and the Conflict in Jos 
Due to the religious plurality of Jos and its function as a state capital, conflict can 
escalate quickly and then extend to other regions of the state because the indigenes 
and migrants residing outside it are sentimentally attached to, and thus affected by, 
the issues in Jos, their capital, and both Muslims and Christians regard Jos as their 
religious headquarters. That is to say, the Plateau’s indigenous groups in local 
governments outside Jos hold strong opinions about a Jos conflict in the same way 
that the Hausa-Fulani diaspora populations do, and by extension Muslim populations 
in the diaspora are sentimentally attached to what happens to the Muslim Ummah in 
Jos city and its environs (Best, 2008:10). 
This strong attachment creates a virtual shared community based on a shared cultural 
(and in this case also religious) engagement (Anderson, 1991). While Anderson 
highlights the importance of language and written culture for the creation of nations, in 
Jos members of the same ethnic group often create a sense of belonging to a larger 
unit through a strong associational life and shared communication through ethnically-
based telephone and internet networks centring on local politics, land use and other 
issues.48 In fact, Nigerian Muslims and Christians everywhere, but especially in Jos, 
                                                          
48
 For instance, various blogs have been created to discuss issues relating to the conflicts such as land, 
political appointments and other corrupt practices. The Middle Belt discussion forum is one I am aware 
of. The University of Jos Alumni also has a blog on yahoo, where issues relating to the stability of the 
institution in a conflict environment are always discussed. 
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already live with a strong sense of shared community as part of the practices and texts 
associated with their faith.49 This investment in a virtual community is linked to the 
belief that an injury to one is an injury to all, notwithstanding distance or actual contact, 
and this sense of brotherhood might explain the escalation of conflicts and religious 
intolerance in Jos and other parts of the country.  
 
2.8 The Impact of the Conflict on Women 
Campbell & Harwood (2013) note that most victims in the Jos conflicts are 
predominantly women, children and the elderly who cannot, unlike men, physically run 
away from any fighting.  Further, women experience great fear, stress and trauma, and 
also often become refugees or are internally displaced (WANEP, 2009: 13). This 
trauma arises from the loss of loved ones, displacement, caring for injured family 
members, sexual abuse and rape. Thus, because of their greater social and economic 
dependence on marriage and family networks, and because of their sexual, emotional 
and physical vulnerability, among other reasons, women suffer more than men in times 
of conflict. For instance, the official ratio of male to female Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) in the Gamai-Kofyar/Pan conflict in Namu, south of Jos in Plateau State, 
indicate that out of a total of 1,719 IDPs at the 333 Artillery Barracks in Shendam, 1,303 
are women (Best, 2007: 229). My interaction with some of the IDPs within Jos and its 
environment suggests that women constitute a high proportion of individuals who are 
                                                          
49
 Refer to Kukah (1993). Kukah pointed out that such imaginings as the Northernisation agenda is a 
guise to gain access to leadership where leaders make unguided utterances and expect support from 
people of the same faith as theirs. 
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unable to rebuild their lives in post-conflict without help. Further, Dinshak (2008: 107) 
recollected that Chindo Madaki told him in an interview that:  
Our women suffered greatly because they left all their belongings behind. Many 
of the women that were pregnant suffered spontaneous abortion. There were 
also cases of ill health because of poor living conditions and many of them had 
diarrhoea. 
That is just one case out of so many other cases of the plight of women in the Jos and 
Plateau conflicts. Scholars (Best, 2004, 2007, 2008; Gwamna, 2010) and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as the League for Human Rights (LHR), 
the Justice Development Peace and Caritas (JDPC) and the Institute for Governance 
and Social Research (IGSR) in Jos have documented evidence of the impact of conflict 
on women and noted that very little has been done to lessen this impact. This research 
is therefore going to look at how conflict is linked to women’s everyday activities and 
how it is also linked to their typical trades and professions, by examining how the 
historical and cultural processes associated with the conflicts in Jos impacts on the 
ability of women to participate in public and political life. 
 
2.9 Conclusion and Reflection 
Nigeria after independence was focused on creating more political units instead of 
building strong inclusive institutions. This approach affects the identity and 
consciousness of the people who later began to align along ethnicity and religion. In 
communities like Jos and other parts of the Middle Belt the high concentration of ethnic 
minority groups and the struggle over control of resources at the local and State levels 
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has created rivalry based on the differences between ethnic groups. Settlers and 
indigenes, herders and farmers, and members of different religious groups are in 
constant competition with one another to gain control. This competition in many cases 
depends on religious identity and ethnicity coinciding with or contradicting each other, 
depending on the context. Similarly, ethno-religious conflict and the tensions 
associated with such conflicts have proved to be sufficiently long-lasting, as to raise 
questions about whether the present ‘emergency’ or ‘conflict’ situation runs the risk of 
becoming the new ‘norm’. This does have implication for our understanding of what 
might be described as ‘politics as usual’ and ‘conflict politics,’ as the distinction 
between the two is becoming increasingly blurred in practice.  
When the democratic era started in 1999, democracy came to be seen as an avenue 
for the dominant political groups to legitimize exploitation and enrich themselves using 
ethnic and religious cleavages, and, as noted, the lives of many women in Nigeria are 
limited by conflict and male dominance within the political system. Thus, as male 
politicians use ethnicity and religion to capture and control resources against outside 
groups, competition within the group is restricted by the exclusion of women. Thus 
women’s lives are also limited by the essentialisation of group differences and growing 
mistrust. This growing exclusion of women from different aspects of social life 
unfortunately affects the ways in which they can be mobilised to participate in research 
like this. The next chapter presents the methodology used to collect data and highlights 
the various ways in which the research methodology had to be adapted in order to take 
account of women’s particular difficulties.  
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     CHAPTER THREE 
  METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION FOR THIS RESEARCH 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an explanation of the various ways in which data for this research 
was collected and analysed. It also explains the methods used in sampling and the 
sampling technique. In addition, it presents some of the experiences in my field notes 
in order to offer an insight into the actual processes of data collection. An open 
discussion of the challenges faced during the collection of data enables the reader to 
better understand the environment in which the research was carried out, which in turn 
had an impact on the quality of the data. This chapter also includes some of the 
challenges faced in terms of research ethics, even where formal consent was given.  
Coming from the Middle Belt myself, I thought conducting research in this area would 
be easy. One reason for this confidence was that, because of my involvement in the 
activities of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) at the onset of the conflict in 
Jos, many respondents knew me by sight; however, those I knew best were not 
necessarily those who were most at ease with me in this new context (Clark, 2010: 
15).50  The IGSR organises seminars on peace and reconciliation.  It also researches 
into the causes of the conflicts and provides recommendations on ways to prevent the 
                                                          
50
 Through my involvement in a series of peace building workshops, seminars, community dialogue and 
negotiations as a volunteer with the Institute for Governance and Social Research (IGSR) from mid-
2006,  I came in contact with a few of my prospective respondents during my activities with IGSR. I re-
established connections with them during my pilot study and during my field work in 2012, they served 
as my link to other respondents. I have also in the process of working with IGSR come in contact with 
other NGOs like the Justice Development Peace and Caritas (JDPC) who also provided useful links to 
respondents.  
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recurrence of violence. With headquarters in Jos, its activities cut across the various 
States of the Middle Belt, including Plateau, Bauchi, Benue, Nasarawa and Kaduna 
States.  
I got involved in the IGSR’s activities, particularly those centred on the conflicts in Jos, 
making me a participant observer. In 2010 and partly 2011, I worked as a member of 
the team established by the IGSR called the Women for Peace Initiative (WPI), which 
engaged women within Jos to talk about the conflict and to be active participants in the 
peace and reconciliation process. Through this work I gained a lot of experience on 
which I draw for my doctoral programme. My ability to communicate fluently in Hausa, 
Irigwe, Mwaghavul and Mupun enabled me to reach a wide range of women as I was 
able to connect with them through speaking their own language. In particular, I often 
used their language for salutations before interviews were conducted, and this opened 
up the conversation space and I did not have to depend on interpreters.  
On the basis of this experience I developed an interest in pursuing doctoral research 
to gain deeper understanding on the impact of conflict on gender relations beyond the 
loss of life and property often adopted by NGOs. With the support of my then Head of 
Department at the University of Jos where I work, I developed a research proposal that 
focused on obtaining a more in-depth understanding of how conflict affects the lives of 
women and men. With this proposal I was accepted at the University of Birmingham. 
After a period of reading relevant literature and of adapting my plans to meet the 
expectations of a doctoral programme, I returned to Jos for fieldwork.  
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As noted above, my prior access to prospective respondents did not make my 
academic field work easier. I found interviewing and recording the personal 
experiences of women for the purposes of research a herculean task. One of the 
reasons for this was that the record and consent forms introduced for research 
purposes changed the ideas of my respondents about the nature of our interactions. 
Although in the past we had interacted easily and informally through NGOs, my 
research sometimes created its own anxieties among prospective respondents. Whilst 
this was not surprising given the sensitive political situation in many parts of Jos and 
the Middle Belt, this made things harder for me in a range of ways discussed in more 
detail below.  
3.2 Geographical Area Covered in the Research 
The research was conducted primarily in Jos, but some of the field work and interviews 
were also carried out in Nasarawa, Kaduna and Benue States for the purpose of 
comparison. These States have experienced conflicts similar to those that have 
shaken Jos, so this enables me to make some broader points about women and 
conflict in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. A comparison of what has taken place in these 
states also informs my views on likely developments in Jos in the future. “Comparison 
across several cases enables the researcher to assess whether a particular political 
phenomenon is simply a local issue or …a previously unobserved general trend” 
(Hopkin, 2002: 249) For example, the conflicts in Kaduna State predate the Jos conflict. 
This state is now divided into Kaduna North and South,51 with Muslims primarily located 
                                                          
51
 The Northern part of Kaduna is occupied by a majority Muslim population, while the Southern part is 
occupied by a majority Christian population.  
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in the North and Christians in the South. The fast growth of segregated residential 
patterns is also a trend that shapes present-day Jos.  
Comparative research therefore has enabled me to consider the shared aspects of 
conflicts in the Middle Belt States and also the similarities and dissimilarities in 
practices day to day interaction. The comparative approach also highlights 
dissimilarities which have arisen as a result of the particular impact of conflict on 
different settlements and locally existing forms of social relations. Despite the long 
established relationships (through trade, marriage, and communal living) that exist 
between the Hausa-Fulani and the numerous other ethnic groups in Nigeria, the 
identity of these groups have over the years remained as important to them as the 
ownership of the land which they occupy. The exact ways in which groups react to, 
and interact with, each other is linked to a range of issues usually including their culture 
and tradition, control of land and other resources, and may therefore differ from place 
to place. 
 
3.2.1 Identity Issues Within the Geographical Area Covered 
The importance of group identities is also reflected in people’s private lives where it 
can undermine or challenge gendered notions of marital control. For instance, even 
though husbands are considered to have control over their wives and children, a Fulani 
woman who marries a Berom man does not automatically become Berom and nor does 
she cease completely to be Fulani. Instead she acquires an added identity by marriage 
and in some instances maintains a stronger affinity to her natal home than to the 
matrimonial home. Depending on the situation, and despite the widespread sense that 
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children belong to the father, she might even pass her own identity on to her children 
who might grow up feeling more Fulani than Berom. As a result of such local practices, 
her experience, and that of her children, may be slightly different from that of other 
groups and marriages. Here the argument is that the particular social and historical 
links between the groups residing in Jos also shape the forms of conflict between them.  
It is important to point out that my identity as a member of one of the Jos smaller 
indigenous groups prevented me from taking on the position of a neutral observer, but 
I have been able to distance myself from the data gathered, by ensuring that interviews 
were reported exactly and unclear statements verified. This was achieved through 
follow-up visits and phone calls aimed at asking the “informant for their reaction to the 
interpretation of the interview transcript” (Devine, 2002: 207). Following official 
designation, many Nigerians may describe my research as focusing on the North 
Central and North Eastern zones of Nigeria. However, I choose to refer to these parts 
of the country as the Middle Belt because this term encompasses, in my 
understanding, the political landscape shaped by the encounters between the Muslim 
speakers of Hausa and Fulani and the often Christian, or non-Muslim, and speakers 
of other languages in Northern Nigeria. These encounters in turn are shaped by the 
historical experience of the Sokoto Caliphate and Indirect Rule, and the colonial and 
early postcolonial structure of the Northern Region.  
Inhabited mainly by groups that produce political, religious and ethnic counter-identities 
to Northern Nigeria’s dominant Hausa groups, the Middle Belt symbolizes a particular 
kind of struggle, identity and self-assertion. In fact, the struggle for an independent 
Middle Belt Region is in itself a part of the conflicts within the region. The Middle Belt 
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according to Mailafia (2012: 3)52 “is ultimately a state of mind – a way of life and a way 
of being. Like the British constitution, it is deeply enshrined in the hearts and minds of 
the peoples of the Middle Belt”. While my own position does not prevent me from 
understanding alternative visions for Jos and similar localities, readers unfamiliar with 
Northern Nigeria’s political geography should note that it is often impossible to find 
neutral words to bridge the gulf that divides different local ways of being.  
 
3.3 Rationale for the Selection of Location and Respondents 
Of the several states that make up the Middle Belt Region, I decided to restrict my 
research to Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Plateau States. This is partly because they 
once shared an administration within the old Benue-Plateau State. Benue-Plateau 
State was created in 1967 from parts of the Northern Region with its capital at Jos and 
existed until 1976 when it was divided into two states: Benue and Plateau. Nasarawa 
State remained part of Plateau State until 1996 when it was created as a separate 
state. As a result these states share a degree of common history in addition to their 
experience of ethnic and religious conflict. In contrast, Kaduna State provides an 
insight into similar conflicts within a separate setting as it relates to the “oppressive 
feature of the emirate system, particularly the headship of Fulani ruling families over 
predominantly non-Fulani districts” (Suberu, 1999: 50), which is the opposite of the 
case in Jos.  
 
                                                          
52
 For more understanding of the Middle Belt conflict, see Mailafia, (2012).  
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3.3.1 Plateau State 
Plateau State is “well known for the ethnic and religious clashes that have taken place 
here since the inception of civilian rule in 1999, and particularly from 2001” (Higazi, 
2011: 15). As the location of competing ethnic and religious groups, as well as an 
established administrative centre and a regional centre of trade, Plateau State, and 
especially its capital, Jos, is the central focus for this thesis in order to attempt to 
understand the impact of conflict on the everyday lives of women and because it offers 
a good case study of the impact of group-based competition on women’s experiences 
in marriage, trade, politics and the public sector. Events in Plateau State will be 
compared and contrasted with recent conflicts in Benue, Kaduna and Nasarawa where 
relevant. 
 
3.3.2 Nasarawa State  
Ethnic and religious competition has permeated Nasarawa State since its creation. In 
1996, General Abacha, the then head of state, allegedly situated the headquarters of 
the state in Lafia to empower and favour the Kanuri emir (his kin) of the town. This 
decision was said to have gone against the earlier agreed siting of the headquarters in 
Akwanga, a town with a strong Christian presence. Subsequently, ethnicity and religion 
continued to remain relevant in the political landscape in Nasarawa. Recent clashes 
between ethnic and religious communities in the state have impacted on the everyday 
marital, political, trade and professional lives of women in the state in similar ways to 
Jos and Plateau State.  
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3.3.3 Benue State 
Benue State has recently witnessed ethnic and religious conflicts similar to those in 
Jos though differing in terms of severity and occurrence. There has been a series of 
clashes between the predominantly Christian host communities and the mainly Muslim 
Fulani herdsmen in Gwer, Shaga, Tse Kyuel, Tse Ayeri, and Zaan villages amongst 
others. A large fire that burnt down major stores in the Markurdi Modern Market in 2011 
and another fire at the residence of the governor in 2012, both credited to the actions 
of political opponents and ethno-religious malcontents who feel marginalised out of 
government.  
 
 3.3.4 Kaduna State 
In addition to the states that were formerly part of Plateau-Benue State, Kaduna State 
was chosen because its population is now split almost equally between Christians and 
Muslims residing in the South and North respectively and increasingly separated 
religiously and socially.53 Ethnic and religious conflicts in Kaduna predate the conflicts 
in Jos, and trends in Kaduna offer the possibility of comparing the impact of ethnic and 
religious conflict on women’s everyday life experiences across different local political 
economies in northern Nigeria. 
                                                          
53
  Segregated settlement is becoming the norm in areas affected by conflict in Jos, Nasarawa and 
Benue State. In Jos, Bauchi road is exclusively a Muslim settlement, while Angwan Rukuba an 
exclusively Christian settlement. This implies that schools even though government, only serves one 
particular religious group, and by implication narrowing social integration.  
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 3.4 Research Respondents 
Respondents for this research were selected from four main categories; inter-faith 
marriage, markets, politicians and those in the teaching profession. The focus is to 
explore and analyse the impact of ethno-religious conflict on women within these areas 
to enable us to have a broader understanding of the implication of conflict on their daily 
lives and on gender relations. 
 
3.4.1 Inter-faith Marriage Respondents. 
Both Christians and Muslims women who intermarried were interviewed in this 
category. I also interviewed women who intra-married because in-group ethnic and 
religious differences do exist. Denominational and sect rivalry puts a lot of pressure on 
women whose lives are often objects of control and domination. To discuss inter-faith 
marriage, I identified respondents through NGOs and especially the JPDC. From their 
original contacts I was able to snowball and get to other women in this category.  
 
3.4.2 Market Respondents 
All the FGDs that I conducted constituted a combination of market leaders and a few 
sellers. In the markets I interviewed market leaders or anyone holding a position of 
leadership, either male or female.  Each group of items (food stuff) sold in the market 
has an existing leadership structure which I utilised for this study, because, it would be 
quite difficult to study the entire markets and each item. Because of the large number 
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of women in the various trades in the markets I concentrated on the foodstuff and 
vegetable sellers. 
 
3.4.3 Political Respondents 
With regard to attitudes towards women politicians, I interviewed both the male and 
female leadership of a party. For the other category of female politicians, respondents 
either hold elective positions or once held representative positions. Identifying these 
women was not necessarily an easy task but it enabled me to understand the different 
nature of the challenges faced by women in each of these roles. Securing 
appointments with the female politicians often relied on the help of my senior 
colleagues at the University of Jos who linked me up to a few University colleagues 
currently on political appointments, from whom I snowballed on to others.  
 
3.4.4 Professional Respondents 
For the professional group, setting up interviews was more or less straightforward. All 
I needed to do in order to speak to teachers and lecturers was to arrive a few minutes 
before the end of their lectures and teaching appointments and wait for them. I chose 
a few primary and secondary schools and one tertiary institution for my research. I 
interviewed both Muslim and Christian teachers and lecturers to give me a view of how 
the conflict has affected professional relations, daily office life and possibly productivity. 
 
3.5 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
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Demographic characteristics of respondents were compiled after the interview but did 
not form the basis for the identification of respondents during the field work with the 
exception of the stipulation that respondents must be 18 years and above. However, 
the location of respondents in this research and their source of livelihood are of central 
importance because it forms part of the central thesis of this work. Issues relating to 
age, marital status, number of children, educational qualification and social and 
economic status were compiled to present a greater picture of how such variables 
might be related to responses. 
 
3.6 Data Collection Methods 
This thesis used face-to-face interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and 
personal observation. The approach “explores attitudes, behaviour and experiences 
through such methods as interviews or focus groups. It attempts to get an in-depth 
opinion from participants” (Dawson, 2006: 14). Secondary sources were also used, 
which included books, internet sources, journals, newspapers, conference reports and 
Governments reports. These methods are discussed in detail below. 
 
3.6.1 Secondary Materials: One of the methods used for this doctoral study included 
accessing secondary literature from the university libraries in Birmingham and Jos and 
locally printed material and internet-based resources. The research also consulted 
various publications of the commissions of inquiry, newspapers and government 
publications. These sources complement each other very well because some of the 
conflicts occurred several years and decades ago and thus the interviews collaborate 
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some of the evidence they provide. Part of the data collection process also involved 
reading and reviewing documents and websites on colonialism and Northern Nigeria 
and the conflicts in Nigeria’s Middle Belt.  
The Middle Belt Dialogue Group (MBDG), is an online blog which I enlisted provided 
useful insights into the nature of discussions centred on the conflicts. The University of 
Jos also has an online group where members interact and comment freely on the 
issues affecting Jos with discussions of the conflict always taking centre stage.  
NGO publications provide a broad range of perspectives. This is because they include 
narratives of individuals involved in the conflict which have sometimes just been 
transcribed and published without editing. They thus provide direct information about 
victims and, in some instances, perpetrators of these conflicts. While carefully ensuring 
that such individuals could not be identified in this thesis, I used such materials from 
IGSR, CEPAN and JDPC, all located in Jos. I also consulted literature from the 
Theological College of Northern Nigeria (TCNN), especially the TCNN Research 
Bulletins. Other materials consulted include reports of Conferences and Judiciary 
Commissions of Enquiry set up by both the Federal and State Government to look into 
some of the civil disturbances in Kaduna and Jos in Kaduna and Plateau States and 
reports of the various ethnic groups (especially Hausa, Yoruba, South-South, Igbo and 
Berom communities) about the ownership of Jos and the root causes of the conflict.  
There were equally varied journals whose publications centred on some of the themes 
of this research including Journal of Women in Peace Building,54 the Journal of 
Christian Religious Education and the publications of the Institute for Peace and 
                                                          
54
 This is published by the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). 
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Conflict Resolution (IPCR) at the Presidency, Abuja. Moreover, I consulted materials 
from the libraries of some of the traditional rulers in Kaduna and Benue and got an 
insight into the rich collection of materials which make reference to local political 
histories. 
 
3.6.2 Interviews 
I conducted face to face interviews with persons identified as relevant to this research 
based on my sampling technique (which is purposive sampling) and I collected data 
on the specified indicators through semi-structured interviews and respondents 
narratives. Most of the interviews were recorded and transcribed. My field notes also 
served as an important part of the interview process, and I referred to them when I 
reflected on the research and wrote up my findings. As information obtained through 
interviews may not always be accurate, I paid attention where necessary to having the 
right contact points and triangulating the data bearing in mind the confidentiality of the 
respondents and in line with the ethics I mentioned above.  
I interviewed heads of NGOs within the study area, particularly those working in areas 
relating to conflict. Efforts were made to speak with government officials to gain insights 
into their re-integration efforts and strategies used in the distribution of relief materials 
and the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Jos and its environs, 
but these yielded very little fruit. The interviews were conducted at a convenient time 
and location for the respondents and the questions were open-ended. I used closed 
questions for those who were very busy or too busy to speak to me and wanted to 
contribute to my work without being interviewed. In such cases I dropped the sample 
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questions and visited later for a very short interview. Most of the interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. Particular attention was paid to observations of the 
environment and recorded in my field notes.  
 
3.6.3 Focus Group Discussions 
The FGD was used during the field work between May 2012 and February 2013. This 
method enables the researcher to gain dipper understanding of the complexities of 
every day market relationships. As Krueger (1994: 29-30) has noted, “researchers are 
recognising the benefits…greater methodological mixes that strengthen the research 
design…two or more different research methods to address the same issue to confirm 
findings and to obtain both breadth and depth of information.” FGDs are meant to be a 
social experience (Krueger, 1998).   Their main purpose is “to gather qualitative data 
from individuals who have experienced some particular concrete situation which 
serves as the focus of the interview” (Merton & Kindal, 1946: 541), thus asking 
conversational questions is essential in order to create and maintain an informal 
environment (Krueger, 1998). It is equally important for the researcher to know that 
they are responsible for establishing a “climate of communication that works well for 
participants to develop a rapport based on trust and confidence” (Krueger, 1998). 
Like interviews, FGDs have the advantage of producing a very rich body of data 
expressed in the respondents own words and context. They also allow the researcher 
to interact directly with respondents. According to David, Prem & Dennis (2007: 42), 
one of the advantages of FGDs is that:  
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It provides opportunities for the clarification of responses, for follow-up 
questions and for probing responses…it is possible for the researcher to 
observe nonverbal responses such as gestures, smiles, frowns…which may 
carry information that supplements and on occasions even contradicts the 
verbal response.  
The process allows the individual to respond in their own words using their own 
categorisation and perceived association, providing very rich data and allowing the 
researcher to obtain deeper meaning of what was said (David, Prem & Dennis, 2007). 
It also enables the researcher to obtain speedy results when various FGDs are 
compared, and to increase the sample size of qualitative studies, thereby saving cost 
and time (Krueger, 1998: 36). 
The FGDs were used mainly for the market category where the market leaders were 
interviewed.  The leaders were specifically targeted because they were considered 
experts who had all the information required. Krueger (1994) has referred to these 
category of participants as a special type of group because participants are selected 
based on the possession of certain characteristics in common that relate to the topic 
and normally the FGD is repeated several times with different people, to identify trends 
and patterns in perceptions. This is why the research was carried out via FGDs in 
several markets within Jos and other parts of the Middle Belt in order to ascertain facts 
about the impact of the conflict on market relations. 
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3.7 The Pilot Study 
A pilot study for this research was conducted between July and August 2011, when I 
was able to distribute approximately 150 open-ended questionnaires to sample 
opinions on the topics of this research within the Jos metropolis. The questionnaires 
were distributed to NGOs, particularly the IGSR trainees who were based at a youth 
reconciliation camp, and at the University of Jos. The questionnaires asked what 
respondents thought the conflict was about, what they saw as the effects of the conflict 
and how it had changed interactions and everyday lives for them and other ordinary 
people.  
In combination with my own reading of the literature, this pilot study led me to the 
understanding that a greater proportion of the NGO work on conflict is centred on loss 
of life and property or on group reconciliation, with very little attention paid to how it 
has changed the everyday lives of women. Following on from this, I also held open 
discussions around the conflicts with the Director and a few members of staff of the 
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Abuja, the Director of IGSR, market 
women at the Terminus market (the main market) in Jos and politicians during the 
IGSR 2012 programme at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPP) 
Kuru in Jos.  
The period of the pilot study also enabled me to collect the most important – and 
internationally quoted – works on conflict in Jos. It was interesting to learn that the 
majority of that literature (Best, 2004 & 2005; Gofwen, 2004; Gwamna 2010; Sha, 
2004) dealt with the loss of lives and property. Very little attention was paid to how 
conflict has impacted on the interactions, relationships and daily lives of women as well 
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as men in Jos. This insight encouraged me to explore the existing gap in the literature 
on women and conflict in the area.  
During the pilot study, I was also able to map out the geographical areas of the town 
which I needed to include in my study, as several of the responses indicated the need 
to cover states like Kaduna, Nasarawa and Benue. The pilot study period also helped 
me to identify and make contact with my future field assistants and some of my 
respondents. In addition, I was able to revive my contacts with NGOs like the JDPC 
and CEPAN that eventually served as major links to my respondents, particularly the 
inter-faith marriage group. The pilot study was also useful, because I was able to 
identify relevant sources of information for my research on issues relating to women 
as well as relevant stake-holders to be interviewed during the fieldwork. I kept a diary 
of comprehensive information on the identified stakeholders, institutions and 
individuals to be contacted during the fieldwork. I was also able to identify themes and 
areas that I was able to later develop for the proper field work. It became clear that 
Focus Group Discussion was to be used alongside other methods of data collection. 
 
3.8 Research Sample and Sample Size 
Initially, I had planned to contact and interview between 400 and 600 respondents for 
this research. But I soon discovered that this was too ambitious for a qualitative 
research project at doctoral level. Apart from the difficulties of obtaining these 
interviews, it would take a long time to actually speak to so many people, and to 
transcribe and analyse so much data. It was therefore more reasonable and realistic 
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to aim for about 100 interviews and FGDs (See Table 1) in the areas mentioned 
considering the time frame needed to complete this research. 
Respondents were basically identified in relation to their position within society, and 
mainly in relation to inter-faith marriage, markets, professional groups, politics as well 
as religious groups and traditional institutions. The location of respondents and their 
source of livelihood are of central importance because it forms part of the central thesis 
of this work, particularly in regard to networking in conflict and post conflict Jos. 
Table 2: Total Number of Respondents by Location and Topics Discussed 
 
S/N Categories Location Total 
1 Inter-Faith Marriage Jos  10 
2 Markets (Men & Women) Jos, Markurdi, Nasarawa, 
Kaduna 
24 
3 Women in Politics (Elected 
Representatives) 
Jos, Markurdi, Nasarawa, 
Kaduna 
18 
4 Political Party Leaders Jos, Makurdi, Nasarawa, 
Kaduna 
10 
5 
 
Professional men and women 
(Mainly Primary, Secondary and 
University Teachers 
Jos 14 
6 Traditional Rulers, Ward Heads & 
Religious Leaders 
Jos, Makurdi, Nasarawa, 
Kaduna 
10 
7 Ethnic Associations (Yoruba, Igbo, 
Hausa, Fulani, Berom) 
Jos 10 
8 Non-Governmental Organisations Jos 6 
Total   102 
Source: Field notes 2012/2013 © Plangsat Dayil 
3.8.1 Research Sampling Technique   
The sampling strategy used for this research is mainly purposive sampling. The 
‘purposive sampling technique is a type of non-probability sampling that is most 
effective when one needs to study a particular cultural domain with knowledgeable 
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experts within’ (Tongco, 2007: 147). This method is very effective in sampling 
respondents who are thought to be of direct relevance to the research. Tongco 
(2007:147) points out that: 
The purposive sampling technique, also called judgment sampling, is the 
deliberate choice of an informant due to the qualities the informant possesses. 
It is a non-random technique that does not need underlying theories or a set 
number of informants.  
The adopted sampling technique can be described as ‘a random selection of sampling 
units within the segment of the population with the most information on the 
characteristic of interest’ (Guarte & Barrios, 2006: 277). This procedure is quite 
effective in qualitative research because it helps the researcher to choose subjects 
carefully and ensure that they only talk to those with knowledge relevant to the 
research topic and thus not waste time. I also used the snowball sampling method 
alongside the purposive sampling method, by taking note of names and sources of 
information mentioned by other respondents. Tran & Perry (2003) point out that 
‘Sometimes snowball sampling involves asking an informant to suggest another 
informant.’ Tongco (2007: 153) explains that “this method might not be free from 
bias…” (See also, Lopez et al, 1997; Seidler 1974; Smith, 1983; Zelditch, 1962). So it 
is important to state the bias clearly when the results are analysed and interpreted so 
as not to mislead people into inferring general conclusions (Bernard, 2002; Godambe, 
1982; Snedecor, 1939). Despite its inherent bias, purposive sampling can provide 
reliable and robust data. The strength of the method actually lies in its intentional bias 
(Bernard, 2002; Lewis & Sheppard, 2006; Poggie, 1972; Tremblay 1957).  
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As a way of ruling out any form of bias and misrepresentation, incoherent and unclear 
responses were cross-checked and respondents contacted in a follow-up visit in 
August and September 2014. This follow-up visit enabled me to clearly understand the 
sense in which certain responses were made at a time and particularly to present the 
arguments exactly in the way they were intended.  
Respondents for this study were carefully selected to respond to the central areas of 
research that emerged as important for women’s everyday lives, namely marriage, 
market relations, politics and the formal sector. The table below shows the categories 
and the number of interviews and focus group discussions conducted under each 
theme. As set out above, most of the interviews were recorded and transcribed. My 
field notes also served as an important part of the interview process, and I referred to 
them when I reflected on the research and wrote up my findings. As information 
obtained through interviews may not always be accurate, I paid attention where 
necessary to having the right contact points and triangulating the data, bearing in mind 
the confidentiality of the respondents and in line with the ethics I mentioned above. 
Conflicting kinds of response are expected in humans when they relate in a group. 
Krueger (1994: 31) pointed out that “human conditions can be distorted intentionally or 
unintentionally. People are not always truthful, and sometimes they give answers that 
seem best for the situation. Other times people hold back important information 
because of apprehensions or social pressure. Experts who work with small groups 
testify about the unpredictable nature of groups, and that group leaders or moderators 
can skilfully or unwittingly lead groups into decisions or consensus.”  
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This is illustrated by an experience I had at the Farin Gada market when the leader of 
the market tried to ensure that he controlled the discussion. He clearly said that the 
conflict had never affected the market. However, when I continued with the FGD and 
encouraged a wider range of respondents, including women, to speak, other views 
emerged. One of the female respondents in the FGD said that they had often narrowly 
escaped death and would have been killed if it had not been for the intervention of 
some of the people who traded within the market. Bearing in mind the complicated 
nature of interviews and of what people considered to be the truth, my collection of the 
data and my understanding of it both relied strongly on my own knowledge of local 
forms of behaviour and social interaction. 
 
3.9 Data Analysis Process 
The data for this research was analysed based on themes for this research. During the 
collection of data, I was able to identify and conduct interviews based on the areas that 
I think speak about women’s lives in the Middle Belt conflicts: marriage, markets, 
politics and the public sector. These areas were assessed in line with the objective of 
this research set out earlier. I tried to ensure a comparison of my findings with other 
research done in same or similar fields from the available literature.  
I was also able to evaluate my findings as I was writing up. The data analysis process 
involved data reduction. This involved “subjecting data to numerous readings until 
different themes emerge[d]” (Divine, 2002: 206). I looked for groupings and 
relationships in the interviews, which enabled me to link up all the themes in the 
research to present a bigger picture. I carefully examined all evidence, reviewing the 
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transcripts multiple times, and comparing and contrasting participant’s comments until 
central themes emerge (Krueger, 1998: 231). Based on this, I was able to draw up 
some more general arguments and conclusions.55  
The larger themes I addressed in this research included women’s lives in inter-faith 
marriages, women’s economic networks in the markets, women’s political 
representation and careers lives, and women’s professional lives in the education and 
higher education sector. The analysis is centred on the in-betweenness of women and 
the politicisation of women’s experiences – and sometimes even presence – in a wide 
range of economic and professional relationships during and after conflicts.  
 
3.10 Ethical Issues 
Like any other, this study was shaped by a number of concerns. Importantly, the 
research had to follow regulations laid down by the University of Birmingham. The 
methodology for this research was approved by the University of Birmingham’s ethics 
committee in line with the University’s rules guiding doctoral research. While the 
approval was necessary to ensure that ethical issues were considered and followed 
during the fieldwork, the entire process took long before the approval was granted. 
This was important because ethics involves the careful consideration about the impact 
of our research on others. Bulmer (1992) referred to ethics as a matter of principled 
sensitivity to the rights of others. It is a form of social responsibility by the researcher 
to ensure that the process of gathering and disseminating information is free from any 
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undesirable immediate and future consequences to the respondent. Good ethical 
practice involves being a good researcher at the same time as being a good human 
being (Iphofen, 2011). The process also encompasses all aspects relating to 
anonymity, confidentiality, consent, feedback and storage and withdrawal, which also 
have to be explained to the respondent at the onset of each interview. Researchers, 
therefore, must be careful to ensure that they are not harming their respondents.56 
As my research relies on the narratives of people, and especially women, who are in 
many instances impacted negatively by these conflicts, I took time to explain to the 
respondents all the aspects of my research in order to obtain their informed permission 
to record the interviews and assured them of confidentiality. The participants in the 
research were given a consent form to indicate that they agreed to participate in the 
study. 
The consent form explained clearly the purpose of this research and informed 
respondents how they could obtain information about this research after it was 
completed. On the form, the respondents were asked to indicate how they wanted their 
information recorded, either through a voice recorder or just note-taking. Participants 
were informed how their information will be used and stored. Respondents’ consent 
forms also asked them how they wanted their information shared, and they were given 
the option to choose if they wanted their identity known. For most respondents, this 
research used a different name and code to identify them so nobody could link their 
responses to them personally. While several people willingly allowed me to use their 
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names I still decided that in most cases, usually with the exception of public figures, 
anonymity was the better option.  
Some of the respondents especially in the markets gave me permission to arrange a 
video recording of the interview. This was useful particularly in the markets where this 
technology allowed me to capture complex events and settings rather than just the 
spoken word. While the doctoral results do not include these videos in order to ensure 
anonymity, they have served as a very good reminder of the environment in which I 
carried out fieldwork. Many respondents allowed me to take voice recordings of 
interviews, while some of the respondents were more comfortable with note-taking 
which they considered as less of a threat than having their voices or images recorded.  
The potential impact of recordings was an important consideration even for ostensibly 
powerful people. One of my respondents, a politician and chairman of one of the 
political parties in the state, did not allow me to record or take notes of an interview. 
He told me to just listen and later make sense of what he said, which I did. Immediately 
after I left his office I stopped to jot down all I could recollect.  
Upon agreement the consent form was signed in duplicate and the respondents 
retained a copy for their own records. I pointed out to all respondents about their right 
to withdraw their consent for up to a year after the interview, and I left my telephone 
number, email address and postal details in Nigeria and Birmingham with each of them.  
Because consent forms immediately take the respondents into the realm of officialdom, 
the need to obtain signatures limited the level of informality and freedom of speech I 
enjoyed with them. In addition to that most of the interviews were accompanied by 
note-taking and voice recording which immediately put the respondent in a position of 
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reservation where he or she focused on accuracy and correctness of speech. Despite 
the difficulties associated with the consent forms, my respondents were very happy to 
know that they could have a copy of the form and that they could also contact me or 
my supervisor at any point to withdraw from the research. It was extremely important 
to many of my respondents to be sure that their information was not going to be used 
against them at any point in time. 
In addition to the formal requirements set out by the university, I also ensured that data 
gathered through recording was properly transcribed and well coded, and I kept a 
record of the contact details of respondents which enabled me to get back to them for 
the duration of the research to ensure that the data was presented accurately and 
constituted a true representation of what they told me. I also avoided or consciously 
moderated very sensitive questions or emotion triggers that would bring back bad 
memories and hurtful feelings. I did that through paying attention to the respondent’s 
facial expressions and body language as questions were asked, and empathising with 
them when the need arose.  
As a researcher, I am also human and have feelings. There were sober moments when 
I had to stop recording and empathise with the respondents before going on. This is 
what Sarantakos (1998) referred to as issues that would have jeopardised the 
respondent’s psychological well-being, but showing concern and empathy goes a long 
way in assisting respondents to quickly relax again  and move on with the interview.   
While interviewing was often difficult I noticed that it also frequently had a positive 
impact on the respondents. Many people became more relaxed and were willing to go 
on with the interview after a moment of shared solemnity. These sort of experiences 
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occurred mostly with the women in inter-faith marriages whose interviews were 
conducted in their homes, and many of them were moved to tears as they recollected 
some of their experiences. The conflict had come to define the way they related to 
society and the way society saw them. The need for breaks and pauses made the 
interview periods longer and more demanding personally as I empathised and in some 
instances even cried with them.  
 
3.11 Challenges and Limitations 
There were numerous challenges faced during the data gathering process in addition 
to some of the challenges related to ethics mentioned in the previous paragraph. As a 
result of the conflicts in Jos, settlement patterns have changed and they continue to 
shift along religious, and in some instances ethnic lines. You find, for instance, large 
areas of the city dominated by Christians, making it quite difficult for someone of the 
opposite faith to move or drive in these areas due to fear of attacks. Similarly it is 
difficult for a Christian to move freely in the Muslim-dominated areas. Therefore, on 
several occasions I asked members of the Jos North Peace Ambassadors to 
accompany me in order to boost my sense of security. 57Since the start of the conflicts 
many Muslim areas had become unfamiliar terrain to me, so often the peace 
ambassadors also provided me with directions to where I was going. 
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the Plateau State Government and the Security agencies in Jos. These group of youths are empowered 
as whistle blowers and mediators in the event of any conflict.  
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The separation of the city added a burden of confidence and trust on me, because it 
was important for the people I visited in these areas to trust and have confidence in 
me, particularly when visiting members of ethnic and religious groups different from 
mine. I was able to overcome such difficulties at least partially by using contact persons 
for each of these settlements who were familiar to the people I was visiting. Important 
among those who helped me to contact members of different groups were the Jos 
North Peace Ambassadors, who are Christian and Muslim youths trained by the 
Institute of Governance and Social Research (IGSR) in collaboration with the Plateau 
State Government and the Security Sectors in Jos. Peace Ambassadors also assisted 
in securing and arranging some of my interview appointments. However, I had to 
conduct almost all my interviews myself, both because of the emotional content of 
many interviews and because I noticed with some of the respondents that they needed 
a little push during interviews before the whole story was told. The confidence required 
for this was not something I could ask or expect of research assistants. Therefore I 
was unable to delegate many interviews.  
Another limitation was the fact that at the time of my fieldwork the conflicts had already 
created certain patterns of behaviour in relation to individuals who were not from a 
respondent’s group. This means that it was sometimes difficult for me to gain the trust 
of respondents who did not see me as a member of their in-group. Due to my own 
background it was somewhat easier to win the trust of Christians and Muslims who 
were members of indigenous groups. However, I was able to utilise some of the women 
whom I worked with during the Women for Peace Initiative (WPI) and the Peace 
Ambassadors to overcome this challenge. These women were able to relate freely, 
and granted interview because of the long established trust which was also important. 
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Another strategy for gaining trust was that during most of the interviews I conducted in 
the exclusively Muslim areas, I had to dress in such a way that is acceptable to the 
community and by so doing avoid drawing unnecessary attention to myself. Dressing 
otherwise would have looked disrespectful and insensitive to the community where I 
was conducting the research, and might have exposed me to abuse because of the 
sensitivity of the research and because the communities were still hurting and nurturing 
the wounds of the conflict.  
A further problem was caused by the period of my fieldwork coinciding with religious 
and ethnic conflicts in the Riyom and Barkin Ladi areas in Plateau, the Asakio and 
Agyaragu areas in Nasarawa, the Manchok and Zangon Kataf areas in Kaduna and 
the Naka and Yogbo in Benue. In the period between May 2012 and February 2013, 
Plateau State lost two of its lawmakers: Honourable Gyang Fuani of the Plateau House 
of Assembly and Honourable Gyang Dantong, Senator of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. When these politicians were attacked by unknown men during a mass burial 
of members from Riyom constituency the government imposed a curfew to restrict 
movement and normal activities in Jos did not return for nearly two weeks, so I had to 
suspend interviews because tensions were too high for me to move about.  
Another problem, especially with prominent women and female politicians, was 
accessibility and keeping appointments. Getting politicians to keep appointments was 
a challenge as many interviews and meetings were re-scheduled repeatedly. For 
example, I tried to meet one of the female politicians in Nasarawa State capital for an 
agreed appointment but on reaching there she asked me to meet her in her village 
compound. Driving to her village, I gave her a call to ask for the exact location of the 
place, but she told me that she had been called out for a meeting, and was sorry but 
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we could not hold the interview. After several such experiences I gave up on this 
respondent. Arranging a meeting with a Nigerian politician, whether male or female, 
requires patience and persistence and some interviews had to be cancelled or were 
too short to be useful. Often I had to make several calls and visits to the women 
politicians and party leaders before interviews were granted.  As illustrated above, 
some women remained inaccessible to me. In other cases I had to attend political party 
rallies to gain access to female party leaders which involved driving long distances to 
the venues of the rallies. Despite many disappointments, I did not give up on this area 
of research and ensured that I got across to as many female politicians as possible.  
Some respondents suffered from research respondents’ fatigue: living in an area 
shaken by conflict, many had seen researchers come to interview them and then leave 
without much change. As a result, some began to question what researchers do with 
the responses they collect, and many of them pointed out to me that there has been 
no commensurate change in their living conditions despite the activities of a multiplicity 
of researchers. Such a challenge spurned me on to consider the need to link research 
to policy formulation in Nigeria and most importantly to instigate development that is 
people-centred. 
Some of the respondents were illiterate and could not communicate in English. Here 
my ability to speak Hausa fluently and my ability to write in Hausa were valuable assets 
as I did not have to depend on interpreters. I noticed immediately that such an 
approach lightened the interview mood, as respondents immediately looked at ease 
and saw me as sympathetic rather than unsympathetic to them. However, the process 
was time consuming because I often had to take time to read through the consent form 
and interpret it for my respondents  
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Another issue was that most of the field research in and around Jos was carried out 
during the rainy season and most of the roads were quite muddy due to the poor 
drainage system. This can make it difficult for pedestrians to move around as well as 
making driving dangerous. As a result rain disrupted some of my fieldwork, especially 
when we had to cancel interview appointments due to the impassability of roads.  
Often I would have preferred to meet my respondents in an NGO office or a 
government establishment. As the conflicts were ongoing at the time of my interview 
work this would have been safer for me. But many people insisted on doing the 
interview in their houses which meant that I had to traverse areas where I might be 
subject to abuse or even violence. About 90 percent of the interviews with the political 
group were conducted with women in their homes, with the remaining 10 percent 
speaking to me in their offices due to their busy schedules. 58 In most of the homes the 
women talked to me alone in their sitting rooms while family members were directed to 
remain quiet to minimise noise interference and distraction. In the inter-faith marriage 
group, 50 percent of the interviews were conducted in the presence of the spouses. 
When these spouses were present I often noticed uneasiness at the onset of the 
interview, which relaxed as we proceed. 
The literature search, particularly of locally produced books and journals, was 
frustrating because there is no central institution such as a library or, for instance, an 
internet listing of books where such books could be identified and purchased. Local 
book stores rarely stocked up-to-date books and I had to rely on friends and work 
associates to identify relevant publications. While I was determined to conduct a 
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 The 10 percent were actually the professional (teachers) groups employed in the public sector.  
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sufficiently broad survey of the relevant literature, I was limited both by the time 
allocated to the doctoral research and by my own financial constraints.  
Finally I engaged the services of a secretary, mainly to assist with the transcription of 
longer interviews. The fact that she was very slow doing this work affected the speed 
of my own work and my ability to complete the field research within six months as I had 
originally intended to do.  
 
3.12 Conclusion: Sensibilities of Research in Conflict Zones  
This chapter has provided an explanation of the various ways in which data for this 
research was collected and analysed. It has also explained the challenges faced during 
the collection of data and how I was able to overcome them. Based on my experience 
from the field I believe that the methodology and experiences described in this chapter 
suggest that research on women, and especially on women in conflict zones, requires 
particular methodologies and sensibilities. 
I realized the importance of my personal respectability and trustworthiness after one of 
the husbands in an inter-religious marriage said to me “madam, we have agreed to 
grant you this interview because we believe you are a mother and capable of handling 
the data with motherly maturity.”59 This stuck in my mind and I later shared this view 
with a colleague of mine who concurred and responded by imagining how hard it would 
have been for a young man to succeed with research on inter-faith marriage.  
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 This response came Mr Muktar the husband to one of my respondents. He himself is a leader of one 
of the ethnic communities in Jos.  
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Certainly in the context of Jos, a man might find it difficult to secure an appointment to 
discuss marriage issues with another man’s wife. Moreover, my own marriage 
conferred on me the respect which some deem fit for a mature researcher in this 
context. Homan (1992:325) points out how a researcher’s social position influences 
their access to respondents. Homan refers to Sutherland’s success in the study of the 
Rom community who were often secretive and exclusive and normally hostile to 
representatives of the world outside, by exploiting her role as a teacher of its children. 
In a recently concluded study on a related topic in Jos and Kaduna where securing and 
keeping up appointments with women was very difficult Mavalla (2014: 11) states that: 
The second challenge was the general decline of potential interviewees, 
particularly among the female population...There was deep anxiety and mistrust 
in Kaduna due to the protracted violent conflict in Plateau State and some other 
Northern states. This fear possibly accounted for women refusing to be 
interviewed … few who accepted to grant me an interview later declined the 
appointments, hence the absence of many female voices.  
The difficulty of carrying out research in Hausa society, as in many other parts of 
Northern Nigeria is that it is sexually segregated and most studies of Hausa women 
have been done by women (Callaway, 1987: xii). Despite my own ‘motherly’ and 
‘married’ respectability, coupled with my commitment and dedication, and even careful 
planning ahead of time, I too experienced disappointments during the field research. 
While this did not affect the presence of female voices, contributions by female 
respondents confirm even the methodology used for research has to be gendered. The 
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same process that works for men might not necessarily work out the same for female 
respondents. As more research is carried out in the area of gender and conflict it will 
be important to explore whether women respondents are more likely to withdraw from 
research than men. 
The particular importance of focusing on women’s experiences includes the fact that 
at least some of them are more likely to have been victimized by conflict. As a result, 
the recollection of their experiences comes with a lot of pain. As most people try to 
avoid pain, I had to be very careful to create personal encounters that were 
nonetheless satisfying to the women involved. For example, I tried to be very sensitive 
about questions asked. While maintaining a calm facial expression myself, I constantly 
paid attention to respondents’ feelings in order to empathise with them when needed. 
This was my way of making them feel that as a researcher I was not only interested in 
their story but understood what they were (and are) going through.  
Despite the inconvenience for myself, it was also very important to go the extra mile to 
meet respondents in places that were most suitable for them in order not to expose 
them to danger. Meeting respondents in places of their choosing was often not 
convenient for me, but it enabled many women to be comfortable and relaxed and thus 
to be more open during the interview.  It also made them see how serious I was about 
getting my data right.   
In as much as I was ensuring my respondents were comfortable with the interview I 
did not take my own safety for granted. Realizing that as a woman I was also more 
vulnerable to aggression, especially in no-go-areas, I drew extensively on advice from 
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local networks of supporters and mentors, and I often used the youth peace 
ambassadors to accompany me on interviews to ensure my own safety.  
 
Finally, I had to realise that the realities of the field sometimes challenge the 
assumptions of the academy. Thus, while I had assumed that all individuals involved 
in research could give consent for themselves, obtaining the consent of spouses of 
female respondents, particularly those in inter-faith marriages, was very important for 
respondents. Like judicial minors, many of the women I interviewed were being 
monitored by their husbands or families – sometimes in order to ensure their 
compliance, but more frequently in consideration of their safety. Given the vulnerability 
of some women, the use of the consent form was helpful because it gave confidence 
to the respondents (and their observant spouses) that the information they provided 
was not going to be used against them, and that the wellbeing of the respondents was 
considered by the institutions involved in the research. Equally importantly, I was able 
to take advantage of the presence of the spouses of the inter-faith marriage group 
during the interview with their wives to verify certain facts, which I considered a way of 
triangulating. But despite the fact that I could gain some advantage from this process, 
it is a stark reminder of the reality of social control and dependence experienced by 
many women in Jos. Research methodology cannot be gender-neutral. In the next four 
chapters, I will present empirical evidence and discussions on the impact of conflict on 
women’s everyday lives.  
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     CHAPTER FOUR 
EFFECTS OF CONFLICT ON WOMEN IN INTER-FAITH MARRIAGES IN 
NIGERIA’S MIDDLE BELT: ISOLATION AND IN-BETWEENESS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the impact of conflict on women’s lives in Jos and Plateau State 
by looking at the experiences of women in inter-faith marriages in Nigeria’s Middle Belt. 
While women face a lot of discrimination and rejection in society, those who are in 
inter-faith marriages face additional forms of discrimination and oppression. Nwabara 
(1989: 7-16) illustrated this by pointing to the fact that women suffer oppression in 
various spheres of life that cuts across both their private and social life; as members 
of a subordinate class and as women. The discrimination of women begins first and 
foremost within the family with “parental upbringing that inculcates discriminatory 
attitudes in children this then leads to the acceptance and perpetuation of women’s 
subordinate position” (Imam, 1989: 5). As a result, women suffer discrimination which 
often goes unnoticed in societies divided by conflict. Furthermore, ethnic and religious 
positions become hardened in situations of ethnic and religious conflicts which creates 
additional difficulties for women especially those in inter-faith marriages, because if a 
person is seen not to belong completely to one ethnic or religious group, their loyalty 
to either group is subject to scrutiny and questioned. For instance, Barnes pointed out 
that “a married woman neither remains fully affiliated to her natal group nor completely 
transferred to her husband’s group but rather sustains an interest in both” (Barnes, 
1962: 6). Such impressions about the in-between position of women have become 
more noticeable in Jos since the beginning of the ethnic and religious conflicts in 2001.  
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As will be seen, the interviews that were conducted between June 2012 and February 
2013 in Jos, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Benue in Nigeria’s Middle Belt were quite 
revealing because they illuminate the dilemmas of everyday life experiences for 
women in a society divided by ethno-religious conflict.  In the predominantly patrilineal 
society, or societies, of Jos, married women are always outsiders in their husbands’ 
and children’s families and thus their experience is that of growing mistrust in their 
everyday relationships including family affairs and relations with friends and 
neighbours. In particular, their wider social circles can be read to illustrate, albeit in a 
more dramatic form, the way in which women more generally have become the 
subjects of increased social control and isolation since the beginning of the conflicts.  
 
4.2 The Mobilisation of Ethnic and Religious Sentiments and its Impact on 
Women.  
Since Federalism was introduced in Nigeria, and particularly in the advent of 
democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, religious and communal crises have been on the 
increase. Religious and ethnic sentiments are deliberately mobilised to fuel these 
crises, particularly in Jos and the Middle Belt (Best, 2004; Gwamna, 2010; Boer, 2004). 
It has been argued that crises are often the result of a deliberate manoeuvring of the 
polity by the political class and its religious zealots (Usman, 1987: Boer, 2004: 
Gwamna, 2010: Kaigama, 2012); and its victims are normally women and children. 
Apart from the loss of lives, property, forced displacement and trauma, these conflicts 
have often left people in mixed marriages feeling in-between in relation to their 
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extended family. Those caught in this web of in-betweenness are mostly women in 
inter-religious or inter-faith marriages and sometimes those in inter-ethnic marriages. 
Existing literature on the conflicts in the Middle Belt mostly covers the physical loss 
suffered by women (and men) in relation to property and injuries sustained, source of 
livelihood, displacement, sexual assault and death. But the strain in relationships, 
suspicion, social exclusion and hatred directed at women, and particularly at women 
in inter-faith marriages still remains largely unexplored. Because of their marriage to 
men of a different faith or ethnic group these women are facing life threatening 
situations because they are daily suspected of colluding with the enemy by neighbours, 
in-laws, friends and even family members and other people. The conflict becomes a 
nightmare even for their children in these communities as they interact with friends and 
relations. These women and children have been at the centre of several forms of ill-
treatment during and after conflicts, often their stories are not heard and sometimes 
not considered obvious. For instance, most cases of domestic violence between 
husband and wife are reported to the religious leader - Pastor or the Imam - rather than 
to the police or social welfare. This is because most women lack access and the 
willpower to go public (Dali, 2012). My interviews revealed this inability to voice the 
frustration brought about by the conflict and how that has affected their livelihoods. 
They also reveal a new dimension of looking at women in conflict, as they showed that 
even without direct violence the conflict has made life unbearable for them and their 
children. Since the conflict, they have been singled out for constant scrutiny by intrusive 
neighbours, work associates, friends and sometimes family members. They are now 
victims of everyday castigations, they are viewed as second class citizens in their own 
community and they have become more confined to their homes. The physical walls 
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of their houses and compounds serve as a source of protection and many women look 
inward to their immediate family for protection. Both the growing need for physical and 
social security also means greater social isolation for them. For this reasons inter-faith 
marriage is increasingly on the decline.  
Higazi (2008: 113) suggests that “the absence of intermarriage in the lowlands60 of 
today is an index of the deterioration in inter-religious relations.” However, while there 
may be few new inter-marriages across the religious divide once considered normal, 
they are increasingly intolerable in the communities that have experienced conflict. I 
mentioned in the earlier chapter that most families in Nigeria are mixed and the 
situation is the same in Jos. Gwamna (2010: 26) observed that the religious scenario 
of the typical African milieu applies quite rightly in the Middle Belt case. He states that 
most African families are multi-religious and belong to different denominations or sects, 
and Jos is no exception as marriage had often created ties and linked families (see 
Cooper, 1997: 10). But recently, society in Jos and in Nigeria at large has placed many 
such families, and particularly women, in situations of in-betweenness as ethnic and 
religious boundaries become hardened. They are often caught in-between in terms of 
religion, marriage and relationship with their immediate families, religious bodies and 
the community at large.  
Experiencing the mistrust of others in their social circle has made many women, and 
especially those in mixed marriages, conscious of the power of gossip and rumour. 
Nervously alert to what people might say about them, they told me that this often limits 
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 The lowlands refers here to the Southern part of Plateau; Shendam, Langtang North & South, Wase, 
Dengi, Quanpan. It is about 3000 ft. above sea level, with warmer weather compared to the other parts 
of the state that are above 4000 ft. above sea level and thus cooler. 
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their exposure to others and they have to seek affirmation in the close circle of friends 
and relatives who still trust them. Increasingly subject to suspicion, dislike and abuse 
for being imagined as standing in between communities has restricted their freedom, 
as for many their immediate family and the walls of their houses offer the greatest 
safety from harassment and abuse. This situation does not only affect them as women 
but affects family structure and other social aspects of their lives. How these women 
have lived through some of the challenges and how they have managed in-between 
family relationships and community is a major thrust of the next section.  
 
4.3 The In-betweenness of Women 
Marilyn Strathern’s contribution to the understanding of women as in-between is 
commendable. Her work reveals that “a married woman is held to have loyalties to both 
or either sets of people, and furthermore to act on these …[as] they are in a theoretical 
position of choice … to demonstrate loyalty to their own husband’s clan” (Strathern, 
1995: 281). This form of loyalty can be distorted in situations of conflict, and in this 
regard gives us a picture of the state of women’s lives in the Jos crises. Strathern’s 
(1995: 281) analysis of female roles in Mount Hagen notes that: 
A woman’s social horizon is relatively narrow, her life being largely focused on 
her immediate kinsfolk and husband, the members of the small residential unit 
where she lives and their close neighbours. She perhaps demands more of 
relations with her husband and her brothers than they exact from her.  
I would add that Strathern’s description of women as in-between aptly captures the 
situation of women in many other societies. In Jos and Nigeria’s Middle Belt, women 
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regularly come face to face with the reality of seeking to achieve social harmony for 
themselves, their in-laws and the communities they belong to. And in conflict and post-
conflict situations, the particular nature of their belonging is continuously tested, and 
sometimes turned against them, as it is in Jos. My intention is to establish the situation 
of the in-betweenness of women, not necessarily in terms of household, divorce, 
ownership and disputes as in Strathern’s work, but in terms of conversion and inter-
marriage in conflictual or divided communities. 
 
4.3.1 Inter-faith Marriages in Jos 
In Jos, the pressure on wives to become members of their husbands’ religion does not 
mean that they will be accepted. In fact, the situation of the convert is an exemplary 
illustration of the dilemma faced by wives who are in-between. This is shown by Mrs 
Sharki Sharfina’s 61 discussion below on some of the difficulty of convincing others of 
her status as a true Muslim convert. Her description of suspicion and rejection by both 
her natal and her marital family illustrates the way in which women in Jos and the 
Middle Belt – and possibly in many parts of Nigeria – are in-between.   A larger 
proportion of the narratives explored also reveal the extent to which the impact of 
conflict goes beyond the rhetoric of physical injury and human losses. It includes the 
excruciating pain arising from the trauma of suspicion and phobia experienced on a 
day-to-day basis especially when relationships are mobilised along religious and ethnic 
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 Mrs Sharki Sharfina works for the Plateau State Government. She was married at the age of 20 and 
became a Muslim, practice Islam for 20 years and has now converted back to Christianity. She is a 
mother of three, and all her sons presently live with her in a no-go-area for Muslims, but they themselves 
are Muslims. Interviewed in Jos. 5/2/2013. 
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lines amongst the citizenry. As both Christians and Muslims look at each other with 
contempt and suspicion this has led to growing residential segregation, to the extent 
that people are unwilling, after conflicts, to return to their residences in mixed areas 
where they had hitherto lived peacefully (The News, 2001).This growing segregation 
is closely linked to the permanent culture of fear of reprisal attacks and the deep-rooted 
culture of lack of trust and suspicion that the Christian and Muslim community have 
built over the decades of conflicts (Fukshiwe, 2010). Perera (1996) explains that 
whatever forms conflicts take, they create physical discomfort and psychological 
tension for women and children, who are often also subject to ill-treatment arising from 
conflict. Mrs Sharki Sharfina62 explained how difficult it has been for her:  
It is tough... first, you are regarded as a convert, and then whatever you do, 
sometimes you are under rated. And it is only you and your God that know your 
heart deep down and that you are true to your religion. But for them... you are 
always a second thought; everything they do is like you are not on the first list, 
no matter how hard you try to prove it, they still call you names and even when 
you have children for them. And from your own family background where you 
are coming from which is a Christian dominated area, they will look at you and 
ask; Do you really like what you are doing? Especially, when they see what your 
in-laws do to you, they ask: why not leave the marriage? Even when you tell 
them no, sometimes they will tell you if you do not leave them, that is how you 
will continue to suffer with them and then we will not do anything about it. And 
then on their own part they are also looking at it like, after all the bulk of your 
people are [Christians], they call you names;- arne, pagan, and your religion is 
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 Mrs Sharki Sharfina interviewed in Jos. 5/2/2013. 
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not just the same with theirs, and so you suffer also that. And especially when 
you start having children, sometimes they tell you stories like ok these children 
might not even be as true followers of the religion, they do not see your own 
children as, you know, children that are born in Islam and sometimes they even 
tell you to a limit that your children might not even inherit [from] your husband 
because of where they are coming from. 
Mrs Sharki Sharfina’s reflection widens the discussion on the situation of women being 
in-between by illustrating how the new settlement pattern based on ethnic and religious 
groupings helps in reinforcing this phenomenon. Because ethnic and religious 
communities in Jos live separately, it puts women into situations that have made them 
helpless and at the same time their voices have become mute in the face of religious 
and ethnic intolerance. Strathern (1995) provides us with a way of thinking about 
women’s structural positions, especially as it relates to married women in particular, as 
they have to be loyal to both kin and husbands. In this sense, she views women as 
being in a theoretical position of choice. This is certainly true for women in inter-faith 
marriages in Jos. Socially focused on family, community and neighbours, women are 
also constantly seeking to negotiate this choice in order to find acceptance. But 
women’s positions in society are related both to the ability to negotiate acceptability 
within the family and from the larger and more general religious communities to which 
the families belong. That women are caught up between choices in Jos means that 
they are in-between both with regard to religion and in their relationship to others. From 
the interviews conducted, responses show that women’s freedoms are limited in many 
cases due to their in-betweenness. This includes their freedom of speech, freedom of 
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movement, freedom of association, as well as the freedom to practice one’s faith as 
enshrined in chapter IV of the Nigerian Constitution.63  
Therefore, in practice, women are often caught in-between their choice of religion, their 
loyalty to marriage itself and negotiating acceptability from families, friends, neighbours 
and work associates. In fact, family and friends sometimes seem to be more worried 
about their stance as converts than how they are coping with marriage and other 
obligations. Mrs Mat Gungwen who is a Christian woman married to a Muslim, 
explained that despite over 30 years of marriage, friends constantly remind her of the 
need to convert and follow the religion of her husband. According to Mrs Mat 
Gungwen:64   
I remember a recent conversation we had with one of our friends when they 
visited. She also married a Muslim and has recently converted. She said to me 
‘Haba, yaya kina ba wannan danuwa na wahala ne? Kullum yana dinga zuwan 
Umrah shi kadai, kai, baki damu da wadan nan yayan ki bane?  My husband 
just smiled and told her not to bother about me, because nobody can change 
me that they should leave me alone. Sometimes he teases me and we laugh; 
he will say please reconsider and I will normally reply and say haba Alhaji, kai 
kenan shekara fiye da arbain a kan magana guda daya, baka gaji bane?65 
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 For Fundamental Human Rights of citizens, refer to the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
64
 Mr Mat Gungwen does not hold any paid employment. She is more or less a house wife. She is 
married to a non-Hausa-Fulani Muslim from Plateau State and she still practice Christianity despite over 
40years of marriage. Interviewed in Jos. 3/9/2012. 
  
65My interpretation: Oh, why do you keep punishing my brother? All these while he goes to Hajj alone, 
are you not bothered about your children. 
65My interpretation: Oh Alhaji, we have been on this issue for more than 40 years now, are you not tired? 
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From the above, it is evident that outside influences from extended family and friends 
reinforce and make visible differences that ordinarily couples would have 
accommodated. For instance, had Mrs Mat Gungwen converted, she would be 
regarded as someone whose loyalty is questionable. However, because she has not 
converted, she is constantly being reminded of her inability to play her wifely role 
effectively, because of her choice.  
Conflict situations also provide opportunities for differences and fears to come to the 
fore. Mrs Mat Gungwen explained that her father lives in one of the no-go-areas of Jos. 
And during one of the conflicts she found herself torn between her loyalties towards 
him and those towards her husband. She explained, “I went to visit them [my father] 
and my husband was very angry with me, because it is a no-go-area for me and I am 
a Christian. I was actually scared too, but I had to [go and visit them].”66  
Such scenarios also illustrate how the nature of mistrust of women by men is 
exacerbated by conflict. In a way, the statement shows how women are still struggling 
to live up to their in-between position. In both Christian and Muslim communities, men 
object to their girls marrying from the other side. For example, Higazi’s (2008:115) 
article on vigilantes in Southern Plateau provides a glimpse of the general control and 
sanctions both religions place on inter-faith relationships. He explained that: 
Christians ... prevented their women from having extramarital affairs with 
Muslim men. ...they harassed and stopped Christian girls... [from entering into] 
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 Mrs Mat Gungwen comes from a religiously mixed family. According to her, the conflict has impacted 
negatively on the family especially with the segregated settlements, as family members have had to live 
on opposite sides of the religious divide. 
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relations with Muslims …but it is never possible for Christian men to form 
relationships with Muslim women.  
However, the experience of women in both conflict and post-conflict situations is not 
always connected to such acrimony and intolerance from both religions. The 
experience of Mrs Mat Gungwen shows that such controls are less effective among 
the middle class and high income earners in society. That is not  to say that such 
women do not face discrimination, but what it means is that they can avoid certain 
forms of social control, as  economic status can “change the conduct of social relations: 
a rich woman would certainly reject undue subordination” (House-Midamba & Ekechi, 
1995: 35). For example, they can avoid the potential harassment that might come with 
shopping in open markets by sending their maids or drivers to do this for them. Also, 
because they seldom use public transport such as town service buses, they are exempt 
from stinging comments made to them by other passengers and intrusive neighbours. 
And by implication their children are likely to experience less discrimination as they 
have fewer contacts with the general public than those from low income families. 
The experience of Hajia Kamran Jepmu,67 a Christian-Muslim convert married to a 
Muslim, sheds more light on the above discussion and illustrates yet another 
dimension of the inter-religious struggle. Even though a convert, Hajia Kamran Jepmu 
was very keen to have an education and also wanted to ensure that the whole family 
embrace education. But as a third wife and a convert her good intentions were not 
welcomed. She experienced a lot of opposition from her mother in-law and her co-
wives, who may have felt threatened by her progressive attitude and the changes she 
                                                          
67
 Hajia Kamran Jepmu is the Head Mistress of one of the Primary Schools in Jos. Interviewed in Jos. 
19/1/2013.  
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was bringing into the family which they themselves were not willing to be a part of. And 
I think her case illuminates how religious sentiments and shared hatred can oppose a 
woman’s desire for personal progress. Hajia Kamran Jepmu recollected her 
experience as follows:  
Honestly, it was not easy for me, because, after my marriage, then I was trying 
to go back to school... my mother in-law said that those women that are 
educated are harlots, so I will not go back. So I told my husband that, if I am not 
going back to school, then I am leaving the house...Then later on, I went to 
Teachers College Jos, and then she said why am I going to Teachers College 
after having four children? So I told her I have to go to school now, because I 
have to improve my education, because I cannot be a total house wife ... I went 
to TC68 ... then his own children with the other wives, I started putting them in 
school and then she started fighting me that; oh see now she is now trying to 
put your children in school then they will be harlots and they won’t like to get 
married and follow their own husband, this and that ... So I took them, and most 
of them have now graduated and are working in Abuja now.  
Hajia Kamran Jepmu was determined to pursue her education even though she was 
caught in-between her marriage and career. She explained that the support of her 
husband who allowed her to continue her education created jealousy at home. She 
endured ill-will, especially from her mother-in-law and her senior co-wives who became 
jealous of the fact that despite being only the third wife she was afforded greater 
freedom than they were. The women alleged that such freedom might encourage her 
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 TC means Teachers College 
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to be wayward. These allegations had implications and eventually her husband 
divorced her. However, her story did not end there despite the active support of her 
co-wives and mother in-law for the divorce, it only lasted for about six months and she 
was allowed to return to her marital home. When her husband later married a fourth 
wife, Hajia Kamran Jepmu made sure that she took her to school.69 The next section 
discusses the way in which women converts are perceived.    
 
4.4 Women’s In-betweeness in Inter-marriage: Perception of Female Converts 
For Hajia Kamran Jepmu, pursuing her academic career and helping others do the 
same against the expectations of her husband’s existing family was an achievement 
against the odds. But despite the fact that the income provided by herself and the fourth 
wife is now indispensable to her married family, her status as a Muslim wife from a 
non-Muslim background still singles her out. She told me that “... sometimes, when you 
talk, they tell you that you reason so because you are not a real70 Muslim. And that 
makes you wonder how very little people understand religion.” She summarised her 
in-between position succinctly by explaining:  
Right now I am in middle, because the entire area where the Christians are, 
they will still say, I am carrying their secrets to the Muslims. And if I am home in 
the Muslim side, they will still say I am carrying their secrets to the Christian side 
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 Hajia Kamran Jepmu’s husband later died in an accident. She and the junior wife are working and 
ensuring they provide for all the family and the other wives. 
70
 Since a true Bahaushe- Hausa Man, is a Muslim, thers might refer to such converts as Muslim with a 
tribe. The Hausa ethnic identity is a complex of variables involving not only language, but also religion 
and descent. See Khalid, (2002). 
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or my people. So you see right now I am in the middle and it is such a painful 
position to be.  
Most women in Hajia Kamran Jepmu’s difficult situation can become discouraged and 
helpless because this perception of women limits their ability to get some degree of 
acceptance. Hajia MS also noted that many people in Jos see religion as something 
they had from birth, that is, something they were born with rather than an individual 
choice, the result of learning or a personal encounter with God. She explained that 
religion was often treated as a form of natural identity which could not really be 
changed, and similarly the subordinate position of women in religion is a reality that 
cannot be changed. As a result, religious zealots like many in society use this argument 
to subdue women. According to her, despite her attempts to practice her new religion 
(her husband’s religion) faithfully and correctly she was treated as though she was not 
a proper Muslim. This attitude is reflected in the use of the term “original” or “real” to 
describe Muslims with a long history of descent (original followers of Usman Dan Fodio; 
the Fulani and Hausa) from other Muslims (who are Yan derika; Muslims who are from 
other ethnic groups aside Hausa Fulani) – as is the case in Jos. As a convert, Hajia 
Kamran Jepmu was often seen and treated as a false Muslim while Christians viewed 
her as a treacherous individual who should not be trusted. She explained: 
Being a Muslim definitely finds people looking at you and then they see your 
own religion as unreal, they look at your own as if it is not even original. And so 
the things they do to you or the way they see you is just like, no she cannot be. 
But I knew when I became a Muslim, that there was nothing I left unturned, I 
made sure I studied very well Islamically, I knew the basic things I needed to 
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know in the five pillars of Islam and then performing Hajj which was one of them, 
I did wholeheartedly.  
It is clear from these few examples that in the religiously divided society of Jos, a 
convert not only elicits little trust but is seen as someone who sets out to deceive 
others. This also affects converts more generally, as the experience of Hajia Reprem 
Mishmut 71 a Christian-Muslim convert who works as a teacher illustrates. Her father 
converted to Islam when she was a young girl, and she followed him into the religion 
and later married a Muslim man. Even though her immediate family was Muslim, she 
experienced insults about her Christian origin in many everyday situations especially 
amongst the Christians. She explained that “at times when you are passing, they will 
be throwing words at you, like: hey hypocrite! Look at them, pretending to be Muslims, 
meanwhile they are hypocrites.” She explained further: “the situation is the same even 
within your own Christian family, you are referred to as hypocrite.” The next section 
discusses the challenges associated with notion that women are hypocrites. 
 
4.4.1 Women’s In-betweenness as a Form of Hypocrisy 
The notion of religious hypocrisy is used widely to criticise women, whether in religious 
matters or not. This is illustrated by Hajia Reprem Mishmut’s story of how an innocent 
encounter led to an abuse of her person: 
                                                          
71
 Hajia Reprem Mishmut is a teacher in one of the Primary schools in Jos. She converted to Islam from 
childhood, along with her father and her siblings. She is a widow. Interviewed in Jos. 8/2/2013. 
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There was a day that we went to greet the Gbong Gwom,72 so they put it on the 
news. So when my neighbours [Muslim community members] saw me on the 
television they said to me: “so this woman they say is knowledgeable, how come 
she is visiting the Gbong Gwom? [a Christian and Traditional ruler]. Such 
women are the affronts and the hypocrites that carry stories from the Muslim 
community and go and give it to them (the Christians)... So at the end of the 
discussion, they said to me: “Bari Allah yahada mu da ita.”73 
Implicit in the abuse of converts as hypocrites is the notion that religion is not an 
expression of individual faith and expression but of communal belonging, and that 
conversion or inter-marriage is a betrayal both of one’s community of origin and of the 
new community to which one seeks access. In this way, it clearly affects both male and 
female converts. Mrs Sharki Sharfina reported that her husband suffered when she 
recently returned to Christianity after 20 years as a Muslim. She noted that, “My 
husband ... told me that ... I am ashamed; I cannot freely walk amongst my people 
anymore, they are mocking me that my wife is now gone back to Christianity.” Here 
the implicit accusation that Mrs Sharki Sharfina’s husband was unable to assert proper 
control over his wife is clearly linked to gendered notions of husbandly authority. 
This reference to ideal husbandly control over their wives being linked to the general 
expectation that women should take on their husband’s religion upon marriage shows 
that the mistrust of those from other backgrounds is strongly gendered. These 
gendered expectations imply that in a society where interreligious marriage was, until 
                                                          
72
 The Gbong Gwom is the paramount ruler of Jos and Head of the Plateau State Traditional Council. 
He is a Berom man from Du District. 
73
 My interpretation: “God will make it possible for us to get at her someday.” 
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recently, widespread, there are likely to be many more female than male converts. 
These numbers are boosted by an ethnic component, especially the many marriages 
between Muslims of different backgrounds particularly those between Muslims from 
indigenous and migrant (usually Hausa-speaking) groups, which are increasingly 
divided by the conflicts.  
But more importantly, my interviews suggest that the men in inter-religious marriages 
are much less affected by the suspicion of duplicity. Even though they are not immune 
from criticism they seem to suffer much less from criticism by family members and 
community members, partly because as men they do not acquire another family after 
marriage and therefore are not automatically suspected of deception and dishonesty. 
The reason why women are affected to a much stronger degree by such suspicions is 
that they already hold a position of in-betweenness between their natal families and 
their in-laws. Knowing the inner workings of two families, women are widely recognised 
not only as mediators but also as potential “enemies within” as they are regarded as 
being in the perfect position to play off one group against another.  
Recognising this perception – and fear – of women, many women try to be as quiet 
and as gentle as possible in order to be seen as “responsible.” The less a woman’s 
voice is heard the more responsible she is seen to be. This is illustrated by Hajia Mat 
Gungwen who told me in our interview that when she got married:  
I promised myself just to be a shadow and support behind him [my husband] 
and the children. Just offering my prayer and support for them at all times. I 
have never wanted to be a public person.  
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Given these worries about, and expectations of women, the suspicion directed at them 
on the basis of religion and ethnic origin is not the only direct form of distrust they 
suffer, even though it is clearly linked to the growing impact of ethno-religious clashes. 
As communal boundaries have hardened, women’s lives have become ever more 
subject to control and threats, until in some cases they seem almost impossibly isolated 
and lonely. This isolation will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4.5 Conflict and the Growing Isolation of Women 
Because of their in-between positions, women often have to suffer their resulting 
exclusion and fear alone. For example, Mrs Matyen Muktar74 lives in a compound 
situated in between walls that are approximately 8ft high. The house is a two-storey 
building with a gate made of plain open rods wielded together so that you could see 
from any part of the house exactly who was standing  there. Next to the gate and about 
one foot away from the gate walls is a kennel in which there was a dog that barked 
loudly immediately it sensed there was someone at the gate. This alerted members of 
the house who then looked through the window to see whether the visitor was a 
stranger or member of the family.  
Thus the architecture of the house was such that it provided Mrs Matyen Muktar with 
the necessary comfort and security to live in an environment hostile to someone of a 
different faith, as it was located within one of the most volatile conflict zones of Jos in 
                                                          
74
 Mrs Matyen Muktar is a retiree. She worked with the Plateau state government and was retired 
prematurely at the beginning of the ethnic and religious conflict. She alleged that the termination of her 
appointment might have been related to the growing mistrust among ethnic and religious communities 
and her position as a woman in an inter-faith marriage. Interviewed in Jos. 24/9/2012.  
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a no-go-area for Christians and Mrs Chinyen Muktar is a Christian. Even in a hostile 
environment people of other religions can stay safe inasmuch as they remain within 
their house or even the walls of their compound. If they leave the compound they need 
to be especially careful during a period of conflict. And they have also learnt, for 
example, never to talk back at boys on the streets who are idle and angrily waiting for 
the slightest provocation to be violent.  
 
4.5.1 Isolation and Lack of Acceptance From Friends and Family 
Loneliness exists within the walls of safety for women in mixed-religious marriages. 
Mrs Chinyen Muktar told me she missed her friends and family so much, saying: 
Right now, nobody visits me like that from my own (family) part, they are scared 
to enter this area. All my friends, nobody comes, nobody comes to visit me. We 
only speak on the phone or I find time to go out to visit, you know, which is not 
easy even for me. Even for my husband whose parents came here [to Jos] in 
the early thirties and was born and brought up here. He has never lived 
anywhere other than Plateau, but yet, he is never accepted as an indigene. So 
we do not find it easy, I just wish things will change someday, but for now, we 
are fast losing hope for any change to come.75  
                                                          
75
 Mr Muktar who was present at the time of the corroborated what Mrs Matyen Muktar said and 
explained other aspects of the conflict, especially the government actions which was seen as negative 
towards others. He explained that: “It is very sad that the government does not care for anyone except 
its own. He explained that, the truth is that even if we had looked for scholarship for our children in 
Plateau, we would not have been given the scholarship, and that is the truth, and which I do not think is 
fair, not for me but even for their mother, who is a bona fide indigene of this State.”  He stressed that: 
“we cannot even go and ask for indigenization certificates for this children, because they will refuse, that 
is why we never even tried it you know. I myself was denied land, just because I am not an indigene of 
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In a similar vein, Mrs Sharki Sharfina said that her worry about personal security 
increased her sense of separation from her former friends. After the conflicts began, 
she noted that:  
With the conflict now, relationships with friends have suddenly changed. There 
are points my friend will ask me, are you in Jos? And even if I am in Jos I will 
tell them no, I am not in Jos, because you do not know, somebody is just asking 
you to send people after you. 
The statement by Mrs Sharki Sharfina suggests that the lack of trust further increases 
her sense of loneliness. The lack of trust also makes is easier for others to justify 
discrimination and can easily constitute negative attitude towards others which 
sharpens existing segregation from the outside world.76 Mrs Sharki Sharfina considers 
that she is watching helplessly as people of the same religion say to her: “you are a 
Muslim... amma fa yare ne (but you got a tribe), you are coming from somewhere so 
you definitely suffer.” Mrs Sharki Sharfina’s statement illustrates the concept of ‘arne 
(pegan)’ and women’s in-betweenness which I will love to explore in the future. 
Similarly, Hajia Manporem Mahmood77, a Christian-Muslim convert who was a young 
mother and a student at the time of this interview had lived peacefully in a compound 
                                                          
Plateau, that is the truth and I have lived all my life here. My parents came here in the early thirties and 
I was born and brought up here and I have never lived anywhere other than Plateau, but yet am not 
finding it easy.” Interviewed in Jos. 24/9/2012. 
76
 This could be referring to Jos and other Middle Belt States. This is an area where these women live 
and so can easily be described as their outside world. 
 
77
 Hajia Manporem Mahmood converted to Islam after marriage. She is a young mother and her children 
are quite young. 
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with her neighbours and some of her in-laws until the 2010 Jos crises. She explained 
that:  
The 2010 crises was the worst moment in my life and to me the most 
devastating of them all. You know, nobody will relate to me, talk to me and they 
all avoided me. They just treated me like an outcast ... even sometimes they will 
gather in front of my house and be saying all sorts of insulting words and things 
that they know will offend me. 
The narrative shows that conflict has not just affected relationships with neighbours 
but also those with friends and extended family members. For instance, Mrs Chinyen 
Muktar explained that family members who used to visit her freely and who have stayed 
with her in the past no longer come to her house. Even those who want to come are 
afraid to do so because of the dangers of the area she lives in. She said: 
Conflict is not good really ... before I used to go to town for my [church] service, 
but now with all the security challenges, I cannot go again. And [the] painful 
aspect of it is that my friends cannot visit me. I miss them and… when I try to 
encourage them to come, they always turn it down... I am feeling they too have 
their fears. Now I have only my husband as my best friend and my children as 
my friends. 
 
4.5.2 The Trauma of Isolation 
For most women I interviewed coping with the pain and agony resulting from isolation 
and loneliness, just as Mrs Matyen Muktar experienced is a continual struggle they 
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have to face in their everyday life. Being cut off from family and friends is often 
experienced as a trauma due to the overwhelming social distance created. For 
instance, Maryam Babba 78 explained that she experienced her loneliness as a direct 
result of violence: 
This psychological trauma in me ... [I] kept thinking about the people that, I 
know, were killed and burnt... and, you know, my good friends who happened 
to be Christians and even some of my closest friends that we grew up together, 
we went to the same primary school together, that I cannot even visit now, that 
I cannot keep on that good relationship that we had due to the conflict has a 
psychological effect on me, you know; the fact that I cannot move freely or visit 
my friends any more is socially distressing. 
Another burden created by religious conflict in addition to the trauma of social isolation 
is that community and neighbourhood groups – often young men – assume for 
themselves the roles of guardians of the community. In this role they often attempt to 
control and police women. The easily visible nature of how women dress is often the 
focus of such policing. For example, wearing the veil in a Christian dominated area or 
dressing in skirts and trousers in a Muslim dominated area sets women apart from the 
norm in that area, and they become victims of provocative attacks or face immediate 
violence by the self-appointed male vigilantes. 
 
                                                          
78
 Maryam Bappa is a young mother who has just had her first baby. She is well educated and lives in 
one of the conflict flash points of Jos. She is not in any formal employment or engaged in any business 
activity at the time of this interview, but depend on the financial support of her husband. Interviewed in 
Jos. 19/1/2013. 
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4.5.3 Stigmatising, Policing and Attacks on Women’s Dressing 
Stigmatising women because of what they wear also occurs in public functions and 
professional environments. Hajia Reprem Mishmut narrated an experience that 
illustrates the way in which community groups can intimidate women who no longer 
visibly belong to the community: 
During December, my brother invited me to go and help him during the 
Christmas holiday ... When I finished some chores, I decided go and see my 
other relatives ... When I was walking in the village, the youths kept shouting; 
hey you woman, where are you going? What brought you here? You better 
remove that thing [a hijab] you are wearing... You see we face a lot of challenges 
from both sides, the rejection is eating [us] up seriously. 
The statement above points to the hostility women come face to face with as a result 
the conflict. Such comments mostly directed at women is part of the way in which the 
experience of conflict in Jos and other parts of the Middle has made it easier for men 
to internalise how an ideal good women should dress or behave. For instance, women 
are taught to ignore derogatory comments for the sake of peace, because an angry 
response is usually taken to confirm the assumption of bad character. Such comments 
and remarks play a very important part in making life difficult for those married into 
another community. In some cases, women even endure accusations of contamination 
from their own family members. The experience of Hajia Kamran Jepmu  sheds light 
on the way women’s lives are being controlled even under normal circumstances, 
sometimes by family members considered much younger than them but who enjoy the 
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privilege of being male. Hajia Kamran Jepmu faced many challenges at the beginning 
of her marriage. She said: 
When I delivered my first daughter I wanted to go home and show her to my 
parents. My own junior brother said to me: ‘I am going to kill you and the baby 
if you dare visit us.’  He said he does not want any Muslim or Muslim baby in 
their house, because it is a contamination of the full indigene blood. He started 
beating me with the girl, he tore my clothes ... to the extent that we were 
admitted in the Hospital.  
Thus, women are targeted partly because of their choice of husband and more 
because of their gender. The statement above demonstrates how ethnic and religious 
divisions further isolate women. The main source of comfort for many women suffering 
the loneliness of growing suspicion from their natal family and community is their 
immediate family, i.e. their husbands and children. For instance, Mrs Matyen Muktar 
told me her husband is her best friend and that his home, even though the area is 
dangerous for Christians like herself is her home. She told me: “There is nowhere like 
home and your family are your friends.” She said: “I married my husband getting to 37 
years now”79 and explained: 
We all live here in peace with one another and I had my nephews who lived 
here with us from childhood and they are orphans. This is their home from 
childhood and we are the only parents they have known all this while, but with 
                                                          
79I noticed a big smile on Mr Muktar’s face when his wife said “my husband is my childhood friend and 
my best friend.”  
131 
 
the conflict they had to go because they are Christians, and with the lingering 
ethnic and religious intolerance, they had to leave. 
Not all marriages survive the pressures of the conflict. For Hajia Sharki Sharfina, the 
challenge was much more than her family could bear. She narrated the effect of the 
fall-out from the 2010 crisis on her own life: 
One of the day I was in the office like that and the crisis in Jos started and my 
husband rang me and asked: ‘where are you’? I said I was in the office, and he 
said, I am leaving the house oh, you better hurry up and come and see your 
children, because I am going [away]. I said to him, where are you going to? He 
said just hurry up, they have started fighting from Bukuru and before it gets here 
I am going to leave. I said to him why are you leaving the children, can you go 
with them and when I come to collect them? He said no, he does not even know 
where he is going to, so I should just hurry up.  
I drove out my car from the office as quickly as I can  [as if I was going to fly] ... 
I got home and I called my children, are you all home?, and they said they are 
all home, and I said enter, and they all entered the living room where I was.  And 
I said to them, there is crisis already and your father had left. And immediately 
I opened my door I saw a letter on the bed that he had written me that he had 
to leave. In it he said he could not put up with it anymore, he could not stay any 
more, he feels so mocked and he feels he will be safer among his Muslim 
brothers than where he is, so I should take care of the children.80 
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 Mrs Sharki Sharfina narrated this aspect of her life to me with tears in her eyes and with so much pain 
in her voice. I remembered my eyes became so teary too and we had to stop the interview for a moment 
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The position of Hajia Sharki Sharfina in the narrative above presents part of the very 
complex and inevitable challenge that results from separation from their spouse, for 
example this situation where women in an inter-faith marriage have had to face divorce 
due to the displacement arising from the segregated settlements. As pointed out by 
Fukshiwe (2010: 38), “residential relationships hardly remain the same after violent 
conflicts, because what…follow[ed] such acts are separation, segregation and 
polarisation.” He stressed further that ‘people whose houses were destroyed no longer 
feel secure’ particularly when the reason for the destruction is ethnically and religiously 
motivated.  In Jos itself and in some outlying villages, the violence has led to ethnic 
cleansing where the animosity and hatred recalls the Rwandan genocide, each group 
with the intension of wippingout the other, as formerly mixed villages or Jos 
neighbourhoods now consist of only one ethnic group and in some cases predominant 
religious groups. If an outsider is detected, he risks being killed on the spot (Campbell 
& Harwood, 2013).  The result of this situation is that women often face forced divorce, 
due to the insecurity associated with the conflict where they or their spouses are easily 
targeted. As will be discussed in the next section, looking after children under such 
conditions also becomes very challenging. 
 
4.6 The Impact of Isolation on Children from Inter-faith Marriages 
Many women persevere in extremely difficult circumstances in order to stay and watch 
their children grow up but as explained below, the narratives reveal that what they 
                                                          
until she asked to continue. The strength she displayed after she noticed I was equally worried enabled 
us to carry on with the interview.  
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suffer also affects their children. Unfortunately I was unable to interview such children 
due to time and ethical constraints so I refer here to interviews with parents, and 
especially mothers. Hajia Kamran Jepmu and many other women I interviewed told me 
that their children do not move around freely because people call them all sorts of 
names and look at them with so much disdain. According to Hajia Kamran Jepmu, the 
children face discrimination arising from both their religion and ethnicity depending on 
the context. As individuals who are at least partly affected by the problematic in-
betweenness of their mothers, they have limited authority to speak. Hajia Kamran 
Jepmu further explains: 
The experience is not good. It pains me sometimes, it pains me ... even for my 
children they always tell them that they are Beroms and they will say yes we are 
Beroms. And sometimes when they are abusing the governor81 and my children 
join in the discussion, they will tell them to just keep quiet, Beroms are not part 
of this conversation. 
Added to the inability to freely join in discussions with their peers, the children of mixed 
marriages often feel insecure among friends and neighbours which is a very ugly side 
of the crises according to most of the mothers.  
                                                          
81
 There is a deep rooted and un-resolved animosity between the Berom and Hausa-Fulani community 
in Jos due to political power contestation, struggle over chieftaincy and indigeneity. The Hausa- Fulani 
believe the Beroms, with the Governor Jonah Jang as their chief representative, have denied them their 
rights in Plateau State for a long time and that the Beroms are fanning conflicts through their actions. 
Similarly, that the Governor of Plateau State who is a Berom man adds to the complexity of the issues. 
It is a widely held view by a large number of the Hausa-Fulani in Jos that he imposed a Berom candidate 
in the Jos North Local Government Election in 2007 against popular will and vote of the people. And the 
governor was accused of imposing a member of his village and clan.  They are of the opinion that if 
elections are to be free and fair in Jos North, it will be difficult for an indigene to win. Hajia Matporem is 
Berom. 
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Many families where parents come from different backgrounds have now relocated to 
areas where they feel they are safe and life itself is less threatening. In a related study, 
Achi (2007:31) rightly points out that “Christians build houses and live where they have 
[a] dominant population and likewise the Muslims.” This study found similar settlement 
patterns in Jos, as since the 2001 crises families have continued to build, buy land and 
transact businesses along religious lines in most instances and sometimes ethnic lines. 
This is probably because they assume it is safer to reside among their own ethnic or 
religious group.  
For instance, Hajia Matporem Mahmood told me they have just moved into a new area, 
and that the reason for doing that was that her children felt they were no longer safe 
where they were. She narrated an incident that took place which involved her daughter 
and a neighbour:  
My daughter then was in Trust International School. She was coming back from 
school and a neighbouring daughter was calling her and shouting; “Ke yar arna, 
yar arna”82 My daughter was bitter ... They came face to face with each other 
and so my daughter got hold of her and beat her up. So she [the girl who had 
abused my daughter] went back home crying.  The sisters came out without 
inquiring into what happened and started raining abuses. So I came out and 
said to them; why would she call her yar arna? Is it Islam for a Hausa man 
alone? If it is so, her dad is a Hausa man, so where does the arnanchi come 
from? Is it because from me [her mother]? So one of them turned and said yes, 
                                                          
82
 My translation “Hey you daughter of an infidel.” 
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we call you arnas because we do not trust your religion and we do not trust you 
as Muslims.  
It became a big scandal that day. Those works pierced painfully into my heart 
and my children also felt the same way. So you see life became unbearable 
since the incident even for my kids. And they kept on repeating the same 
provocatively and it became a recurrent issue. My kids were always scared and 
at night they will tell me, mummy let us run away from this place. So one day, I 
just decided to leave the area. 
At the time of this incident her children were between ages two and twelve, and the 
community they lived in was intolerant and hostile to them as they could not move 
about freely, and at night they had to ask their mother if they were safe living in the 
area. These children have become worried about their safety. Their mother has the 
additional worry of rejection from friends, neighbours and in-laws as well as worrying 
about the safety of, and the constant fear expressed by, her children.  
 
Hajia Manporem Mahmood’s narrative, and that of many other women mentioned 
above, also confirmed that it is not only the community that sees such children as 
outsiders but the paternal family may do so as well, especially if they dislike the mother 
from the onset. For instance, she explained that: 
For the children, it is not only outsiders that treat them that way, even their own 
paternal family. It is almost the same thing. You know, they transferred the 
hatred that they had for me to them. It became unbearable for me [us]. It 
reached a point where my brothers-in-law were threatening me to leave the 
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house or they will burn the house. So that instil [led] fear in the children and I 
thought it was wise to listen to them to relocate to a safer area. 
Leaving such an area becomes imperative when a woman feels so threatened that she 
does not dare to leave the house. Faced by taunts, abuse and threats, or even with 
physical violence, many women are unable to move freely, including going to the 
markets to buy foodstuffs.83 If they are then also ostracised by the small traders who 
move from house to house to sell wares the family goes hungry. Hajia Kamran Jepmu 
summarised the dilemma well. According to her:  
Most women and their children suffer…the problem for most women is when 
there is these conflicts [sic] because when they stay at home, the children can 
cry at home, they do not have food to eat, and there is nowhere to buy the food. 
Once oppression has reached this point many women consider it is wiser to move and 
live in an area where they feel safe, they can move freely, and their family does not 
starve. 
Not all the women I interviewed had experienced this problem, and it is striking that, 
as noted in the previous section, those who are wealthier than average were exempted 
from abuse and threats by neighbours. Many of them live in areas that were former 
Government Reserve Areas (called GRAs) during the colonial era which have now 
become home to the comfortable and rich. They also suffered less interference from 
in-laws and society in general, and it appears that their children too are more confident. 
                                                          
83My informal interaction with most of the women revealed that, whenever the mothers are unable to go 
out and get food stuff and the neighbours are unwilling to assist. The family has to manage the little they 
have stocked in the home and that implies reduced nutrition for the children and the family. 
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Mrs Mat Gungwen reported that the members of her family sometimes managed to 
find something positive in the conflicts: 
During conflicts we normally joke and say to each other during our meal times 
[that] if people come to kill us we can use each other for our defence, because 
the family is a combination of both Islam and Christianity. My son has always 
said he is the only one to bring peace in Jos and the Plateau. Because he has 
parents practicing both religions living together...my son goes everywhere, 
whether it is a Christian area or a Muslim area. 
While this is a good and positive story from Mrs Mat Gungwen, who happens to be 
living in affluence and luxury, it points to the fact that certain people in a particular 
social position can avoid socially undesirable experiences and achieve socially 
desirable experiences. It equally shows that people ranked higher up the social ladder 
have a better chance of securing socially desirable goals and avoiding undesirable 
things like conflict situations, as is the case in Jos and the Middle Belt. Even though 
the serious religious tension and conflict has had an impact on everyone in some way, 
those that have a higher social position and money obviously have the capacity to 
deflect some of the negative impacts of the religious conflict, partly because they reside 
in one of the planned and safe areas, while those that lack resources and power are 
left to suffer the consequences.  
Equally, the conflict has provided an opportunity for Mrs Mat Gungwen and her children 
to have a positive view of their in-betweenness, since they can relate with ease to 
people from both religions because of their social status and position. They are of the 
opinion that if people of different faiths marry and manage to live peacefully with one 
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another they can actually be peace ambassadors who inspire others. Having a positive 
stake in both religions, they are truly in the position to bring peace to the State by using 
their families as examples. 
In contrast to the experience of Mrs Mat Gungwen are the narratives of Mrs Larep 
Bulat84 and Mrs Sharki Sharfina, both of whom are less well off. For Mrs Sharki 
Sharfina, who re-converted to Christianity after two decades as a Muslim, the conflict 
has made life difficult for her children who cannot move freely and who have to come 
to terms with the fact that their father had to leave them due to the conflict. Moreover, 
the children, who are Muslims, also have to put up with her life as a Christian in a 
Christian neighbourhood which has exposed them to taunts and abuse. As we 
interacted, she told me that: 
I am truly challenged, because even my children sometimes when I wake them 
up and I pray with them, I do not know if it hurts them. As Muslims, I wake them 
up before they go to school, before everybody packs his box, we sit down and 
we pray together. I pray and say to them; I leave you in the merciful hands of 
God. But deep in my heart, I ask myself ... are they really happy? I do not really 
know whether they are happy, but they just take it because it is me, their mother 
... they know where they are now, that they are in the midst of Christians. And 
                                                          
84Mrs Larep Bulat is a Fulani woman. She converted to Christianity shortly before marriage. She is an 
employee of the Local Government Authority in Plateau State. Her family members are all Muslims. She 
told me during the interview that she has two other cousins of hers who are now married to Christian 
men and have converted to Christianity. They all face serious oppositions from their families and she 
said they have severally told her to give up her marriage in the heat of the crises. 
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they have to accept it, or they are just doing it to please me or to find a place to 
stay.  
Even though Hajia Sharki Sharfina is a Christian and lives in a Christian community, 
she still feels insecure because of her children, more so that “the problem associated 
with segregation is that it has tremendous effects on other aspects of communal and 
residential interrelations” (Fukshiwe, 2010: 39-40). These changes in residential 
interrelations cause additional pain women in interfaith marriages who have their 
children to look after 
. For instance Hajia Sharki Sharfina told me that she is always making sure she 
provides them with all that they need within the walls of their compound because she 
does not want to expose them to the harm of the outside world. She told me that she 
has to always be vigilant and alert to the news of any conflict, so that she can keep her 
children safe by hiding them or keeping them in the house. She will then go out to fetch 
water, cook and do everything for them until calm returns. 
 
The experience of Mrs Larep Bulat is different again, perhaps because she is one of 
the few Fulani Muslim converts to Christianity, having become a Christian at Secondary 
School in Jos and eventually marrying an indigenous Christian man. She now lives in 
a Christian dominated area and explained that like the Muslim children of originally 
Christian mothers, her children were very careful about their safety. She said: 
My children do not look like Fulani and they all bear Christian names. So they 
are very careful where they go to. They do not just move freely to the Muslim 
areas, because they are not sure what happens. 
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While this statement suggests that the children are careful in Muslim areas it does not 
refer to their abuse from threats by other Muslims. Given the small number of 
respondents this may be an exception to the rule, but it may also reflect the different 
heritages of Middle Belt Christianity and Northern Nigerian Islam. Islam in Northern 
Nigeria has been historically shaped by strong concerns over correct practice. While 
general conversion to Islam has been encouraged since the 1960s, often the doctrinal 
boundaries between different Muslim groups continue to reflect different social strata. 
In contrast, during the 19th and 20th centuries Christian missionaries throughout West 
Africa accepted converts of all social backgrounds as true Christians, and the belief in 
a new start through conversion or being ‘born again’ is still strongly emphasised, 
especially in Nigeria’s Pentecostal Churches. It is possible that as a result, Christian 
children from mixed marriages experience slightly less discrimination than Muslim 
children in the same position. Mrs Larep Bulat, however, added that: 
I can remember one day my son told me that mum you have to start teaching 
me how to speak this Fulani more seriously. With that, I can move freely and if 
someday I get caught up in crises somewhere that I needed to speak Fulani, 
then I will speak and be accepted as belonging to that ethnic group.  
Mrs Larep Bulat’s statement also implies that her children did not see their Muslim 
ancestry as being quite as damaging as that of the Muslim children of Christian 
converts, and that they could envisage themselves as bridging the religious gap and 
being saved by just knowing and speaking their mother’s language. While her 
children’s request to learn Fulani may have been made half in jest, it suggests that 
they also see their mother’s origin as a potentially valuable resource rather than as a 
burden in the confusing religious landscape of Jos.  
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But as women in inter-faith marriages and their children face a daily struggle due to 
severed relationships, some children regard their exposure to both religions in a 
positive light. Overall, therefore, the situation for children of inter-faith marriages is 
similar in many respects to that experienced by their mothers. While more research is 
needed to explore in what ways such children are affected by the conflict in the long 
term,85 the worry about their children’s safety and well-being is certainly something that 
affected most mothers I spoke to. Beyond that, it seems to me that these children’s 
lack of trust that they have had since childhood, and for some since the beginning of 
the conflict, will certainly have implications for the society in the near future. This, too, 
is something that mothers worry about. 
 
4.7 Conclusion: The Inbetweeness of Women as Victims of Social Isolation 
I have argued that women in inter-faith marriages find themselves in situations of in-
betweenness when they come face to face with the frustrations of life in conflict and 
post-conflict environments. Married women in particular are often caught in the web of 
apparently contradictory relationships. Their loyalties are often shared – or divided – 
in relation to their husbands, brothers-in-law, mother-in-law, and sisters, and in many 
cases between Christianity and Islam. Their in-betweenness exists irrespective of 
whether they convert or whether they remain unconverted. However, while Strathern 
has highlighted the fact that women’s in-betweenness puts them into a theoretical 
position of choice, our research demonstrates that in reality that theoretical position 
                                                          
85An in-depth study of the impact of conflict and the social isolation on children in inter-faith marriages 
is one that I would love to undertake in the near future. This is because interviewing their mothers does 
not just explain the predicament they are in at the moment, but highlights the impact of the decisions 
and choices parents make about their children. 
142 
 
often leads to a narrowing of options. It is women’s in-between position that legitimises 
the suspicion they experience from in-laws, family and community. Consequently, they 
are affected not only as individuals, but also in their typically female roles of wives and 
mothers, and in many cases their children experience similar scrutiny. And my 
research also suggests that their husbands too have their own share of problems that 
arise from appearing somehow suspicious through their familial links. While their 
experiences tend to be less dramatic overall, it is my desire that this research opens 
up more discussions on these gendered and relational aspects of being out of place.  
The suspicion experienced by women and their children (and occasionally their 
husbands) as a result of standing in-between conflicting groups and beliefs illustrates 
the intimate links between religious conflict and the declining sense of social trust in 
private lives. As noted, the trust between citizens and communities in Jos and the 
Middle Belt has declined, and consequently women are affected simply by virtue of 
their position within the family, not to mention their activities in the economic, political 
and public sectors. Most of the women I interviewed are unable to engage in simple 
everyday activities such as maintaining good relations with parents as well as in-laws, 
and fulfilling their roles as wives and mothers.  
In his hierarchy of needs, Maslow (1943) argues that for people to pursue higher order 
needs which will enable them to develop and heighten their cultural and academic 
intelligence, they first need to satisfy their basic needs of food, security and shelter.  
Unfortunately, religious conflict in Jos and the Middle Belt has affected women in the 
sense of undermining the basis of their food, security and shelter arising from 
displacement. If this is the case, and if people cannot develop their cultural and 
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academic intelligence without securely addressing their primary needs, it is fair to say 
that in the long run the conflict will reduce the cultural and academic intelligence of 
displaced children and their parents. Nonetheless, it is important here to remember 
that social position and income can provide greater flexibility and even open options. 
Even though all persons are in some way impacted by conflict and violence, those that 
have higher social positions by virtue of their ethnic background and greater financial 
resources have the capacity to deflect some of the negative impact of the religious 
conflict.  
As the narratives of this chapter have illustrated, enduring conflict also leads to a 
normalization of violence in private lives, and especially of those female lives which 
are seen to challenge the boundaries of conflicting groups. Our research indicates that 
the disposition of the average Nigerian living in Jos and the Middle Belt is being 
transformed as violence is becoming internalized and perceived as normal. When 
violence becomes normal, people become insensitive used to violence. As discussed 
in this chapter, violence has now become institutionalised in everyday life in Jos as 
women in inter-faith marriages and their children come face to face with threats, 
mistrust, ill-treatment and isolation on a daily basis. On ethnic and/or religious grounds 
some women are treated by their family members in a dehumanizing way, they 
experience their in-laws or co-wives treating them as less than human, and their 
children are harassed on the street. Much of the violence that has now become 
mundane and prosaic in Jos and the Middle Belt is committed by people who think it is 
alright for them to violate normal ethical principles that should be observed in human 
relations for the sake of an ultimate religious or ethnic goal.  
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In this context, the chapter also highlights an important issue in the state of Nigerian 
society, namely the inability of the institutions of the state to be efficacious in 
implementing or guaranteeing life and the safety of the property of citizens. Even 
though Nigerian women as citizens have democratic rights that are guaranteed to them 
in the Nigerian constitution, those rights are not worth the paper they are written on 
because the state lacks the capacity to enforce the democratic rights of these female 
citizens. If women challenge, simply by virtue of their in-between position, the 
hardening boundaries of ethno-religious groups, they are on their own because the 
state is not capable of protecting or guaranteeing their rights as citizens. This raises 
fundamental questions about the form and the substance of the Nigerian postcolonial 
state, and its instrumentalisation of disorder (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). The fact that 
women are far more likely than men to be subject to violence simply on the basis of 
their structural position as wives, i.e. people in-between families and communities, this 
means that social disorder affects women disproportionately. As a result, disorder 
certainly has to be conceptualised as an important factor in gender relations. 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that women in religious inter-marriages 
experience frustration and isolation during and after the conflict. Women continue to 
suffer due to the impact of conflict on their social positions, and by extension their wider 
social networks. As a result those who marry outside a different group are likely to have 
little opportunity to compete for political positions. In addition, there are other forms of 
discrimination against these women, for example in their professional relationships and 
at their work places. The subsequent chapters describe how women are affected in 
the economic arena, and in the political and formal sector.    
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     CHAPTER FIVE  
 THE CONFLICT, MARKET AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN JOS AND THE 
 MIDDLE BELT 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers an analysis of the impact of ethno-religious conflict on economic 
activities, particularly those that characterise interactions and the utilisation of public 
spaces in the markets in Jos and other parts of the Middle Belt (Kaduna, Nasarawa 
and Benue). The conflict has shaped the socioeconomic space, particularly market 
interactions, resulting in ethnic and religious differentiation in market relations (see 
Lyon & Porter, 2009: 910). This has created mistrust between people of the same and 
different religions, as the markets have in most instances adopted patterns similar to 
the increasing residential division along religio-ethnic lines as communities continued 
to be severed by the conflict. Similarly, the resulting displacement has affected the 
economic situation and has created major strains in economic interactions, making it 
increasingly difficult for women to trade and maintain healthy economic relationships.  
Due to the conflict, people have lost their businesses and the economic co-
dependence that theoretically promotes a stable society and peace has been severed 
by displacement and relocations. Fukshiwe (2010)86 has noted that the conflicts in Jos 
have not just created strains in human relations but have affected the residential 
architectural pattern and movement in the affected areas. These residential patterns 
result both from displacement and the fear of association, i.e. the fact that people no 
longer feel secure among members of groups which have a conflictual relationship with 
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  Fukshiwe, (2010) also wrote on the effects of conflict on Residential Relationships in Jos. 
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their own. This fear of association has infiltrated the market space in Jos, Kaduna, 
Nasarawa and Markurdi breeding mistrust, and by implication, women’s economic 
survival. Because they “have long played a critical role in market trade across most of 
Nigeria and much of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa” (Porter, Lyon, Adamu & Obafemi, 
2010: 32), disruption in the market and trading activities,  the indigene versus non-
indigene dichotomy and the division of the communities along ethnic and religious lines 
affect their economic prosperity. 
The data from this research sheds light on the nature of relationships that take place 
amidst this growing segregation, and the narratives have certainly implicated the 
interventions of government as being instrumental to the polarisation of markets, 
particularly along ethnic or religious lines. At the same time, they reveal the extent to 
which men and particularly women maintain trade networks in other ways against all 
the odds to remain in business. This has been achieved through the maintenance of 
some form of arrangement based on past networks of trust, which implies the crossing 
of ethnic or religious divisions. 
5.2 Composition of the Markets in Jos 
The establishment of markets in Jos in the early 20th century was stimulated by the 
commencement of the tin mining activity of 1905. As set out earlier, “the region was 
once an important tin mining area, and it is very mixed ethnically, with indigenous 
Biroms and Hausa, Kanuri and other migrants, some of whom came to work the mines” 
(Porter, 1993: 58). Several markets within Jos were set up in close proximity to tin 
mining camps to service the growing population of migrants and mine workers, their 
families and visitors. Later, the largest ultramodern indoor market in West Africa was 
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also built in Jos in 1975 and commissioned in 1985. Other important markets in Jos 
include the Dilimi auto spare parts (and accessories), scrap iron and wholesale 
groceries market; the Gangare yams, Irish potatoes and vegetables market; the 
Kwararafa oil and soup ingredients market and the Farin Gada vegetable market, 
which is one of the busiest local vegetable markets in Plateau State and supplies 
traders all over Nigeria, especially from the Eastern and Western part of Nigeria, with 
tomatoes and other vegetables.  
Figure 1. A cross-section of the Farin Gada Vegetable Market  
Source: Field notes 2012/2013 © Plangsat Dayil 
Many of the green vegetables at the Farin Gada market are retailed by women as seen 
in the picture above, while many inter-state and regional transporters and suppliers of 
these vegetables are men. Similarly, many of the yam retailers at the Gada-Biyu 
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market are women (see Figure 2), while the men are involved with sourcing and 
transporting yams from the hinterlands. Almost every ethnic group in Nigeria trades in 
this market, and there is a large presence of Hausa male traders who also constitute 
a greater percentage of the leadership of the market. 
Figure 2. The Gada Biyu Vegetable and Yam Section of the Market  
    Source: Field notes 2012/2013 © Plangsat Dayil. 
5.3 Conflict and the Division of Markets  
In Jos, prior to 2001,87 markets were basically shared between Muslims and Christians 
because many of them, the middlemen and commission agents for most of the grains 
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 The 2001 Jos conflict was said to have been triggered by two factors: the appointment of a Muslim 
politician Alhaji Muktar Mohammed as local coordinator of the Federal Poverty Alleviation Programme, 
and the occasion when a Christian woman attempted to cross a barricaded street leading to Congo-
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and vegetables were Muslim men, while the retailers were predominantly Christian 
women with Muslim women mostly trading within compounds. This cleavage of both 
gender and religion was typical for many markets in Jos, and for Plateau State and the 
Middle Belt more generally, although it is not universal. However, some of these 
cleavages have declined since 2001 due to increasing tensions following the conflict 
(Lyon & Porter, 2009: 916). The implication of this is that markets have adopted 
patterns similar to the increasing residential division along religio-ethnic lines whereby 
a significant development associated with the division of existing markets has been the 
expansion of the number of markets within Jos. There are now two rival, ethnically and 
religiously segregated markets on either side of the Bukuru expressway (Higazi, 2011: 
27). The Gyel market is dominated by Christians, while the Muslims have remained in 
the old Bukuru market. Formerly religiously mixed markets like the Dilimi Market, 
Kwararafa market and a greater proportion of the Katako market have now become 
religiously stratified and are dominated by Muslim traders. The new markets in Gada 
Biyu and Cholbe junction have mainly Christian traders. In all the above cases, the 
Christian – and predominantly female – traders left the markets during or after the crisis 
(Lyon & Porter, 2009: 917). This is due to two main reasons: the danger to their lives 
after losing their businesses, and secondly, the perception of the problem as being 
communal rather than individual.   
The division of the markets was in most cases also alleged to have been supported by 
community leaders or the local government. In the predominantly Muslim Bukuru 
                                                          
Russia, set up by a few Muslims during prayers. Over 1000 lives were lost and several places of worship 
burnt down in a conflict that lasted nearly two weeks; from 7 to17 September.  
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market, rumours suggest that Christians were encouraged to move to the new Gyel 
market by the local government after the 19th January 2010 conflict. While it is not clear 
whether local government was behind the idea for separation, many of my female 
Christian respondents who formerly traded in Bukuru said they had approached the 
District Head of Gyel to ask him to assist them by providing them with an empty plot of 
land, which he granted. Elsewhere, Gada Biyu market sprang from Dilimi Market when 
Christian traders moved away from Dilimi after the 2008 conflict into a half-completed 
building of the market under construction and the empty land around the market, where 
the government later completed the market infrastructure. As a result, the present 
division and segmentation is a result of insecurity as well as government intervention. 
Overall, the creation of new and predominantly Christian markets has disempowered 
and angered members of the Muslim community. The simple duplication of the markets 
that has taken place has implications for the trade in the existing markets, and in the 
predominantly Muslim markets, like Kwararafa, retailers complain of the resulting lower 
turnover and profitability. Interestingly, respondents from the predominantly Christian 
Gyel market had the same complaint at the time of this interview. Interaction with the 
market women and men in all these locations illustrates that the division of markets 
has reduced the profits of many individual traders.  
 
5.4 Survival Strategy of Traders from Divided Markets 
To cope with the changes and divisions affecting these markets, women as well as 
men have had to devise new means of making ends meet, and a growing number of 
people now trade outside the markets. To a large extent this depends on the ability of 
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buyers and sellers to reach an agreement on where to meet outside the existing market 
settings - normally by the road side. Such arrangements became necessary because 
most of the items sold in the markets have an ethnic or geographical origin and “there 
is the domination of the marketing chain by particular ethnic groups” (see Porter, Lyon, 
Adamu & Obafemi, 2010: 35). So a relationship of dependency exists, with each group 
dependent on the other. For instance, the crayfish sold in the markets mostly comes 
from the South-South and South-East of Nigeria and its sellers tend to be Christians. 
The cattle ready for slaughter are usually sold by Fulani who are from the North and 
are mainly Muslims. A greater proportion of the vegetables transported to the South-
South and South-West comes from rural farmers who are Christians, but also from Jos 
township irrigation farmers who tend to be Muslims. Understanding these links in the 
context of our earlier analysis of the go- and no-go-areas of Jos means that the division 
of markets along ethnic and religious lines has serious implications for not just women 
and men in business, but also for their customers. Those who are not prepared to enter 
markets or trading areas associated with the other religious group have to contend with 
more limited market choices.  
In order to ensure that at least some exchange takes place, Christian and Muslim 
marketers now have safe-supply-zones where they meet to get supplies associated 
with the other group, often along the major roads. Some of the market men and women 
are beginning to appreciate the fact that buyers and sellers cannot do without each 
other, even in the most volatile conflict (cf. Lyon & Porter, 2009: 916). Mrs Maman 
Muduka88 is the women’s leader of foodstuff sellers in one of the markets in Jos. She 
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 Mrs Maman Muduka is the women leader of foodstuff sellers in one of the markets in Jos. Interviewed 
in Jos. 7/9/2012 
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was formerly a trader at the Bukuru Market, but lost all her property during the 2010 
crises after which she rebuilt her business at Gyel. She reflected that: 
The Hausas [Muslims] are [divided] into two [groups] … those who love crises 
and those who hate it. In fact, there was a time I went to Bauchi to buy food stuff 
and crisis erupted. The road was unsafe and the whole market was scattered… 
This my customer kept me and watched over me till everywhere was calm. I 
could see he was so sad and angry with those who perpetrate violence. You 
see whenever we [Christian and Muslim] marketers hear that conflict has 
erupted we are sad, because market becomes slow and we incur a lot of loss. 
That is why a lot of them [Muslims] are against it, when they do not sell and we 
cannot buy, we both cannot make any money and so we cannot make any profit. 
The narrative above goes a long way to show that even though the many markets in 
Jos are divided along ethnic and religious lines, market men and women of different 
religions are often part of a shared economic network, and relate to each other as 
partners rather than enemies. This arises, at least in part, from the recognition that 
they are heavily dependent on each other for their economic prosperity. They have 
over the period of the conflicts developed strong trust in their ability to protect one 
another for mutual benefit (see Lyon & Porter, 2009). Through trust, they have 
strengthened and sustained the demand and supply of goods and services even at 
times when conflict was ongoing. 
 
5.4.1 Dependence on Financial Support from Family, Religious and NGOs 
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Most women re-establish themselves economically after conflicts through their own 
personal efforts (see Fukshiwe, 2010). They are also in some instances dependent on 
their religious bodies and their original families’ financial support to re-establish lost 
businesses. A good proportion of women have depended on the NGOs who offer them 
not just immediate financial and practical assistance, but also provide emotional 
support and counselling. For instance, the Justice Peace and Development Caritas 
(JDPC) have organised sessions with the women who were caught in the conflict and 
have lost their means of livelihood. While Government assistance was considered very 
low or absent, Christian and Muslim religious organisations and bodies have provided 
a lot of help. For instance, some of my respondents said their religious bodies gave 
them seed capital after they lost their original businesses. According to one Madam 
Ladi Maibaki: 89 
I lost everything to the conflict in 2010. My stall was completely looted. I came 
in one morning and saw that the shop had disappeared. It was not burnt, but 
intentionally broken into and brought down to its foundation. My entire family 
depends on this business. I had to fall back to the Church…it was their little 
offering that gave me the starting capital to bounce back even stronger…I know 
you will want me to disclose the amount, but I will not. I used the money well 
and that is how I moved out of the Bukuru market to Gyel.  
It was not possible to establish if she had additional capital from banks and lending 
agencies because her shop was huge and left me wondering how she would have 
achieved such phenomenal success with the ‘little offering’ knowing that the family also 
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 Madam Ladi Maibaki is one of the leaders of Gyel Market in Jos. Interviewed in Jos. 20/9/2012. 
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depends on that business. Because many traders could not access credit through 
banks (cf. Lyon & Porter, 2007: 909) they resorted to using the wonder banks90 aka 
money doublers, who offered what appeared to be mouth-watering, very attractive 
investment opportunities such as: getting between 100 and 200 percent profit return 
on investment, but who actually swindled a large amount of money out of people, 
especially market women. This situation forced many market women out of business 
as they were cheated out of their trading capital.  
 
5.4.2 Dependence on Old Time Networks and Relationships 
For such women who had lost everything to get back to business they had to rely on 
old time networks and relationships because it was impossible for them to get back to 
their ethnic or religious organisations to explain that they had been swindled by wonder 
banks. Cornwall (2007: 30) points to the significance of relationships in mediating in 
times of uncertainty and misfortune in a study of female traders in Yorubaland where 
traders give and collect goods on credit as part of the market relationship.  This is also 
the case in Jos and the Middle Belt where although defaulters have caused many to 
go out of business and have threatened existing trust, such exchanges have continued 
despite the uncertainties of the conflict environment. In a FGD91 at the Gada Biyu 
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 The operation of wonder banks in Nigeria was alleged to have started around 2009. These ‘wonder 
banks,’ offered mouth-watering interest to depositors at 100 percent in a month or in three months. The 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) revealed that between 2009 and 2012 such banks had defrauded 
560,000 Nigerians of N1 billion. 
91
 FGD Gada at the Biyu Market, Jos. 21/9/2012. 
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market, the women were unanimous in explaining the centrality of credit to the survival 
of their business. One of them told me: 
I lost everything to the conflict…all I had was the good relationship with the 
middle men. They will supply me with foodstuff and I give them no kobo 
[money]…just sell it, take my profit and give them back the main money agreed 
upon. If we were to depend only on little support from our Church or Mosques…it 
can only go this far. We need steady exchange and supply of goods, even 
though sometimes you notice that the supplier you know is charging you higher 
prices and because of the conflict, they are very impatient and are not ready to 
negotiate prices either. 
The above narrative strongly supports the centrality of long term trade relationships. 
As conflict continues to destroy the markets and segregated settlements continue to 
sever common markets, “personalised relationships become increasingly important in 
order to reduce uncertainty” (Lyon and Porter, 2007: 904).  
During my visit to the Zonkwa market in Kaduna state, I asked some Christian market 
women from the religiously mixed market how they get their supplies of foodstuffs and 
one of the women explained: 92 
We have a customer [vendor] who is a Hausa man [a Muslim]. He brings the 
stuff to us. We sometimes pay him full or half. He comes after a week and 
collects his money and drops another [load of] stuff. Even during conflicts, he 
finds a way of supplying us. We keep him abreast of happenings and we know 
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 FGDs at the Zonkwa market Zangon Kataf, Kaduna. 6/2/2013. 
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he will always come to supply us, except if death separates [us] and we pray 
we do not see such. 
This narrative reveals one interesting topic, the use of communication technology, but 
that is the subject of another study, however, it should be noted that these market 
women have utilised such technology in maintaining market relationships in order to 
withstand the recurring crises that have threatened to sever them. Relying on modern 
communication devices like mobile phones to keep each other aware of the 
happenings in the community, they ensure their meetings are safer, it held at the 
roadside. This is linked to a feeling of attachment and responsibility as these traders 
interact, they take their safety and those of their business counterparts seriously. The 
act of keeping each other informed is in a way promoting community integration that 
could be harnessed for the peace building process (see Jackson, 1995: 145). 
 
5.5 Impact of Conflict on Markets and Relationships in Jos and the Middle Belt 
 
The declining sense of social trust due to the conflict has affected many long-time 
trading relationship in many ways these include: severed relationships, mistrust and 
exploitation. These will be discussed in the sections below. 
 
5.5.1 Severed Relationships and Lack of Trust 
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As mentioned earlier, even though visible settlement patterns tend to suggest that 
Christians are confined to their own market and Muslims to theirs,93 both sides miss 
the opportunities associated with contact with the other side and often make conscious 
efforts to meet due to economic necessity. After the markets were divided, one 
acceptable way of doing business was to do it along the lines-of-safety (safety zones) 
where differences are put aside in the light of economic necessity. According to Mrs 
Yosi John94 who operates a restaurant along the Bukuru expressway, her business 
was able to recover because it was well located and people missed the service she 
provided. She noted:  
My customers...initially Muslim customers will not come... [But] over time, 
people grew tired of secluded life and they started coming back all over again.  
However, although evidence shows that dependence on past relationships of trust 
became central to the sustenance of women’s businesses during and after the conflict, 
Lyon & Porter (2009: 904-907) also point out that trust can actually be a mask for 
domination, especially in unequal power relations involving men and women. To 
confirm the above statement further, several of the women I interviewed in Jos reported 
that some of their business partners had changed the terms of trade since the crises. 
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 Markets like that of Dilimi and Bukuru became majority Hausa (Muslim) markets, while the Gada Biyu 
and Gyel markets were used mainly by Christian traders. Though whenever normalcy returns and the 
conflictsease, traders still visit different markets to cope with the demand and supply which they have 
been used to over the years. 
 
94
 Mrs Yosi John is a business woman/entrepreneur. She operates a restaurant and equally maintains 
a stall at the Bukuru market. Interviewed in Jos. 7/9/2012. 
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Mrs Asabe Dabi,95 one of my respondents, is a teacher and also keeps a small poultry 
business. She noted:  
I live in Gyel96 and so most of my customers [who are Muslims] cannot come. 
We still do interact; they come and stop by the main road near one of my sister’s 
shop to take supply. The business is now low, before I can breed 700 to 1,000 
birds, but now I cannot. I have to breed based on demand. Sometimes when 
they tell you they are coming, they do not show up, because it is not safe to do 
so. 
In Mrs Asabe Dabi’s case, the division of the community has separated her from her 
customers. The segregated settlement has made it impossible for Mrs Dabi to go and 
meet her customers because of her religion. This has affected the sense of obligation 
feel. She explained to me that:  
I do keep cockerels and most of my customers were Muslims. Now most of them 
cannot come to my house now to pick up supply… they used to buy it in large 
quantity. After two weeks I get about #12,000 - #13,000 every two weeks. But 
now my profit is about #8,000 - #9,000. The only difference now is that most of 
the new customers I have now are not faithful like the ones I had before. A lot 
of new ones have now gone with my money. I had to re-establish connection 
with the old ones, though most of them are Muslims who buy and take to Abuja, 
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  Mrs Asabe Dabi is a Christian and a teacher in one of the Primary Schools in Jos. She lives in the 
predominantly Christian community of Jos South Local Government Area, but goes to teach in a 
predominantly Muslim school. She also keeps poultry to supplement her monthly income. Interviewed 
in Jos. 23/8/2012. 
 
96Gyel is located in Bukuru, Jos South Local Government Area. It has recently become a no-go area for 
Muslims. 
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but am sure of my market and we understand each other well in this business. 
We pray that God brings an end to this conflict because we are suffering. 
Sometimes they have somebody who now comes to make purchases on their 
behalf. Most of the business of rearing birds is done by us the Christian women, 
and the buyers are the Muslim men. Because of the conflict there is a lot of fear 
and movement becomes restricted. 
The increasing  loss of business, and the fact that her customers no longer have a 
close personal relationship with her and so find it easier to default on her may be a 
result of the crisis, but it may also reflect a growing sense of alienation between 
members of different groups in the city. Nevertheless, business transactions such Mrs 
Dabi’s and many others rely mostly on trust built and maintained over time, even where 
it is evident that the conflict has made the other party  not be trustworthy and should 
be regarded with suspicion.  
 
5.5.2 Exploitation in Trading Transactions 
While existing credit relationships have been vital to the economic survival of most 
female as well as male traders in Jos and the Middle Belt, they have been exploitative 
in some instances because the terms of the relationship are often decided by the 
creditors or middle men. Some women have responded to this by changing the way 
they do business. Madam Ladi Maibaki explained:  
Even though my suppliers still remain Muslim men who have established 
themselves in the business for long, I now go to Bauchi state personally to get 
my supplies directly. 
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Her narrative indicates that some women are taking proactive measures by skipping 
middlemen who might have taken advantage of the conflict and insecurity to pass on 
the costs of increased risk to female traders. However, especially among those whose 
businesses were damaged by the conflict, many women were not able to resist the 
increasing exploitation of middle men. Some of my respondents in a FGD told me that:  
 You suddenly notice that they [men- middle men] are demanding more and 
 not willing to pay the full price. They feel you owe them much gratitude for 
 coming to pick up your supply, so they treat you badly. When they want to  buy  
 our grains, they now use double hands to add so much to the quantity to 
 their own benefit, while you lose. And because you want to sell, you just have 
 to take it. 
The comments above shows that there is an unhealthy power relationship in which 
prices and market participation are more generally determined by women’s ability and 
willingness to accept the authority of middle-men and male buyers. However, some 
people were even more painfully affected. At the Asakio market (see Figure 3- Asakio 
yam market), the woman leader of the Yam sellers explained this further when she told 
me:97  
I lost all I have to the conflict and all I have left is the clothes I am now wearing 
[referring to the clothes she was wearing at the time of the interview]. They burnt 
my house and stole all the yams I had in store. And now, when I go to get supply, 
                                                          
97
 Interview with the women leader of Yam Sellers Association Asakio Market in Nasarawa State. 
4/2/2013 name withheld. 
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I notice that they have increased their profit margin leaving me with very little 
gain … now I feel [I] am just working and selling for them.  
This exploitative relationship highlights some of the impact of conflict on market 
relations, placing women at the mercy of male wholesalers who control the pricing. 
While these men may claim the increase in price relates to other variables such as 
increase in transportation cost, these women certainly feel subjective to paying higher 
price without any corresponding benefit. 
Figure 3: The Asakio Yam Market 
     Source: Field notes 2012/2013 © Plangsat Dayil 
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5.6 Government, Market Politics and Gender Relations  
Government intervention in encouraging the setting up of new markets in Jos may have 
come about originally as part of official efforts to secure the lives and property of local 
inhabitants. However, government intervention at both local and state levels in the 
establishment and allocation of shops and spaces in the markets is seen by many as 
trying to favour supporters or loyalists and exclude others.  In a study of markets in 
Jos, Porter, Lyon, Adamu & Obafemi (2010: 35) found this to be true, particularly with 
the reallocation of markets stalls by every new Chairman of the Local Government.  
Data from the interviews in the markets in Jos, Markurdi, and Nasarawa supports the 
position that friends and allies readily benefit from the benevolence of government in 
market allocation.  
Unlike the major markets in Jos, the markets outside of Plateau State, and especially 
those in Markurdi, Lafia and Kaduna, are religiously mixed. However, in these mixed 
markets, ethnicity and indigeneity, sometimes linked to religion, play a very important 
role in the market hierarchy. My interaction with Mr Peter Uche98 at the Markurdi 
Modern Market sheds light on the complexity of relations between indigenes and 
settlers in this market which has become a base for exclusion and the denial of 
privileges. Mr Peter Uche stated that:  
There is a lot of ethnic hatred here in this market … The worst is that when they 
[government] allocate these shops, they allocate only to their own people 
[indigenes] and so we [non-indigenes] have to rent from them and take 
                                                          
98
 Mr Peter Uche is the chairman of the Markurdi Modern Market. Interviewed in Markurdi. 6/2/2013. 
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directives from them. The shop owners are majorly indigenes [and one of them] 
might just wake up one day and call you that he has increased his rent. You 
either pay or vacate the shop. Sometimes you might even have your money and 
want to buy the shop off them, but they will refuse or make you pay 1,000% of 
the original price. 
This experience is not limited to market traders in Markurdi and it has also affected 
markets in Nasarawa. For example, in the Asakio yam Market, the Alagos, an ethnic 
group in Nasarawa State, claim that the land on which the market was built is theirs 
and therefore the market belongs to them. They expect that those who trade within this 
space must recognise that. This means that the market has become a contested 
political space, and the Alagos, like many other ethnic groups in the Middle Belt and 
Nigeria, are seeking recognition and identity for their ethnic group. This experience fits 
into the wider narratives about demands for control and access to the resources of the 
state such that can in turn confrontational and violent. There were violent ethnic 
clashes in 2013 in the Asakio market as a result of such differences.  
While the crises did not affect relationships in most markets directly, they were 
perceived as a threat to retailers and middle-men relations especially where religion 
and ethnicity were involved. While female traders do suffer more during conflicts, this 
situation was sometimes the same for some of the men that were interviewed. The 
male chairman of the Yam Sellers Association of Asakio Market shared his experience 
in a FGD,99 explaining that he has been trading in the market for a long time but has 
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 FGDs at the Asakio yam Market in Nasarawa State. 5/2/2015.  
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now lost everything in the same market due to the 2012 conflict between the Alago and 
Eggon tribes. He lamented: 
The government has refused to come to our aid, and even the local government 
is doing nothing to assist us. I only get to know that others were assisted 
somehow…why this selective assistance? I do not know…it appears 
government is more interested in others but certainly not us. 
Most of the marketers in Nasarawa, Markurdi and Kaduna who are non-indigenes 
suffer similar forms of discrimination and they equally complain about violent 
confrontations. Generally, respondents were aware that they must remain silent about 
their ordeal for peace to reign. One of the women100 traders in the Market in Benue 
whom I interviewed said that: 
Jos is a 100 percent better. These people [referring to the Tivs of/in Benue 
state], they do not like visitors. When you go to Plateau, they welcome visitors. 
If not for religious problem[s], Jos has no problem. They welcome visitors. But 
here, they do not even want to see visitors. Once you are not an indigene, they 
do not even want to see you …these are the things we are enduring and 
suffering, we are just dying in silence.  
Given the everyday nature of discrimination against non-indigenes in many parts of 
Nigeria, it may seem unsurprising that the North has experienced so many religious 
                                                          
100
 A supposed women leader in the Markurdi Modern Market, who spoke to me under anonymity 
because of the ongoing skirmishes between the government and the leadership of the Market. Most of 
the traders during my interview were suspicious of my interviews because they thought I was a 
government agent trying to spy on them since the crises between them were ongoing at the time of this 
interviews. And most especially they were afraid of naming any leader in the market because they are 
afraid of being identified later. 
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and ethnic conflicts. However, this discrimination is not only experienced in the Middle 
Belt of the North. Those who settle in other parts of Nigeria suffer similar forms of 
discrimination and do not feel able to come out and speak about it. This was illustrated 
to me by an informal interaction with an elderly man (approximately 60 years old) in 
Markurdi.101 He was an indigene of Makurdi who had formerly lived in the country’s 
South-East and explained anonymously that: 
 My parents moved to the East in the early 90s, they are still there, we 
 all grew up there but at some point I decided to come back home. I do 
 not love this place [Markurdi], but I have to come, you know. In the 
 East, a non-indigene dare not talk about right to land. The mere thought 
 of it is terror!! You must have seen that on Nigerian movies. If you do, 
 you would realise their approach to land matters, so how can  someone 
 from outside think of claiming any right to land there. 
As sad as the narrative appears, ethnicity and religion are key players in determining 
who is an outsider and who is not throughout Nigeria, even in the markets. “In Jos [the 
Middle Belt and Nigeria at large], the politics of chieftaincy, administrative participation, 
[and] ethno-religious manoeuvring” (Ochonu, 2014: 182), as well as competition over 
access to land and scarce economic resources, makes it possible for the leaders to 
continue to manipulate the citizenry. The citizens for their part now use religious 
language that is violent towards fellow citizens, treating each other, and most 
especially women, as enemies and as subhuman. Women thus have very little chance 
to compete in such situations, especially when this attitude filters through to the market. 
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 Anonymous elder. Interviewed in Markurdi. 6/2/2013.  
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In an earlier survey of market reorganisation in Jos and Borno, Porter (1993: 60), 
observed that “some individuals and groups may have more [to] gain by market 
expansion.” The interview data supports the opposite. For example, the creation of the 
Gyel market in Bukuru was interpreted -by the traders in the Bukuru market- as 
government ordering all Christians to leave the Bukuru market and move away from 
the Hausa Muslim traders. But despite the assumptions, a few women see the market 
expansions as having created alternative markets. Mrs Yosi John explained:  
In the past, we just have these idle youths that used to smoke and would rather 
lazy around doing nothing and waiting to be mobilised as political thugs now 
getting involved in some form of business or the other. They can be seen now 
occupying the former shops and stalls owned by the Muslims who left due to 
the conflict… in the past, to slaughter a cow in the market was for an Hausa 
man or an Igbo man…the Plateau man does not slaughter meat in the market, 
but now when you go to the markets, you see that all ethnic groups on the 
Plateau now participate in the sale of meat. Similarly most ethnic groups are 
now involved in the dry season gardening which was in recent past left for the 
Hausa man.  
This means that young men have now ventured into some areas of business, partly 
due to the fall-out from the conflicts and the establishment of new markets at close 
proximity to their residences. Meaning that government support for alternative markets 
has provided opportunities for the hitherto idle young men to get engaged in some 
forms of income yielding activity. In the context of this research, the Hausa Muslim 
traders feel they are unfairly targeted by government for their exclusion from the 
economy of Plateau state. The failure of government to involve the market leaders in 
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discussions relating to the relocation and allocation of stalls might be partly responsible 
for this growing animosity and suspicion. My interaction with Alhaji Buba Pyem102 who 
believes that the government of Plateau State has made its greatest mistake by 
intervening in the conflicts through its creation of separate markets and by 
encouraging, or perhaps giving clear instructions for Christians to move from the 
Bukuru market to the Gyel market, supported this. According to him: 
Market is not a religion, neither is it a place of worship. It is for everybody, it is 
a space for unity, and peace must first begin from the market. Because here 
Christians and Muslim share a common space and are happy to buy from each 
other. But the government and some of our market leaders decided to bring an 
end to that; they separated us along religious line. Now Muslims in Bukuru and 
Christians in Gyel. This market has over 700 shops [See Figure 4, mostly empty 
shops at the Bukuru market] and can contain all of us and so no need for a new 
market elsewhere…this is one of the greatest mistake[s] of this 
government…instead of bringing us together, it separates us…if we cannot 
have a common place to buy and sell together, then the peace in Jos will take 
years to come. We know that this is the architecture of the government…it never 
consulted us about it, it no longer comes to this market to collect revenue when 
hitherto it does. The government is not making any conscious effort to unite the 
markets or to dialogue. …so government must be the one to find a solution to 
the problem, because it created it in the first instance. 
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 Alhaji Buba Pyem is one of the Local Government Chairmen of the Traders Association in Plateau 
State. Interviewed in Jos.  8/9/2012. 
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The creation of Gyel market from the Bukuru market did not go down well with the 
Muslim Hausa community, because many of its members believed the government 
was attempting a form of divide and rule and it was seen as creating undue privileges 
for the Christians, or indigenes, to the disadvantage of the non-indigene Hausa 
Muslims. They felt that it shows that the government does not identify itself with them, 
and they feel left out because government no longer collect fees or taxes from the 
markets.  As a result, they cannot place any demands on government to improve the 
condition of the market since this separation, which the Hausa Muslim considered a 
form of violence and marginalisation which could have further promoted division and 
conflict. 
Figure 4: Some of the Vacated Empty Shops at the Bukuru Market 
Source: Field notes 2012/2013 © Plangsat Dayil 
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Figure 4 illustrates the current situation of market stalls in Bukuru where most of the 
occupants of the shops have relocated to the Gyel market, as most of the shops were 
given to Christians in the newly created market. 
As mentioned earlier, a similar government bias was noted by many Muslims during 
the allocation of shops at the Gada Biyu market, which sprang from the now Muslim 
Dilimi market after the 2008 crises. Most of the shop owners there now are Christians 
of varied ethnicities. As Best (2008) has noted, “People in Jos have mobilised religious 
identities in the recent past to exclude and discriminate against others” and the market 
is no exception. Data from my interviews suggest that not only are religious differences 
mobilised, but government is seen to be supportive of differences because it did 
nothing to bring the two groups together, rather it was involved in the splitting of 
markets. Further, many Hausa Muslim traders are not willing to associate with the 
government or to accept any form of assistance from them which they view as a form 
of “political patronage and manoeuvring” (Porter, 1993: 57).   
In effect, some of the markets, such the Bukuru market, are gradually moving out of 
government political control, which means that the state is losing by not generating 
revenue from this market. During the interviews I noticed that shops were being 
erected, and could see some form of work going on in the market. One would assume 
this was taking place without any approval from government. Such expansion without 
any form of control means that the market space becomes rowdy and increases the 
potential for conflict.  This creates a risky situation for the majority of female traders 
who often bring their children to the markets after school hours and all day at 
weekends. 
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Anger over unproductive government interference is not limited to Jos and Plateau 
State. In  the still mixed Asakio market in Nasarawa State, the conflict that erupted 
between June and November 2012 led to the burning of the popular Asakio yam 
Market, with the Alagos blaming the Eggon for the inferno and vice versa. The Asakio 
paramount ruler was also implicated in the conflict as he was accused of illegal and 
unlawful seizure of farm lands as well as oppressing farmers by appropriating their 
food crops. Similarly, the government was accused of handpicking individuals for 
compensation after the Asakio conflict; as a result there was growing animosity and 
tension in the market when this interview was conducted.  
Other respondents accused the government of not responding promptly to the plight 
of the traders who lost their businesses to the conflict, while informal sources confirm 
the government for its part referred to the incidences as attempts by the opposition 
party to disrupt the peace in the state ahead of the 2015 general elections. The traders 
clearly felt betrayed because the government was being insensitive to their needs, and 
that playing politics in the market was affecting their livelihood. Prof Wurang Monday, 
103
 one of the respondents, explained the situation of the traders in the Asakio market 
after the conflict by saying that:   
We received no support from Government…they are really not ready for us. We 
only hear stories of them compensating others. The only help we got was from 
a private organisation that gave each family 10 piece of roofing sheets, 7 pieces 
of wood and a kilo of nails. They could only do that much… but what can that 
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 Prof Wurang Monday is one of the leaders in the Asakio market. He was nicknamed Prof because of 
his activism in the market and engagement with government over market welfare. Interviewed in Asakio, 
Nasarawa State.  5/2/2013.  
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do even. It is such a shame that we have a democratically elected government, 
who collects taxes in this market. We know how much revenue this market 
generates for the state, yet we have not received any support from them. 
The women104 I spoke with in a FGD at the Asakio market echoed the assertions of 
Prof Wurang Monday that government is not willing to make any meaningful impact in 
the markets. They said:  
The Government is doing nothing, absolutely nothing. You see all these stalls 
and shops were all built out of communal efforts. I think the government can do 
a lot… first, they can build shops, provide soft loans to traders and make their 
presence felt in the markets, but no, they will not do that. 
As a result most of the women had to build their shops through communal efforts or 
loans from their women associations. The efforts of women in building their own stalls 
and shops has already been noted by Porter (1993: 61) in a study of the rural markets 
in Jos, where the Berom women were involved. This research sees a similar trend and 
an increase in women’s involvement in rebuilding markets in the absence of any 
meaningful government intervention. Though the involvement of women in this regard 
often goes unnoticed, it has had a significant impact on trading and the market. It is a 
way in which women contribute to making markets work effectively in an organised 
form, thereby contributing to the economy. And because a “vast majority of African 
women earned money through trade” (Liebling-Kalifani & Baker, 2010: 787), getting 
back to business is key to their livelihood. The women in some parts of Jos were able 
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 FGDs at the Asakio Market, Nasarawa State. 4/2/2013. 
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to acquire land on lease from the community heads, which they cleared through 
communal efforts and erected shops as is the case of Gyel market.  
Gofwen (2004: 162) noted that one of the implications of government complicity is its 
inability to decisively deal with societal problems by putting an end to the violent 
conflicts. Ideological difference filters through market spaces as politicians continue to 
take advantage of the conflict to handpick and reward victims. Moreover, as noted by 
Prof Wurang Monday, government interventions are mostly superficial. Prof Wurang 
Monday observed that:  
Up till now, government does not have the right formula for interventions in 
markets and agriculture… or maybe they are pretending. They have not been 
able to make any positive impact because of their urban approach and 
politicking. Their approach is always about educated-and-big-men-dressing-up 
approach to issues. They call for farmers meeting in Abuja, and someone 
dresses big and appears in Abuja as representative of farmers, and they give 
him money on behalf of others who cannot even afford a meal, transportation 
to Abuja or those clothing and yet, they assume they have done something. 
What have they done? At the beginning of the rainy season, you can sight a big 
lorry from government distributing a bag or two of fertilizer to farmers who 
normally use between 50-100 bags for cultivation. Is that fair? No I think it is a 
shame and equally annoying. Government should better be serious and come 
directly to individual farmers and help them instead of relying on some well-
dressed-tycoons who goes to Abuja to speak English on our behalf. They should 
work with groups and associations formed and run by farmers and not those run 
by these same big men as their local businesses for selfish purposes. 
173 
 
Similarly, my observations105 at the Markurdi, Nasarawa and Jos markets revealed that 
most of these markets actually lack any government presence. This is evident by the 
dilapidated shops, absence of sanitary facilities and poor drainage systems. The layout 
of the markets also speaks volume, as most shops are seen to be in a poor condition.  
This was illustrated by the narrative of Mr Peter Uche of the Markurdi Modern Market, 
who believed that the constant misunderstanding that ensued when the market was 
burnt down is a pointer to the government as the culprit responsible for starting this 
fire. This is because it happened within the period when government had threatened 
the traders with either having to leave the market due to intended renovation work or 
either pay higher charges to retain their shops. The traders were suspicious because 
they believed that it was not possible for a fire to start at midnight when no one was 
there apart from the government appointed security personnel. Mr Peter Uche narrated 
that: 
This government is so unfair in its treatment of traders… it is the government 
who came and set fire in the market at night while we were all gone. The motives 
behind this action is best known to them. The situation here is worsening…it is 
ethnic clashes amongst the traders here and government is not doing anything 
to encourage buying and selling… the government is just doing everything 
possible to frustrate us the non-indigenes (Igbo traders). 
He continued: 
The women here are crying, especially the widows. The government is not even 
caring about their plea. Most of the women cannot afford to pay the rent 
                                                          
105Personal Observation/informal interactions at the Jos, Markurdi and Nasarawa markets. Field notes 
2012/2013 @ plangsat Dayil. 
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increment the government is demanding for. We have been to the House of 
Assembly… and it is the same uncaring attitude we receive there. …the widows 
even wrote an appeal for rent reduction, but nothing was done till date.  
Though Mr Peter Uche seems to present a justifiable reason for trying to gain the 
sympathy of government, by using the condition of the women as a tool, his statement 
suggests on the other hand how men use women’s agency to achieve male domination 
for as long as it is profitable. For instance, between  June 22 to August 6, 1945, 
Nigerian workers - mostly civil servants and railwaymen - protested in Lagos in the 
South-West region over the government’s refusal to raise wages after years of acute 
inflation, and “male workers demanded wage increases and even family allowances 
on the basis of their status as breadwinners, yet they survived during the course of the 
strike in large measure because of the economic independence of their wives and the 
importance of market women to local economies” (Lindsay, 1999:783). Men like Mr 
Peter Uche who act as the women’s spokespersons have become women-advocate-
entrepreneurs who derive personal benefits from doing so. Mr Peter is clearly using 
his vocal support of the market women – or, in his words, widows – in order to maintain 
his own position of authority within the market. Thus, men like Mr Peter try to mobilise 
sympathy for the plight of the womenfolk, not necessarily because they want to ensure 
that women gain a better position (cf. Lindsay, 1999) but because they believe that 
speaking on their behalf, often in a way that portrays women as particularly helpless 
(as widows usually are), will in the long run enable them to remain or become leaders 
in their own right.  
The concept that women who are distressed in some way should accept male 
leadership may reflect the widespread acceptance of men as overall leaders in the 
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relationship between market women and market men. Throughout Nigeria’s Middle 
Belt, men tend to be in charge of market associations while the women are only in 
charge of the women’s wing. The women, in turn, are sometimes so accustomed to 
men helping them to get what rightfully belongs to them that they do not support their 
own female leaders. 
This suggests that women do not always have the capacity to make strategic choices. 
Cornwall (2007: 28), for example,  argues that, “making clear-cut strategic choices is 
dependent on having the power to realise them: power that many women in this as in 
other settings, including those with considerable buying and spending power, are not 
in a position to fully exercise.” And because most women are left out of market 
leadership positions, they lack the power to realise their choice and often have to defer 
to the male leaders.  
In many areas, the conflict has made women even more reluctant to take on leadership 
positions than before, because they are not prepared to face opposition.  For example, 
the market women leader of Zonkwa explained that the market had about 12 women 
leaders before the conflict. The number dropped to four after the conflict, with little 
commitment even when persuaded. It seems women have lost interest in leadership 
because it affects their ability to cope with other domestic challenges. The conflicts 
have equally created fears in them and they are equally afraid of more commitments. 
They would now prefer to concentrate on running their own business than get involved 
in any activity that took them out of the market in order to attend meetings, which 
referred to as disturbance.106 
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 Interview with foodstuff Women Leader Zonkwa Market, Kaduna. 13/2/2013. 
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As well as excluding themselves, women are sometimes also actively excluded from 
market spaces by their male counterparts. The market created in 2011 on the Bauchi 
road by-pass is one good example. After the 2010 conflict at the Dilimi market, the 
government provided land for the establishment of a temporary space for the women 
to continue their businesses. This was received with some scepticism as the 
government was seen to support the new market as a way of disempowering the 
Muslim community, which further contributes to religious resentment and division. 
 
5.6.1 Government Involvement in the Markets 
The issue of religious discrimination has made it easier for the government to be 
accused of favouritism. In Jos like in other parts of the Middle Belt, government was 
accused of allocating shops exclusively to indigenes (who are mainly Christians) as in 
the Gada Biyu market in 2008. And one result of this was gender bias, as women who 
are less able to establish links in the political sphere were also left out. Further, women 
who had held leadership positions in joint markets were often denied the opportunity 
in new markets because new male leadership came into force. One of the women 
leaders107 at the Gada Biyu market narrated how men kept women out of market 
leadership. According to her: 
We, the women, moved to this market first [referring to the Gada Biyu market] 
before the men joined us. We were given the space for free by the Mai-Angwa 
[Community Head] to trade…we cleared the space and organised our 
business… Later the men started coming to join and then later they started 
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 Interview at Gada Biyu market. 21/9/2012. 
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demanding all sorts of payment from us for using the market. We already had 
our leaders and we are not aware of any government levy… then they 
introduced to us the new leaders of the market who will be collecting these fees. 
They did not consult with us and did not recognise our leadership. We later 
learnt that they had the backing of the local authority to do so.  
This clearly illustrates that because their focus is on conducting trade, the women were 
disadvantaged by men who first of all built political links and networks. Even though 
the women predated the men in moving to the new market, the men then drew on their 
links to the government to control and benefit from their activities. Clearly the political 
importance of the establishment of a predominantly Christian market to challenge the 
existing Muslim-dominated one also led to the discrimination of (Christian) women, 
because it was considered important that the new market had male leadership.  
 
5.7 Conclusion and Reflection 
The foregoing illustrates that trust, understanding and dependability links are important 
in bringing together Muslims and Christians in the market space. But even though 
economic prosperity for a greater number depends on close chains of exchange, many 
markets have been divided by government intervention after religious conflicts. The 
displacement of people from markets and segregated settlements due to the conflict 
has affected the economic life of Jos, the Middle Belt and Nigeria at large. Its effects 
are complex. On the one hand, people have lost their businesses and source of their 
livelihood. On the other the creation of new markets has opened up opportunities for 
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some women to venture into business and be actively involved in building business 
relationships and peace.  
Overall, however, the increased involvement of local government in market relations 
has meant that markets in the Middle Belt have become more difficult places for 
women. In Markurdi, just as in Jos, the struggle for recognition and the struggle over 
economic resources makes it easy for the indigene versus non-indigene dichotomy to 
be pronounced (cf. Porter, Lyon, Adamu & Obafemi, 2010). As in many localities, 
government has helped to fan existing flames by creating separate markets. As a result 
of this, there is a lot of mistrust among not only marketers of the same religion but also 
in the relationship between Muslims and Christians. But despite this, the mutual 
dependence of Muslims and Christians suggests that market trade remains, at least 
hypothetically, a form of exchange that can be utilised for the preservation of society 
and the promotion of peace. 
The conflicts in Jos and the Middle Belt has affected women in obviously negative 
ways, and given the physical dangers and demands on their time associated with the 
trade between different religious communities, women are often at a relative 
disadvantage to men. They tend to be the ones most in need of intermediaries, which 
affects their profits. Jackson (1995:142) views these networks and intermediaries in a 
more positive light. He refers to their role in sustaining business during conflict as a 
form of “creativity.” Even though Jackson was referring to the case of the Mozambique 
war, the analysis fits quite well in explaining the advantage of such networks during 
conflicts. According to him: 
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There are many other ways people work to subvert terror and destruction and 
to reconstruct a purposeful social universe. In Mozambique, these…dangers 
were too great and the profit negligible… because that’s how life goes on [in Jos 
and the Middle Belt as in Mozambique]… I realised that through their journey, 
they performed an invaluable function. They carried messages for families and 
friends separated by the fighting; conveyed details on troop deployment and 
dangers; and transmitted critical economic, crop, trade and political news, not 
to mention gossip and irrelevant stories between communities severed from one 
another by the war. They linked different ethnic and language groups in a 
statement that war was not about local rivalries [they warn about imminent 
dangers] and could not be, if they were to survive. They forged trade and social 
networks through disordered landscapes of violence… they simply defied the 
war in a way that everyone they passed could enjoy and draw strength from. 
They were literally constructing social order out of chaos (1995:145-146). 
The market women as well as men in Jos and the Middle Belt can be seen to be 
constructing social order. They have tried to overcome any form of existing rivalry from 
within the market and have forge ahead and ensure that the networks and interactions 
are not severed by the conflict. But while these traders stand to gain from established 
business links and trust, the proportionate benefit is lower for most women, and trust 
sometimes masks male dominance. Middle men have privileged access to information 
and long-time networks which is difficult for new entrants, and especially women, to 
master and establish. Moreover, the conflict has also reduced the possibility of 
negotiating prices, and while many middle men have benefitted from this women have 
remained more dependent on them.  
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                CHAPTER SIX 
      THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON WOMEN AND POLITICAL MOBILISATION IN        
 NIGERIA’S MIDDLE BELT 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In this Chapter, I explore and analyze how ethno-religious conflict affects the political 
participation of women. The data in this chapter presents the experiences of women 
as they aspire to political representation in a society ridden by ethnic and religious 
violence. Though the political discrimination against women is part of the wider 
resentment for them in other aspects of society, the conflicts have made it more difficult 
for them to mobilize and gain support across ethnic and religious communities. In a 
society like Jos and many other states of the Middle Belt, where ethnic and religious 
divisions have become firmly established, women politicians (as well as men) have 
found it very difficult to establish political, economic and social connections and 
maintain trust due to their structural positions. Also, as indicated in the discussion on 
inter-marriage, a Christian woman married to a Muslim man (and vice versa) is unlikely 
to be trusted by people from either religion which makes it increasingly difficult for them 
to mobilize support in Jos and the Middle Belt. 
In the current situation of conflict, an unhealthy mix of existing challenges, growing 
mistrust and the hardening of ethnic and religious boundaries influences attitudes 
towards the political participation of women, and by extension women’s ability to 
establish themselves as political leaders. Worldwide, only 14 percent of 
parliamentarians are women (Akiyode-Afolabi & Arogundale, 2003: 39), although some 
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countries employ quotas to increase representational equality women still occupy only 
20 percent of lower-level parliamentary seats on average internationally. A recent 
survey shows that gendered roles and expectations continue to hold back female 
legislators, unlike male counterparts, capping success and stunting ambitions (World 
Bank, 2015).  
 
6.2 Women and Politics in Nigeria: The Pre-colonial Era 
As in many parts of Africa, women participated in the decision making of pre-colonial 
Nigeria. For example, in many Yoruba communities, women held specifically female 
chieftaincy titles representing the interests of women (Nolte, 2008: 86) and both men 
and women wielded political power and authority, albeit in differing degrees, in 
precolonial Igbo society. Here, women became political actors based on their kinship 
relationships as daughters, sisters, mothers, wives, and in-laws to men and the Isi Ada 
(oldest daughter of the lineage), royal women, and heads of women's organizations 
(Chuku, 2009: 83). Similarly, in Northern Nigeria, the Magira (Queen mother) and the 
Gumsu and Magaram (both stand for the official elder sister of the Mai- ruler) wielded 
tremendous influence and power (Awe, 2001: 14).  
 
 
6.2.1 The Colonial Era 
During the colonial era, the British governed through male authorities and also 
formalized male institutions and thus female socio-political organisations were 
weakened (cf. Akiyode-Afolabi & Arogundale, 2003; Chuku, 2009). However, although 
women were excluded from the colonial administration, they continued to organise into 
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various associations such as the market women’s association to make demands on 
the colonial government. The 1929 Aba women riot is a testament to women’s ability 
to mobilise and participate in governance despite unfavourable conditions (Chuku, 
2009: 89). Through colonial civil society, women were represented in the anti-colonial 
movements and, albeit to a much lesser degree, in the post-colonial party politics of 
the 1950s and 1960s (Nolte, 2008: 86-87). 
 
6.2.2 The Post-Colonial Era 
After the collapse of Nigeria's First Republic and during two long periods of military rule 
(1966-79, 1983-99), women were almost completely excluded from active political 
participation both in Southwest Nigeria (Nolte, 2008: 87) and in almost all other regions 
of Nigeria. “Interestingly, several post- 1999 Nigerian parties have women's wings. At 
the same time, the number of women in public office increased by a very small margin, 
though in most cases by appointment rather than election. While this development 
suggests that women's wings have, in the absence of other forms of women's inclusion, 
a small positive effect on female representation, it also illustrates the very real 
constraints of mobilizing women through structures appended to the main (male) 
section of organizations” (Nolte, 2008: 92).  
Women have remained associate members of political parties in Nigeria through the 
women's wings of political parties throughout the first, second and aborted third 
republic108 (Osinula & Mba, 1996: 13). As auxiliary members, they cannot  be involved 
                                                          
108
 Nigeria’s first republic was 1963-1966; Second Republic 1979-1983 and the third republic 1993 was 
aborted. Though the late M.K.O Abiola emerged as a winner, the General Babangida the then president 
of Nigeria annulled the election of June 12.   
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in the decision-making processes of political parties so their primary task is to ensure 
that women have registered, campaigned, and voted for party candidates, especially 
in rural constituencies (Chuku, 2009: 102), even when their suggestions are  never 
taken seriously (Osinulu, 1996: 19).  
The period following the return of Nigeria to democratic rule in May 1999 has been 
marked by increasingly violent conflicts (Elaigwu, 2012),109 most of which relate to 
struggles over access to state resources and for recognition by numerous ethnic 
nationalities. Both Christianity and Islam have become tools that astute politicians 
manipulate to acquire power (Falola, 1998: 15). Both religions to a great extent have 
similar beliefs about politics; one of which is that women should not be active in the 
public domain. Political parties are also male oriented (Osimulu, 1996: 19), and their 
structure privileges men more than women (Chuku, 2009: 102). This situation has over 
the years disadvantaged women. 
Table 3: Women in Elected and Appointed Offices in Nigeria in 1999, 2003, 2007 
and 2011 
Office Total 
Positions 
Percentage 
of Women 
1999 
Percentage 
of Women 
2003 
Percentage 
of Women 
2007 
Percentage 
of Women 
2011 
President 1 0 0 0 0 
Vice President 1 0 0 0 0 
Senate 109 2.8 3.7 8.3 6.4 
House of 
Representatives 
360 1.9 5.8 7.5 6.9 
Governors 36 0 0 0 0 
Deputy 
Governors 
36 2.8 5.6 16.7  
State House of 
Assembly 
990 2.4 3.9 5.8 6.9 
State House 
Speakers 
36 2.8 5.6 - - 
Cabinet 
Ministers 
49 8.2 17.6 17.9 - 
                                                          
109
 See Elaigwu, (2012). 
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Source: Abiora & Toomey (2010) Federalism and Gender Politics in Nigeria. Pg.211. 
(Updated) 
On the political presence of women in Nigerian politics, research indicates great 
gender disparity (Awe, 2001; Ibrahim & Salihu, 2004; Osinulu & Mba, 1996). As already 
stated during the 1999 elections, women constituted about 27 million out of the 47 
million registered voters, but only 1.6 percent of them won elected office.  In 1999, out 
of 49 ministers and advisers, only 4 were women and out of 990 State Houses of 
Assembly, only 24 were women. In the 2003 elections, out of 109 senators in the 
Senate, only 4 were women, while of the 360 members of the House of 
Representatives only 21 were women (Agina-Ude, 2003; Ibrahim & Salihu, 2004; 
Alubo, 2004). There was a slight increase in the 2007 elections when women in the 
House of Representatives increased to 27 and the number in the Senate increased to 
9 (Gender in Nigeria, 2012).  The 2011 male and female representation in parliament 
speaks for itself - in the House of Assembly, for instance, 25 of 360 Representatives 
are women. In the Senate, 9 of 109 representatives are women (Gaaderse & Valasek, 
2011: 188). Although the research is not able to establish the percentage of registered 
women voters who actually voted, available evidence from precolonial Nigeria to the 
present polity reveals a trend that suggests that the political marginalisation of women 
is also linked to class and status, and many of the women who have become 
successful politicians have been either daughters of politicians or wives or relatives of 
prominent politicians (cf. Coleman, 2012). 
In an effort to ensure the full integration of all women into the development process, 
the Federal Military Government of General Babangida established the National 
Commission for Women by Decree No.30 of 1989. The purpose of the commission is 
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to ensure the integration of women as participants and beneficiaries in the 
development process, promote healthy and responsible motherhood, enhance 
women's civic, political and socioeconomic education and eliminate socio-cultural 
practices that dehumanise and discriminate against women (Abdullahi, 1993: 6). 
However, wives of past presidents of Nigeria have established various programmes to 
help women become integrated into society. The Maryam Babaginda’s Better Life 
Program for Rural Women (BLPRW) in 1986, and Dame Patient Goodluck's Women 
for Change Initiative (WFCI) of 2011, have had a limited impact on women and society.  
For instance, these programmes have failed to contribute to the success of Decree 
no.30 of 1989, they were unable to make tangible success in the elimination of gender 
subordination because their structure, objectives and constitutions negate the need for 
the mobilisation of the majority of women in Nigeria. This is because these 
organisations are made up of upper and middle class women whose concerns are to 
improve the provision of social services rather than change the consciousness of 
women (Heyzer, 1986:126). In addition, they have not developed a clear 
understanding of gender sub-ordination or its relationship to other forms of social and 
economic oppression (Sen and Grown, 1987). Rather, these programmes appear to 
have been created to provide a useful and appropriate occupation for the wives of 
important state officials (Abdullah, 1993: 33) and have been unable to challenge the 
fundamental causes of the discrimination and marginalisation of women in politics and 
society. 
6.3 The Challenges to Women Political Participation 
Several reasons and excuses have been given for the low participation of women in 
politics (Akande, 1996). Some of the excuses are- Religion and traditional practices 
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and customs that discriminate against women, lack of finance, labelling and name 
calling, God Fatherism, the use of thugs, scheduling of late night meetings and 
marriage and husbands as gatekeepers (see Awe, 2001; Ibrahim & Salihu, 2004; 
Imam, Pittin & Omole, 1989; Osinula & Mba, 1996). These challenges are discussed 
in the sections below. 
6.3.1 Religion, Customs and Traditional Beliefs  
Traditional practices, customs and societal norms and attitudes prevalent in Nigeria 
constitute a hindrance to women’s political abilities. For instance, families rejoice over 
the arrival of a baby boy but are indifferent if it is a baby girl. And growing up, the girl 
child is easily withdrawn from school to help with household chores. So right from 
childhood women face discrimination and exclusion (Osinula & Mba, 1996:20; 
Warsame, 2004: 31). That is why, for example, women are excluded in many Nigerian 
communities from participation in periodical extended family meetings where concerns 
and issues relating to family life are discussed (Para-Mallam, 2007: 155). Such cultural 
bias is not peculiar to Nigeria but also affects other African societies.110 Furthermore, 
religion and ethnicity are closely linked, particularly in their effect on the subordinate 
status of women.  
 
6.3.2 Labelling and Name Calling 
                                                          
110
 For instance, a study of Somaliland children found that they are brought up with the assumption that 
the social status of women is inferior to that of men. See Warsame, (2004). 
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Labelling here refer to branding, name calling and tagging women politicians as 
irresponsible, cultural deviants, prostitutes and loose women as a means of deterring 
them from participating in politics. Similarly, Wood (1985: 352) in explaining the 
function of labelling in political economic and social competition argued that, “the 
authors of labels determined the rules of access to particular resources and privileges. 
They are setting the rules of inclusion and exclusion.” Thus, the aim of discriminating 
against women is to control their presence in public life and eliminate them as 
competitors with men. One very good example of the implication of name calling with 
regard to female politicians is contained in the narrative of Hon Mrs. Matdiret Muse 
who explained that: 
When I first muster[ed] the idea of going into politics, my friends said to 
me…why do you want to spoil your name and that of your children. You know 
my family live in Jos, and if I have to participate in politics, I need to relocate to 
Benue. And with the fear that I will be called names, which might put my family 
on the front line, I had to hold myself back.111  
The narrative of Hon Mrs. Matdiret Muse mirrors the experiences of many other women 
around the world who go into politics. In Iraq for example, female members of 
parliament have been regularly insulted by their male colleagues and relegated to 
working on “women’s issues.” (Coleman, 2012). While in the United Kingdom, 
Margaret Thatcher who was prime minister between 1979 and 1990 was nicknamed 
‘the iron lady,’ for her uncompromising political leadership style and partly because she 
                                                          
111
 Hon Mrs Matdiret Muse contested and won elections in Benue state in 2003. Interviewed in Markurdi. 
6/2/2013. 
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was a woman. For whatever reason, most successful politicians have since come to 
be referred to as ‘iron ladies’ worldwide. The use of this slogan might have the 
connotation of referring to women politicians as those who abandon or neglect their 
motherly roles to venture into politics, and as lacking good judgement and moral 
upbringing, even though their male counterparts who adopt similar leadership styles 
are showered with encomium. Also, “Society rules that aggressive political 
commitment is unfeminine and unhealthy for women” (Osinula, 1996: 21). Thus, this 
negative attitude might be responsible for the disproportionately low numbers of female 
representatives in Jos, the Middle Belt and many other parts of the world. Another 
obstacle used to relegate women politicians to the background is religion. This will be 
discussed below.  
 
6.3.3 Ethnic and Religious Manipulation 
In addition to labelling, religion has also been used to subvert the position of women in 
politics and continually ensure that they remain politically in the background. This is 
because in Nigerian society, as in many other parts of the world, “religion affects social 
and political order, by defining appropriate conduct and morality” (Falola, 1998: 11) 
particularly for women. Religion in this context is used to pressure women out of the 
public realm and reinforce their subordinate position in society. Some of the reasons 
identified as causing the marginalisation of women also include cultural beliefs and the 
patriarchal attitudes of the Nigerian family. For instance, Gwamna (2010: 2) argues 
that “religion has become a major defining factor of identity in Nigeria. It becomes 
dangerous when religion is linked to politics and to ethnicity.” Bayart (2010: 42-43) is 
of the opinion that ethnicity has always been part of the politics in Africa and that it is 
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often utilised for sectional rather than broader aims. From this perspective politics has 
become a tool for personal enrichment and the distribution of patronage to kin as 
evident in the Nigerian Federal system. And as established politicians wish to maintain 
their status, new entrants in the political terrain particularly women, are normally 
perceived as encroaching onto personal property. For this reason they are likely to 
face stiff resistance.  
The implication of religion, ethnicity and patriarchal attitudes as part of Nigerian politics 
is that female entrants into the male-dominated political arena often fall victim to ploys 
where religion, tradition, marriage and physical violence are used to keep them out. 
This has significant implications for the level of support women can mobilize and it 
increases the amount of energy needed to convince potential followers to support 
them.  Moreover, female politicians who hope to appeal to primarily female voters are 
at an important disadvantage because many women do not consider their right to vote 
as their personal property, rather, they see their vote as at least partially subject to the 
control of their husbands. As a result, women’s political careers encounter more 
stumbling blocks than those of men. For instance, in the past eight years Bolivian police 
have received more than 4,000 complaints of harassment from women participating in 
politics; many more incidents are likely to have gone unreported (UN Women, 2012). 
The Bolivian example points to the fact that the issues associated with the private 
(domestic) sphere of the home should be incorporated into the democratic and trade 
union discourse. Issues such as domestic violence, rape in marriage, incest and sexual 
harassment and abuse should no longer be treated as the private and personal affair 
of individuals and households. It is in the home that women experience their first 
oppression from their fathers, brothers and, later, their husbands (Abdullah, 1993: 34).  
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The story of Mrs Jirap Matak112 from Jos reveals how such resistance can be 
encountered by women in politics. Mrs Jirap Matak went into politics hoping for the 
female vote. She had worked with women’s groups for over 20 years, taking part in 
micro-credit and health programmes and even mobilizing them to reflect on themselves 
and their positions. But once she started active politics she realized that she had to 
deal with gatekeepers that she did not know existed beforehand. When it came to 
voting, the women who had long worked with her all felt obliged to go home and seek 
the opinion of their husbands about who they should vote for irrespective of other forms 
of empowerment. The lack of ability to think strategically is linked to the close control 
of women. These women were not able to make their own decision when it came to 
voting no matter what a candidate might have done for them. At first, Mrs Jirap Matak 
thought that maintaining a steady communication with them and building trust would 
be enough, but later she realised that was not the case. She said: “though we could 
talk with women… these gatekeepers, the men, are still in control.” 
She noted that most of the women to whom she appealed would talk to her, they would 
come to see her, they would even promise to vote for her if she could solve some of 
their problems, but the day before they went to vote their attitudes changed. Mrs Jirap 
Matak believed that she lost the elections not because she was not capable or popular, 
but because the gatekeepers who controlled her natural supporters’ votes did not wish 
to support her. The lack of support from men generally convinced her that many men 
                                                          
112
 Mrs Jirap Matak formally contested for the Chairmanship of a Local Government in Plateau State 
and lost. Interviewed in Jos.  24/09/2012. 
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considered her political activism as inappropriate or threatening. In addition to her 
experiences with female voters, Mrs Jirap Matak reported that many of their family 
friends were not in support of her candidature. The idea that women are traditionally 
expected to confine themselves to the domestic arena is one example of cultural bias 
limiting women’s ability and constituting a severe obstacle to their struggle (Warsame, 
2004: 8). Given the situation of male opposition to female political activism at an 
everyday level, Mrs Jirap Matak’s experiences explain how many female aspirants and 
new entrants are prevented from going into politics. 
Hajia Saudatu Abulle,113 who is a wife of a politician, got herself involved in mobilising 
women and youths during her husband’s contest for the Local Government 
chairmanship. As most of her constituents’ houses are Muslim compounds where 
women are secluded her husband could not go into them to campaign so she and her 
team normally entered instead. It was very difficult to get the women together during 
political mobilisation and the team had to move from compound to compound. Hajia 
Saudatu Abulle was determined to win the women over and get them involved in 
politics, but seeking their votes was just one aspect of the challenge. She told me that 
when she and her team got to these Muslim dominated areas mobilisation was a 
herculean task. She recounts her experience in the field: 
We discover during such mobilisations that some of the men in these 
compounds stopped their wives from coming to such meetings, while some of 
the men will say go since the campaign team is exclusively women. …so 
mobilising these women and bringing them together is the most difficult part of 
                                                          
113
 Hajiya Saudatu Abulle, contested and won the elections in one of the Local Governments of Plateau 
State. Her husband is also a politician. Interviewed in Jos. 17/8/2012. 
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the campaign. It is quite easier with the youths. All you need to do is tell the 
youths the time and venue for the meeting and they sometimes wait for your 
arrival there. But for the women, you have to go and wait for them and 
sometimes they have to get their husbands’ consent. 
Several of my interview partners noted that there are women who appear to have no 
opinion or political choice of their own. Those who work with a candidate against their 
husband’s wish risk being divorced, which is considered a terrible disgrace for any 
woman. But even where divorce is not threatened and the couple can discuss politics, 
they assume that voting is not an individual right or choice but is subject to collective 
decision. To illustrate my point I would like to give the example of a woman who 
negotiated successfully with her husband over this issue. The woman told me in an 
informal discussion that she was a member of Nigeria’s ruling party- the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP)- and her husband was in the opposition party- the Action 
Congress of Nigeria (ACN). Following a discussion, her husband said he would allow 
her to vote for the PDP, but only on the condition that he and all their children voted 
for the ACN. Undeterred, the woman later re-negotiated the issue with him and they 
agreed that she and their daughters would vote PDP while he and their sons voted 
ACN. The ownership of the vote is an important consideration in Nigerian politics, and 
while some women have negotiating power, it means that the processes which lead to 
political success are far more complicated – and shaped by the importance of gender 
and age relations – than political novices often assume. 
 
6.3.4 The Conflict and Dirty Politics 
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In addition to keeping new entrants away from politics, the ever increasing tensions 
between various ethnic and religious communities in Jos over access to power have 
set the stage for violent politicking which almost always relies on the agency of male 
thugs and their political patrons. Thus, women have to dance to the tune of their male 
competitors to gain entrance to politics. Most of the female politicians I interviewed 
were of the opinion that allowing oneself to be remote-controlled by male politicians is 
what makes politics dirty. According to one of my female respondents, Hon Beatrice 
Jetbwon:114 
Politics is dirty because …they steal ballot boxes. I cannot have any woman to 
go and steal ballot papers, and I cannot ask any woman [to] do that because I 
want to be in power, but the men can do it and they are doing it. They would 
ensure that and would not let you do it. They bribe their way through and give 
out brown envelopes [money as a bribe] and I cannot do anything like that. 
For a majority of the men interviewed for this research politics is a game which only 
the wise and swift win. And the strategy that leads to victory can involve giving money 
in return for votes. The narrative above indicates that conflict has changed the 
approach of many men and women in politics because while some are unwilling to get 
involved in fraudulent behaviour, others are more willing to resort to dirty tricks, 
including hiring thugs, as long as it leads to victory.  
 
6.3.5 Scheduling Late Night Political Meetings 
                                                          
114
 Hon Beatrice Jetbwon contested and won elections in one of the Local Governments. Interviewed in 
Jos. 12/2/2013. 
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Knowing how to deal with thugs is an issue for many female politicians because some 
men play on their fears about security and also their need to maintain the good wife 
image presented above. For example, male politicians often arrange for political 
meetings to take place at midnight, partly to discourage women from attending and 
particularly when they realise that women are becoming a threat to their success. 
Tactically also, meetings at such odd times can allow those who control thugs to send 
them after an opponent easily, because most people can be expected to have gone to 
bed and the thugs can attack and get away without being noticed. Some of the women 
who are aware of these strategies have responded by reinforcing their security and 
ensuring they are not left out of such meetings. Hon Beatrice Jetbwom narrated:  
When men discover that you are pulling your way [becoming successful], they 
will start to scare [threaten] you. When they do and you do not draw back, 
honest[ly], they give up [and] make you their friend. They schedule late night 
meetings and you show up on time and stay to the end. They will try all sorts, 
but if they scare you and you run away, then you will lose the fight.  
Therefore, as discussed, political opponents try all sorts of possible avenues to scare 
women out of politics including the use of thugs. As previously noted, these thugs have 
become quite handy and are easy to recruit due to the crises in Jos and the Middle 
Belt. They also parade during late night meetings in large numbers under the guise of 
bodyguards. Although data on the subject matter is unclear, observations and informal 
discussions during field work reveal a link between the local militias, political thugs and 
personal bodyguards.  
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6.4 The use of Religious Rhetoric in Middle Belt Politics   
As explained in earlier chapters, the political struggle over access to the state by the 
various federating units (including ethnic nationalities) of Nigeria is being reinforced by 
religious manipulation. Nigeria is a pluralistic society being both multi-ethnic and multi-
religious. While this plurality has the capacity to foster understanding and tolerance, it 
has often been use divisively when it comes to politics. It is in this regard that Niels 
Kastfelt (1994: x) gives a vivid picture of religion and politics in Nigeria. He notes that:  
The politicization of religion is nothing new in Nigeria, However, ever since 
southern and northern Nigeria were united into one state in the early colonial 
period, the different religious orientations of the country’s regions have been 
inseparable from their political interest and strategies. ... [And with the] 
emergence of constitutional regionalism of the 1950s and regionally based 
political parties, religious, ethnic and regional loyalties have been decisive and 
formative elements in Nigerian politics. 
Turaki (1993: 188) agrees with Kastfelt that in understanding the socio-political 
dominance of one group over another, one needs to understand that in many parts of 
Northern Nigeria, “religion was used as a means of social stratification and 
differentiation and in consequence, the socio-political dominance of one group over 
the other” thereby denying the active participation of one group in public affairs and 
using this to perpetuate marginalisation. This societal norm based on religious and 
traditional beliefs has in many ways constituted an obstacle to women’s political 
participation. And because religion is so closely linked to local political identities in Jos 
and elsewhere in Nigeria, it is very difficult for women to overcome the socially 
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conservative interpretations of Islam and Christianity which dominate the area and 
which emphasise the leadership roles of men. Hon Laraba Abu115 related how her 
opponents and detractors used religion against her. According to her: 
During the campaigns, my opponents tried to use religion against me. They will 
say ‘she is a Muslim’ and see what is happening [the conflict] in Jos, when you 
vote her, she will get there and join [protect the interest] the killers. But unknown 
to them, I am from a Christian background. My mother and father all died as 
Christians and many of my siblings are Christians. When that ploy did not work, 
they started another rumour that I am going to marry a Muslim, the sitting 
governor in one of the Northern States. They even went to the extent of printing 
and circulating fake invitation letters [to the wedding which] they invented. When 
the news got to me, I told my supporters not to be distracted, that they know me 
better. Why did these men not call me a prostitute? Because they have no single 
case against me, so the best thing is to bring religion and marriage (because I 
am single). 
Hon Laraba Abu’s experience in politics shows how religion is used for political 
discrimination against women. Her candidature came under constant attack by male 
opponents and she was aware that her political opponents tried to manipulate her 
religion against her. She observed that:  
Now going back to Islam, because I am Derika and not Izala, denominationalism 
set in … my opponent was a Christian and I am a Muslim, we are both from the 
same locality. And in order to discredit me, they started saying I am not from 
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 Hon Laraba Abbu contested and won elections in one of the Local Governments. Interviewed in 
Jos. 15/2/2013. 
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that local government but another. You see, the men already had their 
candidate who is a Christian and so I was left wondering. But I never gave up, 
growing up in the barracks and the daughter of a military, I was determined and 
stronger than they could imagine. 
Another female politician had a similar experience of being targeted by religious 
authorities during her campaigns. Hajiya Saudatu Abulle told me that: 
It was never easy for me, because there were also many men who opposed the 
idea that a woman was contesting. That drove me crazy, because the men will 
tell the electorates not vote for a woman, because a woman is not supposed to 
be elected leader over men. That religion forbids that a woman rules over a 
man, because a woman is under a man. If there is a man, a woman should not 
be seen a contender. It got to a level that it formed part of the sermon in the 
Mosques and one day, I had to go to the leader of the Izala in Local Government 
on that issue. I told him that this is what I heard. I am not saying I want to be a 
Liman in the Mosques, which is impossible for a woman to lead prayers, it is not 
even allowed. Secondly, I am not seeking to be a leader of Imams. It is political 
position that I seek. So I cited examples of Islamic countries that women have 
led, like in Pakistan. So they promised to find the mallam that preached that 
sermon, because they have not authorised any one to say such a thing or get 
involved in politics. They only authorised advice that people be told to be 
watchful of the kind of people they vote for. So I pleaded with them to assist me 
because other people might take such sermons seriously. And so the next 
morning, they called the mallam to order. But of course, he has already said it. 
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So you see, that was a challenge for me in a community that was predominantly 
Muslims. 
The idea that many women hold back from politics because of the way people see 
female politicians was common in most of the interviews I conducted. For example, 
religious rhetoric and manipulation by political zealots is to a large extent responsible 
for the view that female political aspirants are social deviants. During political 
campaigns religion and tradition mainly become a tool when a female aspirant is 
involved as it is very important as to whether a female aspirant is married or single. 
When an aspirant is not married she is spoken of in derogatory terms, for example she 
is regarded as being irresponsible or a prostitute. In the words of Hon Beatrice Jetbwon 
who is a member of the House of Representatives:  
My opponents even went to the extent of dramatizing during their campaigns, 
calling me [a] prostitute and putting an underwear [sic] on a stick and displaying 
saying “This is her underwear.” They said I am the governor’s girlfriend, that I 
have flirt with so and so. They say all sorts of unimaginable things about me, 
just to derogate me and try to win elections. I did not give in to the pressures, 
you see, people do not want women to lead and in my case a single lady. My 
opponent then was the former chairman of the Local Government and was 
known for carrying out violent campaigns and using wild thugs. He had even 
started trailing me, until I alerted the security and I reinforced my own security. 
He had plans to disrupt the elections and I alerted the security. A night before 
the elections, they arrested about 67 people with arms imported into the 
community to come and disrupt elections in wards where I will be leading. So 
women face the threat of violence and discrimination…people look at them and 
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call them [the] weaker sex, when leadership has nothing to do with physical 
force. 
This rhetoric not only influences men but it also shapes women’s views of other women 
in politics. Although religious and ethnic differences exist everywhere the dividing lines 
become sharper in societies divided by ethnic and religious conflicts, particularly where 
as a result of these conflicts religious leaders play more important roles in their sections 
of the divided society.  Further their sentiments about female political activity can be 
very influential. However, some women are now countering these challenges as 
presented below.  
 
6.5 Opposition and Manipulation by Family and Male Politicians 
Most female politicians argued that men manipulate and encourage negative 
portrayals of female leaders. Women are aware that men cannot easily give up power 
and they are also aware that desperate male politicians have to go the extra mile to 
discourage women, especially using religion to manipulate the public into not voting for 
women. But despite the widespread feeling that politics is a male terrain, some of the 
women are of the view that it is women’s fault for not working harder to make politics 
a more level playing field and to challenge the status quo. Hon Mrs. Joan Tersa116 
describes the need for women not to succumb to the pressures of their male 
counterparts. According to her:  
Politics is not a game that is very difficult, but the people involved… Some 
women sometimes cheapen themselves by giving up so easily. And then men, 
                                                          
116
 Hon Mrs. Joan Tersa contested and won election in Benue State. Interviewed in Markurdi. 6/2/2013. 
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instead of concentrating [on their own tasks], they focus their energies on 
distracting women. Quite bad that some of the women also believe that you just 
have to be following the men; they do not believe in struggling it out with the 
men. Most of women sit down and fold their arms and just be following one 
particular man thinking the man will connect them, and at the end of the day, 
they will become disappointed… Some also believe that in politics you have to 
tell lies… but when you speak the truth, most men will go back home and think 
about what you said and later realise that what you are saying is the truth.  
She continued:  
Women have a saying that politics is a difficult game, and “I cannot do it”… [but] 
it is only when you are not disciplined that you cannot do it, because men will 
use every means in trying to discourage you… and you will be tempted to pull 
out. But when you stand strong, they will be able to identify you and say this is 
what you can do or cannot do, let people identify you in words and in character… 
that makes politics simple. 
Women can overcome some of the opposition they face by persisting and showing 
themselves to be trustworthy. The particular example of Hon Mrs. Joan Tersa shows 
that women need to understand that men can make politics difficult for them, but they 
should not be deterred. While I found evidence of the slander against them from the 
interviews and informal interactions that took place during the field work, the personal 
obstacles preventing women from assuming political leadership are not immediately 
clear.  
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While it is important to remember the strong emphasis put on keeping family affairs 
private especially the control over women’s decision making power, one can 
nonetheless deduce from the interviews with female politicians that many of them have 
faced very strong opposition from their families. Almost all the women I interviewed 
were quite keen to tell me how much their children love and pray for their political 
career. Almost all the women said that they have very supportive husbands, thus 
emphasising that they were beloved and appreciated within their own families, as the 
cultural onus on women as home makers requires. But in informal comments, I often 
learned that these woman experienced strong pressure from their husbands and family 
members to quit politics.  
Some women were more open about the attitudes of relatives within the extended 
family system, and especially their in-laws. These play an important role in most 
Nigerian families, to the degree that they can certainly affect marital and parental 
relationships. Hon Mrs. Terumbu Muse,117 recals her experience when she went into 
politics: She said: “when I contested, my paternal uncle said to the hearing of everyone 
in the family that; I will remove my private part if she wins.”  
However, despite her uncle’s confidence about her inability to win electoral support, 
Hon Mrs. Terumbu Muse’s candidature was a success and she became a 
representative. For her, the experience of proving her relative wrong added to her 
appreciation of her achievements, and she commented that: 
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 Hon Mrs. Terumbu Muse, was a onetime Councillor in Abuja and former member of the Benue State 
House of Assembly. Interviewed in Markurdi. 6/2/2013. 
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Till date, people kept asking him [the paternal uncle who bet his private parts 
on her losing] why he has not done so because I won… I was like a threat to 
him politically, he thinks I will block his way, because I am his senior in politics, 
but now he comes to me for advice. You see, such challenges charge you up 
and make you appreciate the position you are aspiring to occupy the more.118  
In my experience, it is common for men in Nigeria to hold the belief that women should 
stay at home and not go into politics, and several male politicians told me that women 
are not very effective in politics. This is because they feel that when women are given 
a political post they become proud and lose their regard for marriage and respect for 
their husband. An example of this view was provided by Hon Mr Yayil Peyaya,119 a 
former councillor and Chairman of Local Government in Kaduna State, who told me 
that:  
I will not allow my wife to go into politics… You see, when a woman goes into 
politics, except she has the fear of God and a good background [discipline] she 
will start misbehaving. Women who go into politics are disobedient to their 
husbands and do not value marriage any longer. I do not want to mention 
names, we have a woman who was elected here and she left [divorced] her 
husband and six children. So that is a signal that politics has changed her and 
you know such experiences are capable of creating a lot of fear in men. Okay 
come to think of it, a woman leaves her home and goes for official duties for 
                                                          
 
 
119
 Hon Mr Yayil Peyaya was a councillor and Chairman a Local Government in Kaduna State.  
Interviewed in Kaduna.  13/2/2013.  
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days, if care is not taken, she will be tempted. But for widows, they can 
participate fully. 
The result of this attitude is that women have to face a lot of opposition both from their 
husbands and extended family members. So, in the realm of politics, married female 
politicians have to strike a balance between marriage and politics to reduce the 
domestic pressure. Further, most husbands and other men in the family need to be 
assured that the domestic power structure and roles will not change. So in addition to 
their political work, female politicians still have to organise the home and ensure that 
everyone in it is comfortable because they know that their domestic arrangements will 
be scrutinised closely. Apart from requiring time and organisation, this ongoing 
responsibility for the wellbeing of their household has an important financial aspect, 
especially given that politics is, in Nigeria, a very capital-intensive vocation. The section 
below throws light on some of the financial challenges of female aspirants.  
 
6.5.1 Women Using the Right Knowledge to Counter Opposition 
The growing importance of male politicians who use ethnicity and religion to oppose 
the candidature of women in Jos and Middle Belt politics has made some female 
aspirants more determined than ever to establish themselves. This includes exploring 
ways to defend themselves using the constitution as a reference point, and in some 
instances, redefining their political strategies. The extract from the interview with Hon 
Mrs. Laitu Dharbal120 with me below suggested that women politicians always need to 
arm themselves with the right knowledge about the constitutional provision for equality, 
                                                          
120
 Hon Mrs. Laitu Dharbal is a women leader of one of the political parties in Plateau State. Interviewed 
in Jos.  22/11/2012. 
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fairness and justice in every instance. The experience of Hon Mrs. Laitu Dharbal shows 
that when she was appointed as the Chair of a Local Government many of her female 
friends left her as did most of her male friends in the political arena. This process was 
linked to the general prejudices surrounding female politicians, because the enmity 
she experienced was linked to rumours, petitions and printed stories about her 
personal life which were untrue. But she did not give up, she held on until her 
nomination and tenure came through. She explained: 
I think most of the opposition I had [to face] has to do with the fact that I am a 
woman and of a religion that [states that] women should not rule over men… 
My friends might have left me because they identified me as a political deviant. 
On the other hand, the male friends brought in the issue of indigeneity, because 
my parents are from a different community, while I am married to a man from 
another district. I am aware that in both constituencies, we practice rotational 
politics, but when it comes to the turn of women, the whole thing changes. When 
I was appointed, it was the turn of my [husbands’] constituency, but the men 
opposed me vehemently. Well, with my little knowledge and education, I 
decided to visit the party office and quoted from the Nigerian constitution during 
one of the meetings at Kalwa House. I referred them to the section of the 
constitution that gives dual citizenship to a woman. So I challenged their notion 
for opposing me, because I can be a shareholder from both sides.  
As this narrative suggests, education and knowledge are central to women being 
aware of their rights as this helps them to put forward a strong defence against any 
opposition. Knowledge in this context provides women with the necessary tools to 
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navigate the challenging political landscape. Hon Mrs. Laitu Dharbal was able to utilise 
her knowledge and she knew exactly how to use it. 
 
6.6 Finance and Politics 
 The field of Nigerian politics is dependent on finance, as emphasised by all the men 
and women interviewed who were unanimous in supporting the fact that a lot of money 
is needed to achieve success in politics. However, most women are financially poorer 
than their male counterparts and thus find it difficult funding election campaigns. For 
example, politicians need money to buy the registration forms required to contest in 
the primaries or elections, and they are expected to buy gifts for people like traditional 
rulers, chiefs, district heads, ward heads, prominent sons of the soil, youth groups, 
market women and tribal associations during mobilisation. Money is also needed to 
rent or buy the cars that are used during the political campaigns and to fuel these cars 
to transport their campaign teams from place to place canvassing for support.  In 
addition, politicians have to feed their campaign teams during such mobilisation visits.  
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However, the conflict in Jos and Nigeria’s Middle Belt has escalated the poverty there, 
making politics more expensive as the electorates become more demanding.  This is 
because some of the electorate who have lost their means of livelihood during the 
conflict now place demands on politicians to give them start-up capital in exchange for 
votes. And this has made it harder for women to raise the kind of money that is required 
for successful competition. Hon Mrs. Laitu Dharbal’s comment on the importance of 
political financing in Nigeria sums this matter up succinctly: 
Politics in Nigeria has become an issue of money; you have it, you are in and 
you do not have it, you are out. So women need to know this is a fact.  
Some female aspirants are able to benefit from the reciprocity of family ties, using the 
vantage positions of their husbands to mobilise funds or relying on their parents’ 
political standing and popularity. Other women use funds they have saved over a long 
period of time from business proceeds. But most of the interviews revealed that such 
resources were not sufficient.  Therefore, as on average women have less access to 
financial resources than men, money is an important obstacle to female representation 
in politics. In short, a woman who waits for others to give her the money she needs so 
that she can invest in her political career will find it very hard to enter politics. Women 
have to be sure that they are involved in some form of income yielding activity and that 
they have saved up a large amount of money before venturing into politics.  But given 
the fact that the cost of running campaigns has a significant impact on the family 
resources, which are part of the responsibilities of most women, If family incomes are 
drained to pay for politicking and women are not victorious then they might face serious 
domestic confrontations as well as the threat of poverty. For this reason, Hon Beatrice 
Jetbwon strongly suggested that:  
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Before you [women] go into politics, be sure that they are financially prepared, 
because you have to spend… It is unlike in some developed countries where 
the electorates who believe in you fund your campaign up to 90 percent. Here, 
a few friends will support you, but you have to provide most of it. 
Similarly, Hon Mrs. Terumbu Muse confirmed the centrality of money in politics. She 
explained that:  
Even though women are behind politically, I advise that if you do not have your 
own money, do not ever contest, because you have to depend on a sponsor 
who will later dictate how you run your life. I have been into business and have 
saved a lot of money for my politicking. It is also important that once in a while 
you organise some women to make political noise, which will make you 
politically relevant in addition to your money. 
These interviews refer to the fact that some men might offer financial support to a 
female aspirant, sometimes an aspirant who is a friend’s wife, in anticipation of 
dividends in the event of victory. This means that not only do they expect to be 
reimbursed for their outlay but they also hope for influence and material rewards. Such 
demands can be excessive, especially if the men imagine that the woman owes 
everything to them. Moreover, such demands will compete with the other financial 
requests that will be made to a female politician because, soon after an electoral 
victory, all politicians are besieged by members of the electorate who request financial 
as well as political support, and it is usually more difficult for a woman to deny such 
requests, especially if they are requests for food or children’s school fees. This is 
because as women and mothers they often have more sympathy for the struggles of 
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less fortunate women, but also because, judged as women and mothers, they would 
look less sympathetic than men if they refused to offer support (cf. Osinula & Mba, 
1996). This leads to the importance of image which will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
6.7 Image as a Form of Control: The Good Woman/Wife As Politician 
Many of the women with whom I interacted informally during my fieldwork were quick 
to point to the fact that a good female politician must first and foremost be seen to be 
a good wife. However, the task of being a good wife is made much harder by the fact 
that there is no clear description of what it means to be a good wife or even what the 
substance of being a good wife is in the political arena.  In this regard, a vast majority 
of female politicians I spoke to affirm the importance of wifely submission. These 
affirmations probably had a strong tactical element in winning the support of their 
husbands, and by extension other men, who view such women as being submissive 
and therefore less threatening.  
Another problem with regard to the challenge of inter-state or inter-faith, inter-local or 
inter-tribal marriage for women discussed in chapter four is that they face the double 
jeopardy of the outsider syndrome. This has led to women being called betrayers in 
some instances and their loyalty to their husband’s family questioned. These women 
have the additional burden of gaining the trust of their family and in-laws should they 
venture into politics. Hon Mrs. Juan Tersa was quick to draw my attention to the 
importance of good marital relations – and their projection as part of a political profile 
– at the outset of our interview. She stressed that: 
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Most of the problems women face is that they do not really give absolute support 
to their husbands… I am really being encouraged by my husband. Since I 
started this politics, when I am home I try to ensure that I do my house chores 
well before going out as a housewife, and that is why I am not having any 
problem with my husband. 
 This statement corroborates the above assertion that female politicians are expected 
to balance their responsibilities on the home front with their struggle to achieve success 
in politics. By not pointing out the different standards for male and female politicians, 
these affirmations confirm that despite their political successes most female politicians 
accept their marginalisation as normal. For them, the much talked about double burden 
that comes with the advancement of women, according to feminist writers appears 
natural, and they do not see it as part of their responsibility to change this. While it is, 
of course, important for all politicians to maintain a psychological balance between their 
family lives and the rigours of politics, the refusal to point out that the different 
expectations of women puts them at a disadvantage is remarkable. It discredits and 
invalidates efforts at ensuring inequality and independence for women as they are 
expressed in most of the conventions and declarations which Nigeria is a signatory to.  
A consequence of the logic that equates female achievement with social deviancy is 
that husbands of female politicians are sometimes ridiculed by their friends, and in 
some of the interviews I held women gave examples of such experiences. In one 
instance a friend visited a family and had lunch with them during a campaign rally in 
which the woman contested. After finishing his lunch, instead of saying thank you to 
the family, he looked to the woman who was hurrying to get to a rally and sarcastically 
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said that he hoped when she got the chairmanship position she would still serve her 
husband and have the time to cook for him. 
While that statement was provocative, it illustrates the pervasiveness of the pressure 
on women to be seen to be both good wives and good politicians. It is necessary for a 
woman put in more efforts to ensure that the relationship between her and her husband 
and in-laws remains very cordial. By so doing, she can ensure there is the peace in 
her home that she can draw on to gain the inner strength she needs to cope with 
external pressures. Hon Mrs. Laitu Dharbal stressed the importance for women to 
understand this from the beginning of their political careers. She reported: 
My husband gives me 100 percent support; financially and socially. But his 
extended family were totally against me and that brought a lot of problems into 
the family. I can say this serious internal opposition was a major setback to my 
political career. If not for these internal oppositions, I would have been in the 
National Assembly or maybe a major stake holder in the politics of Plateau 
[State]. But I tell you what I did, I made sure I pulled myself together and centred 
my life on those who gave me support – my family.  
The recognition of the need to earn the support of the spouses of female politicians 
echoed all through the interviews. While most of the male politicians were reluctant to 
comment on the need to seek the approval and support of their wives, responses 
suggest that male politicians make more independent choices about their political 
involvement. And because Nigerian society is permeated by patriarchy, whereby 
women are expected to conform to and confine themselves to a situation of male 
dominance and female subservience (Arowolo & Aluko, 2010: 583), some women have 
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come to accept this position as absolute. Interestingly Hon Mrs. Laitu Dharbal also 
commented on the fact that the pressure on female politicians does not only come from 
men but also from women who, because they have internalised the prevailing views 
on female submission, do not offer solidarity to each other. Hon Mrs. Laitu Dharbal 
noted that:  
Another great challenge apart from extended family and friends is that the 
women do not support each other; when you share your political ambition with 
some of them, instead of joining you, they instead discourage you and join the 
men to fight you. Even though at the end of it all, they do come back and work 
with you. 
Therefore, as in other areas of society, in politics women’s economic, political and 
public lives are generally linked to their private lives.  
 
6.8 In-betweeness of Women and Politics 
I discussed in earlier chapters that the conflict in Jos and the Middle Belt has had a 
negative impact on women’s private lives by isolating and undermining women in inter-
faith marriages. Turshen and Twagiramariya (1998: 104) highlight these difficulties by 
pointing that not only are women in such marriages at the mercy of both religions but 
this can also constitute a significant problem for female political aspirants.  
The comments by Hon Mrs. Jesica Bawah,121  is illuminative in this regard. Hon Mrs. 
Jesica Bawah is married to a Muslim but has practised Christianity throughout their 38 
                                                          
121
 Hon Mrs. Jessica Bawah contested and won elections in Plateau State.. She is married to a Muslim 
and she practice Christianity in their 38 years of marriage. Her mother was a leader/member of the 
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years of marriage. She told me that when she wanted to stand for the House of 
Representatives, her paternal family had mixed feelings about what side she really 
belonged to. She explained, however, how she turned this to her advantage: 
When I went to the Muslim community they welcomed me thinking that I am 
their own simply because my husband is a Muslim. My children are Muslim and 
I am a Christian and the conflict was happening to my people. The crisis is more 
on my people and here I am, from one of the ethnic groups implicated in the 
conflict, and a Christian woman with a Muslim husband and children. I am happy 
that during politicking when I [went] to the Muslims they welcomed me and I 
talked to them, we discussed peace with them. When I won the election, I 
continued that forum, and that led me even to get to the presidency and some 
of the governors who are our neighbours. The governors that are Muslim 
welcomed me, they discussed peace with me, most specially the governor of 
Bauchi State. He is a Muslim, he took me like his sister we discussed peace 
issues and sometimes I call him… and I see my governor [of Plateau State] to 
tell him they should try to meet and put this crisis behind [them]… I know Islam 
very well and it helped me.  
She continued: 
I was very close to Gen Buhari and the late Yar’Adua’s and their wives and even 
the late general Yar’Adua’s family. So when he [Yar’Adua] became the 
president I was able to face him and to challenge him despite the fact that I was 
a member of the Representatives in his cabinet. I used the relationship from my 
                                                          
Zumuntan Mata of Church of God in Nations (COCIN) in 1945 and her father worked as a miner. 
Interviewed in Jos. 3/10/2013. 
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secondary school time in Katsina through his late brother. I was able to make 
peace between him and my governor, because that is how my own mixed 
marriage really assisted me in terms of this crisis. Sometimes we get some 
relative peace, though we want complete peace. You see, sometimes they 
reveal to me what they are planning to do. For example, they wrote a letter to 
ICC and I was told and I picked it up. By the time I picked it up they had already 
submitted their letter to ICC and I started following it up to the United Nations 
(UN). I even went to talk at the Capitol Hill over this crisis and yet they still 
welcome me because they believe I am part of them because I have been 
talking peace, I have been discussing peace.  
It is quite clear from the above narrative that Hon Mrs. Jesica Bawah is a member of 
the upper class in Nigerian society. This means that she has the connections and the 
money needed to be able to contact and influence important members of society. 
Thanks to this, she has been able to turn her ‘disadvantaged’ position and her 
automatic association with the interests of her husband’s background to her 
advantage, as her in-betweenness has helped her to gain access to the Muslim 
community with the aim of promoting peace. It should be noted that Hon Mrs. Jesica 
Bawah’s privileged position should not detract from the fact that a large proportion of 
the female aspirants in politics must suffer situations where their religion, ethnicity and 
marital status is used against them as few of them have husbands who have her  
material resources and the links and connections.   However, her successes illustrate 
that the disadvantages arising from inter-marriage also offer opportunities, if properly 
harnessed. These opportunities include connections arising from “dual affiliations” 
(Strathern, 1972: viii) to both kin and in-laws.  
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6.9 Impact of Ethnic and Religious Divides on Political Mobilisation 
Though the conflicts in Jos and the Middle Belt are often labelled religious conflicts, it 
must be taken into account that social, political and economic relations increasingly 
revolve around the issues of ethnic, religious and indigene vs settler identity (Gwamna, 
2010: 2). This is despite the fact that in many cases religious identity and ethnicity 
coincide or contradict each other, depending on the context (Best, 2008: 10). Thus, 
conflict over chieftaincy titles, land ownership, politics and recognition can easily be 
tagged religious or ethnic, depending on the parties involved. We pointed out in the 
introductory chapters that the conflict in Jos and the Middle Belt is directly related to 
the struggle for access to political power and recognition; with the indigenes (the 
majority of whom are Christians) on one side and the Hausa and Fulani (where the 
majority are Muslims) on the other. The inability of the state to find a lasting solution to 
the lingering conflict over the past decade has had a serious impact on politics, not just 
for women but also for men. The interview data revealed the fact that political 
mobilisation is no longer as easy as it used to be. Hajiya Saudatu Abulle explained this 
point: 
In the past, when we mobilised, there was nothing like, you are a Christian or 
you are a Muslim. It was purely politics based on principles, opinion and choice. 
That time, both Christians and Muslims [went] out to campaign, we all worked 
together moving from house to house during my husband’s campaign. But of 
recent, I have seen some changes; during mobilisations, you will see purely 
Muslim women going for campaigns in certain areas and Christian women going 
alone too. So now you have to go the extra mile to find the people you trust to 
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go to the Muslim or Christian community for you. And even if you want to go and 
do it yourself, you need to get good feedback to be sure you are safe. Because 
you are afraid something might happen and people will end up giving it a 
different meaning and interpretation from what actually happened. 
Though some women like Hajiya Saudatu Abulle have been able to make good use of 
the opportunity to mediate, the situation is different for so many others because the 
ethnic and religious divide, lack of trust and the high cost of political mobilisation for 
female aspirants persist. We have seen that with the crises on the Plateau political 
mobilisation has taken on a new dimension which has made politics quite expensive 
and dangerous for women as well as men. 
 
6.10 Conflict and the Increased Use of Vanguards and Thugs  
It is important to note that one of the aftermaths of conflict is the existence and 
proliferation of arms and light weapons in the Jos area and beyond. This is linked to a 
militarisation of youths due to their involvement in the conflicts. Since the end of some 
of the fighting, many of them, some unemployed, have been hired by politicians as 
political vanguards and then suddenly they are transformed to thugs used to threaten 
and scare away political opponents or to assist in elections rigging by carting away 
ballot boxes. These idle youth groups have gained recognition over the years, 
particularly since the inception of the conflict, and are fast becoming Nigeria’s un-
official law enforcement agents. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is easy to hire 
members of these groups to act during political campaigns as political vanguards as 
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they are keen to earn a little more income. Similarly, the use of ethnic militias, 122 the 
majority of whom are youths, as noted above, become popular in Jos, the Middle Belt 
and elsewhere in Nigeria. Their presence at political campaigns, rallies and voting is 
not unrelated to the sporadic violence that occurs during elections, and though their 
violent activities are not necessarily targeted directly at women and female politicians, 
the data from this research shows that this violence affects women more than men. 
Contributing to this discussion, Turshen and Twagiramariya (1998:159) explain that:  
The ease with which virtually any group can obtain light weaponry has 
encouraged political dissidents, ethnic groups and sectarian movements to 
abandon non-violent political activity and resort to the use of force to advance 
their interests. Moreover, it has promoted the proliferation of armed groups by 
encouraging internal factionalisation and fragmentation.  
Women who vie for political positions are often ill-prepared for this experience and 
become ready victims in this regard, particularly if they are unable to recruit their own 
thugs, at least for security purposes. For Hon Beatrice Jetbwon, one of the major 
challenges is for a woman to discover that, after passing through all the rigours of 
campaign and mobilisation and coming to terms with the religious rhetoric, she has 
had to face security challenges that threatened her life. For her, the experience she 
had a few days before the elections was shocking: 
 I was initially taken a back because of the thuggery involved in politics, which I 
 was not fully aware of. But I resolved that I will not allow myself or any 
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 These militias are sometimes referred to as vigilantes to legitimise their violent confrontations and 
sometimes possession of arms. For example the Bakassi Boys, the Egbesu Boys” and recently the 
Ombatse (in Nasarawa State) among others. 
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 member of my team to be intimidated. I promised myself not to match them 
 thuggery for thuggery, [and] instead report[ed] all instances no matter how 
 small to the security agents…and they responded appropriately. 
Hon Beatrice Jetbwon said she ventured into politics because she was not happy with 
the kind of representation people were getting at all levels of government and she felt 
the people were entitled to better representation. She had no idea about election 
rigging and the use of thugs. When she stood for election in 2003, she lost due to 
rigging because, as she explained to me, some of her agents were bought over by 
political opponents. With that experience, she developed the courage she needed and 
developed a strong team to monitor votes and she did not just assume that she was 
the popular candidate and could win an election on the basis of her popularity. After 
her experience in 2003, she decided in 2007 to mobilise a large number of youths, 
most of them university students who identified with her and wanted to ensure that she 
won.  
Another complex aspect of the use of thugs is their ability to sell their services to the 
highest bidder, making it increasingly difficult to associate some of these thugs with a 
particular ethnic or religious group. According to Hon Katchy Pestu: 123  
A politician might sponsor a thug to harm an opponent who might not be of the 
same religion with him, so he hires a thug of a different religion for the job. When 
such thing happens [it] triggers other problems. Even if you labelled such 
attacks as religious, you cannot pin down the attacker to an ethnic or religious 
group. 
                                                          
123
 Hon Katchy Pestu is one of the Special Advisers to the Governor of Plateau State. Interviewed in 
Jos.  1/2/2013. 
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In states that have experienced conflicts like those in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, the 
use of violent thugs in politics is an additional issue. Their visibly menacing presence 
intimidates political aspirants at election venues, especially when contests are 
polarised due to ethnic and religious divides. At the venues of elections, party offices 
and sometimes through their presence as bodyguards, these almost exclusively male 
thugs target female aspirants. The picture below shows the presence of highly armed 
police men (see Figure 5 below) at a political rally in Jos. These security personnel are 
always present at political rallies to look after the security of everyone and to subdue 
any crises that may arise. But at the same time, their presence could be very 
intimidating if they have to take instructions from the male political aspirants. 
Figure 5: Political Rally in Jos 
 Source: Field notes 2012/2013 © Plangsat Dayil 
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At the same time, while a majority of female aspirants successfully ‘play politics’ 
smartly by advocating and negotiating to achieve success, some have resorted to 
using thugs as a means of survival in the male controlled political terrain. One of my 
respondents Hon Laraba Abu told me how she suffered male prejudice and how she 
countered it: 
Religious leaders joined in the war against my candidature… a clergy man 
warned his congregation against promoting and voting incredible people 
(referring to me). At that point, I knew I had to do something. So I organised 
some men [presumably thugs] and we went and gave the pastor the beating of 
his life. Even though we were taken to the police station after that ... I made 
them realise that they cannot rubbish me and get away with it because I am a 
woman.124 
The narrative shows how experience radicalised this respondent, and, possibly 
drawing on resources linked to her upbringing from a father who was in the military, 
she responded to the religious mobilisation against her candidacy through the use of 
violence. In her words: 
When I was in the House of Assembly, I tried my best for my people, except that 
some of the men who were close to me and were not happy with what I was 
doing. They believe instead of developing and assisting the people, I should 
have developed them (individually) instead. On one of my tours to distribute 
materials, they planned an attack on me. They sent thugs after us, they 
destroyed some of the things we carried and engineered their boys to kill me. 
                                                          
124
 Hon Laraba Abu contested and won election in Plateau State. Her father was in the military. 
Interviewed in Jos. 16/1/2013. 
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My saving grace was that among the youths who were to carry out the act, some 
said, but this woman has done no harm or anything wrong. So they decided not 
to act, but took me through an escape route to the chief’s house for safety. That 
was Gods intervention on my behalf. 
The foregoing narrative of Hon Laraba Abu reveals much about the ‘politics of the belly’ 
mentioned in our introductory chapter. It also says much about the nature of politics in 
Nigeria in the sense that most of the people around Hon Laraba Abu wanted her to 
develop their pockets by giving them money as their own share of the ‘national cake’ 
(Bayart, 2010). And because she failed to do this, they sent thugs after her. Apart from 
the use of thugs, ethnic and religious manipulation, societal views and norms, labelling 
and finance in politics, other issues like Godfatherism and the scheduling of late night 
meetings also constitute a serious challenge to women wanting to enter politics. 
 
6.11 Godfatherism and Political Manoeuvring  
Godfathers in Nigerian politics are those who have the ability, or who are believed to 
have the ability, to determine political success through financial support and personal 
political networks. These godfathers have tremendous influence over the functioning 
of party caucuses because of their financial power. Hon Katchy Pestu informed me 
that the problem of godfathers is that you find elder statesmen insisting on a candidate 
that they feel they have control over and who is not the popular candidate. Though 
most of the women I interviewed distanced themselves from the word ‘godfather,’ they 
nonetheless pointed out that they had role models and mentors. These mentors were 
not necessarily politicians but could be professionals who excelled in their various 
fields of endeavour.  
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Most women shared the belief that if they had a godfather they would have to repay 
this patronage if they won the seat or become successful, and they may not have the 
power to decide the direction of social projects expected of them as they would always 
have to consult the godfather. Even though there is no available documented evidence 
to support the argument that godfathers play a significant role in the manipulation of 
electoral outcomes in Jos and the Middle Belt, this is the assumption and belief of many 
people. As people who control political networks, godfathers seem to benefit from 
‘disorder’ (cf. Chabal & Daloz, 1999) and situations of intense competition and rivalry. 
Some of the women I interviewed preferred to be a member of the opposition party in 
the first instance, not because having a godfather is bad but because it is a strategy 
used to gain popularity. However, the strategy of working with the opposition favours 
women who already have some level of financial independence. For example, Hon Mr. 
Laitu Dharbal said she had no godmother or -father, because she went into politics to 
serve her people. But on getting there, she discovered a caucus in the opposition party 
and she joined them. She explained that: 
I do not have any godmother or father. I got into politics with a plain mind, not 
for any gain. I know in politics you normally have a caucus; a small group of 
about five to six people who are the think-tanks of political parties at each level. 
They are responsible for mobilising money, they research to know credible 
candidates who can win, and they sponsor candidates. So you need to have 
money to be a member of the caucus. By that time, I had a little money, and so 
I became a member of the caucus in my Local Government. So my hard work 
and money brought me into politics; I worked very hard and used my money. I 
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have women I admire who stand firm despite opposition and are professional, 
they are my models and not godmothers.  
Traditionally, and to a large extent politics was and is a male dominated field, and men 
easily form caucuses and decide who leads and who does not. And since most of the 
women are not part of these caucuses they find themselves struggling establish a 
presence. For Hon Mrs. Joan Tersa, women cannot give what they do not have. If the 
women have the finance and opportunity to go and assess and sponsor a candidate 
then they can also start to be godmothers and can sponsor a candidate. After all 
women are good organisers and can form groups under all sorts of names to mobilise 
support, but they have not been able to form a political caucus and sponsor candidates. 
This is partly because, as discussed earlier in this chapter, women lack the necessary 
finance to be able to achieve success in politics. 
One can deduce from most of the responses received that when a popular candidate 
is ousted and the government (and godfathers) insist on a candidate that is not popular, 
then that person owes their loyalty to the government or the godfather instead of the 
people. Such candidates end up losing their ability to act independently of the political 
control and manoeuvring of the godfathers, even in matters that are against the wishes 
of the people. Women have had both negative and positive experiences when 
participating in politics, but most of them have the resolve to remain steadfast 
notwithstanding the numerous other challenges caused by the ethno-religious conflict. 
The next section discusses the various challenges to political mobilisation in the wake 
of the conflicts in Jos and the Middle Belt. 
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6.12 Ethno-religious Conflict and Political Mobilisation 
The politicisation of religion in the relations between Christians and Muslims in Nigerian 
Middle Belt was first seen in the 1950s. The Middle Belt ethnic minorities mobilised in 
religious and ethnic terms during the period of decolonisation to maintain their 
independence of the Muslim Hausa-Fulani hegemony. The same structure of political 
conflict with its conjunction of religious and ethnic interest is repeated in many of the 
violent confrontations of the 1980s and 1990s (Kastfelt, 1994: ix-x) and in the current 
political dispensation. Local conflicts are translated into religious loyalties and 
interpreted within a framework of historical antagonism between Christian ethnic 
minorities and Muslim Hausa-Fulani (Kastfelt, 1994: ix). Similarly, post-election 
violence often centres on ethnicity and religion in Nigeria. According to Hon Mr Yayil 
Peyaya,125 since politics started in Nigeria ethnicity and religion has always been an 
issue.  
Many religious leaders and politicians deceive a lot of gullible people because it could 
be argued that they seem to be serving a God that is only interested in money and 
power, rather than standing for justice and human rights - most especially the rights of 
women. The political elite seem more preoccupied with the struggle for the ‘national 
cake’ (see Bayart, 2010) rather than creating effective and inclusive institutions. 
Continuously, these leaders pitch individuals and groups against each other using 
ethnicity and religion in their campaign slogans to cover their evil and corrupt practices. 
This has created hostility among the citizens who are ready to fight each other with 
                                                          
125
 Hon Mr Yayil Peyaya contested and won elections in one of the Local Governments in Kaduna. 
Interviewed in Kaduna. 7/2/2013.  
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little or no provocation. Some of the respondents believe strongly that most of the 
conflict that has taken place is the result of the distortion of religion. According to Mrs. 
Grace Jakatai:126 
Politics in the past is quite different from politics nowadays. In the past, the 
community chooses one person they believe can represent them. Someone 
who interacts easily with the people and [who] loves to help and assist people. 
But now, people take politics to be like a market place, where everyone comes, 
just to get what he wants as quickly as possible. And because these politicians 
are nowadays desperate and in a hurry to get rich, they use ethnicity and religion 
to mobilise support as long as it gets them what they want.  
In this kind of politics female aspirants become an immediate threat and are regarded 
as an enemy that has to be removed quickly, whether they are Christian or Muslim. 
And because religion and ethnicity come in to play when people interact in Jos and the 
Middle Belt, political aspirants and political parties are finding it increasingly difficult to 
mobilise and run female-dominated campaigns and meetings. Mrs Henrietta Tapden127 
laments that:  
Before the conflicts, we could meet and hold meetings anywhere and things 
went on smoothly. But with the conflict, women became sensitive to their 
religion…we are no longer united as we use to be. Before, we use to meet freely 
in Angwan Rogo, hold meetings in houses, but not now. …it became difficult for 
                                                          
126
 Mrs. Grace Jakatai was a Women Leader for one of the political parties in Nigeria. Interviewed in 
Jos.  16/8/2012. 
 
127Mrs Henrietta Tapden is a women leader of one of the political parties in Nigeria. She is also one of 
the state coordinators of the Women for Change Programme of Mrs Patience Goodluck Jonathan.  
Interviewed in Abuja. 24/1/2013. 
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either the Christians or Muslims to keep up attendance of meetings, and the 
location for meetings became a very serious issue. As the coordinator of women 
for change of Mrs Jonathan, I had to depend on other women for my messages 
to get across to the Muslim women and do not interact directly with them, like I 
use to do. 
She continued: 
Before [the conflict], you could talk freely; you know you are talking to mothers 
and women. But now, I am very selective of my choice of words, because I do 
not want to say something that a religious faction will respond negatively. So 
the fear of not hurting is always there and that makes me not to be free to say 
all I am supposed to say or open up easily like we do before. And when I want 
to hold a programme that is beneficial to a community that I cannot go to, then 
I must have to delegate. When we sit as women politicians, on an agenda to 
discuss things that will be beneficial, differences show up and that affects the 
meeting in the sense that one is limited in what to say. Such restrictions are 
against progress. That is why we are not getting anywhere in our struggles. 
This means that the conflict has brought about a major setback in women’s political 
careers and decision-making since they are now divided on the basis of religion and 
find it difficult to agree on certain issues. It also means that a lot of time is spent during 
meetings disagreeing and not making any progress. The impact of conflict on politics 
is not limited to local and state politics but is now affecting the National Assembly. 
According to Hon Beatrice Jetbwon who is a member of the House said to me:  
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Religion is a challenge, sometimes even in the National Assembly, when a 
meeting is being called, you tend to see some sections of the community being 
more represented than others. So politicking there [National Assembly] is all 
about gender, religion and ethnicity. Even though we have a women caucus in 
the house we discuss women issues and bring it to light. For example, we insist 
that every ad-hoc committee should have at least one or two women depending 
on the size. If is up to six, then at least one should be a woman. So also in all 
appointments we insist women should also be appointed to key positions 
[Aviation, Foreign Affairs, Environment, Public Procurement], unlike in the past 
when they are relegated to insignificant committees. But still you will notice that 
certain groups of people get certain positions and you wonder. 
Most of the respondents in this category admit that the ethnic and religious differences 
have deeper roots than it seems on the surface, and a lot of regional comparison and 
blaming takes place. Similarly, many of people in the informal discussions that I had 
related the escalation of ethnic and religious divides in the country to conflict in its 
totality, and told me that many politicians manipulate these divides for their own selfish 
gains. And in such situations, the opposition group can easily be accused of aligning 
with other marginal groups to bring down the government. It may be assumed that if 
the government tried to distribute development projects equitably by giving the 
opposition a sense of belonging, then some of the problems would be reduced.  
 
6.13 Conclusion and Reflection 
As discussed in this chapter, women in Jos and the Middle Belt have faced numerous 
challenges which has limited their ability to effectively mobilise and participate in 
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politics. Institutional and cultural obstacles are largely responsible for these difficulties. 
Male politicians manipulate religion and tradition as a means of establishing and 
maintaining power and control. All conservative traditions, whether Christianity or 
Islam, seem to have similar beliefs about politics, one of which is that women should 
not play an active part. And the Nigerian elite and political class has since utilised 
similar strategies – division on the basis of religion, culture and traditions – to divide 
the polity and to exclude women. In Jos and the Middle Belt, male politicians rely on 
religion to exclude female political aspirants and to restrict new entrants into politics, 
just as the European rule utilized the divide and rule system to ensure dominance (see 
Ekeh, 1975).  
 Although Religion, culture and traditions are critical in the institutionalisation of 
democracy, the practices/institutions do not support democratic principles as seen in 
the discriminatory practices against female politicians. For example, using the 
argument above, the institutionalisation of Sharia in Nigeria128 by some Northern states 
was condemned as it was seen as acting against the principle of democracy, moreover, 
the rights of women were very much limited under Sharia law. In Nigeria, the focus is 
on the practice of democracy, while ignoring the cultural and attitudinal change and 
world view change that democracy entails. The form and substance of politics may 
give the impression that Nigeria is a democratic nation, but data from this research 
suggests the contrary for example; the use of thugs, election rigging and godfatherism, 
                                                          
128
 Sharia, an Islamic civil and criminal law was introduced in Nigeria in 1999. The then Governor of 
Zanfara Ahmad Rufai Sani pushed for the institution of Sharia at the state level of government. Sharia 
was introduced in: Bauchi, Borno, Jigawa, Kebbi, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Yobe and Zanfara, states.  
The introduction of sharia in states like Gombe, Kaduna and Niger, was limited to parts with large a 
Muslim population, usually the Northern parts of the state.  
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are not democratic practices. For instance, democracy in many non-western societies 
is not just a question of having a modern constitution and creating political structures 
and institutions that resemble that of the west. In many liberal democracies, every adult 
is believed to be an autonomous individual and rights are supposed to apply to all 
without regard to gender differences. Data from this research strongly suggests that 
women are not treated as autonomous beings. So the Nigerian female politician face 
the challenge of being treated as an appendage especially when she has to seek 
consent and approval from their husbands in everything they do.  
Institutional and cultural challenges can be found in almost all African countries and 
many western nations alike. And in this respect, the institutionalisation of democracy 
is constrained by institutional and cultural factors in Nigeria. However, because 
“economic power is strongly correlated with political power [in Nigeria], economically 
empowered women may find it easier to take on policy-making and choice making 
roles” (Mazrui, 1998: 53). In contrast, female aspirants who are less well-off 
economically suffer because religion is constantly being used to dissuade and silence 
them. This research therefore emphasises the need for scholars to look beyond the 
form or the formal expression of democracy by looking at substance. This requires 
ethnographic research, especially the approach explored in this research, where lived 
everyday experiences of female political aspirants are carefully documented and 
studied. This is because in theory politics is open to all, but in practice it is only open 
to those men that have money and a few privileged women who are able to challenge 
the status quo. The next Chapter discusses the impact of ethno-religious conflict on 
professional relations. 
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            CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON WOMEN AND THEIR PROFESSIONAL WORK 
RELATIONSHIPS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EDUCATION SECTOR 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores and analyses the implications of the religious and ethnic divides 
on professional relationships in the wake of the conflicts in Jos and the Middle Belt, 
with particular reference to the education sector, i.e. the teaching profession. Literature 
on the exact impact of conflict on professional relations in Jos and the Middle Belt 
remains scanty, and that which is available pays little attention to understanding how 
these conflicts have changed the professional lives of women and had an impact on 
performance and the general wellbeing of the workplace. Consequently little is 
understood about the impact of conflict on the position of women, their everyday work 
experience and their professional lives. 
The chapter shows that in the conflict-driven societies in Nigeria women have become 
subjected to exploitation, marginalisation and scrutiny even as they try to progress in 
their professional careers. Though both men and women suffer from the exploitative 
character of Nigerian society, especially in its conflict driven societies, women suffer 
additionally by virtue of their gender as they are in a subordinate and potentially more 
vulnerable position (Nwabara, 1989; Amundsen, 1977). Nwabara (1989: 7), for 
example, points out that women are discriminated against simply because they are 
women in a society that values the subordination of women to men. This discrimination 
starts when children first go to school and continues in the workplace. Amundsen 
(1977: 37) rightly points out that gender “discrimination in education is of course of 
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tremendous importance for the opportunities and advances of women into many 
[professional] fields,” education is therefore a “precursor to social and cultural 
independence” (Bloch, Beoku-Betts & Tabachnick, 1998: x) for women as it provides 
the right knowledge to fit into the modern day economy.  
As discussed below, life in the workplace, in particular, does not favour women 
because it is where they come face-to-face with discrimination in terms of selection, 
promotion, salary, attitudes and structural violence due to the absence of policies that 
recognise and offer them direct protection. Nwabara (1989: 8) points out that, “men’s 
position of influence in a system and society that allows the exploitation” of women in 
subordinate positions implicitly supports discrimination and structural violence. In 
addition, since the conflict, there has been an increase in attitudes that put pressure 
on women’s behaviour in the way they are expected to behave in the workplace. For 
example, the professional conduct of women is often assessed in the context of two 
religions that both emphasise the importance of female subordination to religious rules. 
This means that women are subjected to unnecessary scrutiny from male colleagues 
in regards to appropriate conduct and dressing, which often leads to an unhealthy work 
atmosphere. This will be discussed further in the sections below.  
 
7.2 Politics and the Nigerian Work Environment 
In Nigeria, and the Middle Belt in particular, the perceived marginalisation and 
underrepresentation of one group over the other in the public service is a matter of 
everyday discussion. For instance, the apparent disadvantage of one’s own ethnic or 
religious group has been at the centre of political debate over appointments to public 
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office, political representation and employment in the civil service, while the concerns 
of women continue to be left out of group concerns. As pointed out in the earlier 
chapters, in situations of conflicts and the competition for the national cake, group 
boundaries have become hardened and affirmed and as a result women are 
increasingly seen, in all areas of life, not as potential links between these groups but 
as either intruders or threats to group cohesion because of inter-faith marriage or they 
are seen as subordinates. However, it should be noted that it is not only women who 
are marginalised as many of Nigeria’s ethnic nationalities and religious bodies have 
also claimed marginalisation. In Kaduna State for instance, the Southern Kaduna 
people, who are mainly Christian, have over the years complained of their persistent 
marginalisation in the civil service and politics by Northern Kaduna Muslims (see 
Suberu, 1999: 63). In Benue State, the Idoma people complained of political 
marginalisation by the Tiv people. In Plateau State, the Governor Jonah David Jang’s 
administration has since its assumption of office in 2007 faced accusations by other 
ethnic and religious groups. His administration was accused of favouring the Beroms 
(his kin) over the others in terms of political appointments and promotions in the civil 
service. And in Nasarawa state, the Eggon and other ethnic groups have complained 
of political domination by the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri groups.129  
Throughout the Middle Belt and Nigeria at large, fears and ongoing mistrust   
accompany all forms of interaction among the different ethnic, regional and religious 
groups in their struggle for the control of local, State and Federal resources otherwise 
                                                          
129
 See Ostein, (2009) and Mavalla (2014), on the indigene settler divide, ethnic marginalisation and 
competition over resources in Jos and Kaduna. See also Suberu’s (1999) discussion on power sharing 
strategies.  
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referred to the ‘national cake’ (Bayart, 2009). Often, these groups claim their struggle 
for emancipation is only possible through ethnic and religious mobilisation to push 
forward their demands (Mohammed, 2012). This form of competition is often 
encouraged by religious leaders and ethnic associations seeking to ensure their group 
is put in the most advantageous position. While such comparisons are not new,130 the 
various ethnic nationalities and religious groups in Nigeria usually have different ways 
of explaining the perceived disadvantage of their own group. As pointed out in chapter 
two, political and community leaders study the personnel composition of every 
institution of government with a microscope to find a breach of the principle where they 
are not favoured (BBC, 2006). Golwa (2013:2), encapsulates the scenario of 
competition in the Nigerian system as follows: 
Every appointment by government is scrutinized to ascertain whether the 
appointee is a Muslim or Christian, a Northerner or a Southerner, a Northern 
Christian or Southern Muslim. It is not enough that the appointees are Nigerians 
and are competent to hold those positions. 
The existence of this approach points to the fact that the potential for conflict has 
increased in the wake of Federal competition, thus leading to the politicisation of ethnic 
and religious sentiments; and because only a few people control state resources, the 
State and its institutions are seen by many Nigerian citizens to exist only to make a 
few people rich (Oguntola, 2015). And, further, because Nigerian society has not 
                                                          
130For instance, the Punch Newspaper of 22 March 2014 quoted the Secretary General of the Jama ‘atul 
Nasril Islam (JNI), Dr Khalid Aliyu, who accused the Federal Government under the leadership of 
President Goodluck Jonathan of the lop-sided appointment of delegates to the National Conference. 
According to him 62 per cent of the delegates to the conference are Christians while the remaining 
percentage is shared by Muslims and other religions in the land. 
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institutionalized liberal values, it means that women are almost always shut out, 
whether from formal organizations in the public sphere or religious circles, despite 
increasing international insistence on gender equality. And Nigerian society is unable 
to address the underrepresentation of women in different fields, such as trade, politics, 
and the teaching profession and in the wider context of societal norms and practices. 
In Nigeria, there is strong resentment among men over the perceived ‘advantage’ 
enjoyed by women such as the international conventions that seeks to eliminate 
discrimination and the various media campaigns seeking 30 percent reserved seat for 
women in both appointed and elected positions, has led to a form of backlash. As a 
result of the mobilisation of ethnic, religion, indigene-stranger (settler) and also gender 
boundaries, this resentment often further increases male scrutiny and control of 
women. This equally means that in the professional context another dividing line is 
drawn by gender. The scrutiny of women particularly has become politicised, often 
bleeding into and reinforcing other dividing lines such as ethnicity, religion and the 
indigene-settler dichotomy in the work place which will be discussed next. 
 
7.3 Gendered Competition in Professional Context 
The ethnic and religious hatred that is frequently directed at women in professional 
environments is seen as a category of violence which is often neglected in many 
professional discusses. In particular, in relation to the educational context, the 
professional experiences of women in Middle Belt schools and at institutions in Jos 
suggest that as ethnic and religious conflict redefines the work environment it also 
dramatically transforms gender relationships, particularly the way men relate to the 
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women they work with. Thus, a professional environment that is supposed to celebrate 
accomplishment, professional conduct, merit and respect is turned into an extended 
zone of conflict or violence manifested through the everyday gendered discrimination 
and violence in the workplace.  
This means that widely-held notions of equality in many workplaces in Nigeria only 
exist in print,131 as narratives suggest. In practice, notions of equality are not easy to 
achieve because the open and indirect injustices many women (and some men) face 
in the workplace makes it difficult for them to progress in their career and have a 
dramatic impact on their well-being and performance. In many professional contexts 
there has actually been an increase in the competition among ethnic and religious 
groups for career progression with regard to promotion and positions since the 
beginning of the conflict, and religion and/or ethnicity are often used to reinforce this 
competition for access to the civil service. This situation was explained in more detail 
by one of the interviewees Dr Shar Lagwen,132 who explained that the competition is 
worsening day by day. He narrates:  
A lot of the unhealthy competition you see in the workplace [is] emphasised by 
religious groups. Because if you have denominationalisms where you have a 
Muslim, and within the Muslims they belong to different denominations like the 
                                                          
131
 Information on workplace equality and gender equality in general is contained in the Nigerian National 
Gender Policy and the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, especially chapter IV- fundamental human rights. 
The National Gender Policy is meant to ensure women’s empowerment and the eradication of unequal 
gender power relations in the workplace and economy, in trade unions and in broader society; Increase 
the participation of women in leadership and decision making; Increase awareness and gender 
sensitivity in all sectors; Defend and advance women rights; Ensure that through labour legislation and 
collective bargaining, the particular circumstances of women are considered and that measures are 
promoted to eliminate discrimination on the basis of gender; Fight against stereotyping on the basis of 
gender in the workplace; Ensure that there is a gender perspective in all sectors of development.  
 
132
 Dr Shar Lagwen is a lecturer with the University. Interviewed in Jos. 8/1/2013. 
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Izala, Sufi, Derika, competing. And the differences [are] very serious within 
these different groups, to the extent that one group cannot pray in another’s 
Mosque. So when members of these groups come to work together, they are 
full of differences. And sometimes even to lead or hold a position, they feel and 
prefer their denomination member to others. Within the Muslim community, they 
struggle over who should be elected; if you elect the Sufi, they will say no, he 
will give preference to the Sufi. And so they take some of these differences to 
the workplace, they go with them to work.  
He continues: 
I have this Muslim friend, who was really worried that there is so much bias 
where he works and he was looking for who to salvage the situation. Then 
someone came with a Muslim name and this is supposed to be the boss of the 
unit. So everyone goes to meet him with their complaint and when he went in, 
he said to the boss, that my only problem is that the Christians here are truly 
biased, so I want you to help. So he told him that I also want you to be bias 
towards the Muslims, not knowing that the guy is a Christian and only bears [a] 
Muslim name. So you see how far this has gone even through the military, and 
even the police.  
The statement above indicates that since the conflict, mistrust and division cut across 
almost every sector of the formal economy, which affects both men and women. More 
particularly several factors have been outlined as being responsible for the minimal 
presence and active participation of women in the formal sector. For example, 
Nwabueze and Nnadi (2009: 27) argue that “Nigerian women always encounter gender 
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specific obstacles in various fields of their national life” due to structural imbalances. 
Religion is used to “dominate women and exploit their labour at home and in social 
production” (Imam, 1989: 2).  
 
7.4 Overview of Structural Discrimination in the Professional Work Environment 
As we have noted, indirect injustices and competition affects many women in the 
workplace and it dramatically affects their well-being and performance. Gender 
discrimination in the workplace “endorses the subordination of women by affecting their 
ability to control their life chances in…the labour market” (Beoku-Beths, 1998:158). For 
instance, a recent survey of the Security Sector Institutions (SSIs)133 in West African 
Countries shows that women are discriminated against through the restrictions for 
women in the armed forces in relation to marriage and pregnancy. The Nigerian penal 
services additionally discriminate against women by limiting recruitment to unmarried 
women. Not only are few women recruited in the first place, but female personnel are 
subjected to restrictions as to when they are allowed to marry and become pregnant, 
and those who become pregnant during the first 6 years of employment they are 
dismissed (Gaaderse & Valasek, 2011:9). Further, the professional environment of the 
SSIs (in terms of policies, institutional and physical infrastructure) rarely 
accommodates the needs of male and particularly female staff.   
                                                          
133
 The result is based on the 2011 survey of 14 ECOWAS Countries Security Sector Institutions (SSIs) 
- Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The survey indicates that female representation in SSIs is 
low: on overall average, women represent approximately 12 percent of the Police services, Armed 
Forces, justice systems and the penal services. Refer to Gaaderse & Valasek, (2011) for the full survey. 
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In the medical profession, female doctors who get pregnant after medical school and 
before starting their one year compulsory residency programme are often denied the 
opportunity to participate in the training programme.  In an informal interaction, a 
female resident Doctor in Jos, who only agreed to talk to me on condition of anonymity, 
told me that: 
I got married just before my final medical examination. I was very happy 
because I passed and when I discovered I was pregnant it looked to me a 
double blessing… [a] few weeks before the start of the residency programme, I 
to a general hospital and was shortlisted… When I went to assume duty, I was 
told I cannot practice at that time because they noticed I was pregnant… I was 
shocked to my bone marrow. I was denied my right just because I was pregnant, 
someone must have assumed it is unsafe for me to practice. This was my worst 
moment ever.   
This example shows women are controlled in the public sector by senior male 
colleagues who often assume control of female subordinates by making, prescribing 
and implementing policies that discriminate against women as individuals and as part 
of the broader perception that women’s ability should be limited because. This 
structure of inequality then becomes part of the system, since “structural violence is 
often invisible and may not be recognized” (Action Aid, 2014: 10).  
To support this point further, Nwabueze and Nnadi (2009) have stressed that the 
discrimination of women exists in many other professions. Just as in the Military and 
the medical profession, the judicial system does not allow women to request bail for a 
person in police custody, despite the fact that there are proportionally more female 
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judges and female lawyers134 (Gaaderse & Valasek, 2011:9). Thus, the absence of 
policies and procedures to address gender inequality in the workplace nonetheless 
contribute to an unhealthy work environment.   
Having provided examples of some of the difficulties women face in the workplace, the 
next part of the chapter will address their situation in the teaching profession, beginning 
with an overview of education in Nigeria as it relates to the differences between the 
North and South. 
 
7.5 The Disparity in the Acquisition of Western Education in Nigeria 
The disparity in educational development in Nigeria’s North and South has been a long 
standing phenomenon (Imam, 2012). Between 1910 and 1929, a carefully controlled 
programme of education was sponsored in the North by the colonial government 
(Okpu, 1977; Turaki, 1993). The model that was used differed from the system already 
being followed in the South. Its aim was to ensure that schooling did not radically 
disrupt the traditional feudal order of the North. For this reason, the primary schools 
were constructed and run by the emirs, appointed by the colonial state as Native 
Authorities, and the main subjects taught were the Islamic religion and Arabic. 
Character training in all matters of dress, especially as it relates to women, as well as 
behaviour and traditional forms of salutation were supervised by the traditional 
teachers -the mallams- and pupils were required to conform to local customs, while the 
South accepted and adopted the Western system of education with minimal 
                                                          
134
 Nigeria has produced a female Chief Justice in the recent past, Aloma Mariam Mukhtar, who became 
the Chief justice of Nigeria from July 2012 to November 2014. 
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involvement of the traditional rulers as teachers. These differences in the system of 
education not only created an educational imbalance between the North and the South, 
but, as far as the emergence of ethnicity was concerned, widened the social distance 
between people in the two parts of the country (Nnoli, 1980: 119). 
In an effort to bridge the widened gap in education between the North and the South, 
private schools are being established, along un-going government campaigns to 
encourage every child at primary school age has access to free education. Private 
initiatives of the graduate youths particularly in the North is particularly commendable. 
The picture in Figure 6 shows one of the schools established by graduate youths in 
Jos, it offers free education and girls are particularly encouraged to enrol. 
Figure 6: Community Secondary School in Jos 
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Source: Field notes 2012/2013 © Plangsat Dayil 
The secondary schools is run by graduates of the community to assist students who 
are unable to attend other fee-paying government and private schools. During my visit 
to the school, I was really impressed by the manner in which the students conducted 
themselves and especially the salutation I was given. The teachers confirmed to me 
that they take issues of respect and discipline very seriously. Even though the school 
appears to have a good female enrolment ratio, the picture is just a presentation of one 
class.  
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7.6 Regional Disparity in Access to Education  
As mentioned above, the various regions in Nigeria advanced at varied levels, with the 
Northern region lagging behind (cf. Okpu, 1977) due to partial implementation of the 
policy on education and the interference of the traditional teachers. Nnoli (1980: 117) 
equally notes that, one section of the country differed significantly from the other 
because education in the South received greater investment than that in the North as 
it was deemed capable of subverting the authority of the emirs, especially since its 
major harbingers were Christian missionaries. The next sections describe the 
education system from the colonial to the post-colonial era. 
 
7.6.1 Education During the Colonial Era 
As described in the previous section, during the colonial era, missionary activities were 
restricted in the predominately Muslim North in order to curtail the spread of Christianity 
and Western education (Okpu, 1977, Turaki, 1993; Fagbumi, 2005) while Quranic 
education was allowed to flourish, leading to a considerable educational gap between 
the Northern and the Southern parts of Nigeria (Ogunsola, 1982). Although Western 
education did not prove to be of any immediate benefit to the Northern region the 
subsequent “demands for more Muslim administrators and teachers, [and] the 
acquisition of Western education and skills widened the cultural differences between 
them and their [Southern] neighbours” (Okpu, 1977: 50). This differentiation was to  
have a serious impact on politics and employment in the public service as the  
differential patterns of knowledge and skill acquisition meant that women in the North 
were held back educationally, affecting their chances to access formal employment.  
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The discrepancy in education between the North and South continued with the 1948 
Education Ordinance which decentralized educational administration in the country, 
setting the stage for an uneven implementation of educational policy throughout the 
country (see Imam, 2012). By 1954 when Nigeria became a Federation of three regions 
(i.e. the Eastern, Western and Northern regions) and the Federal Capital of Lagos, the 
constitution gave each region the power of making laws, including its own educational 
policies (Imam, 2012: 185). An initial experiment to offer Nigerians Universal Primary 
Education was started in the Western region in 1955 and in the Eastern region in 1957 
(Fafunwa, 2004). Considerable efforts were made to develop and expand educational 
facilities in the North (Ozigi & Ocho, 1981), but these were less successful due to the 
active distrust towards Western education. The majority of the people preferred to send 
their children to the Qur’anic schools and viewed western education with suspicion 
(Imam, 2012: 186).  
In the Northern parts of Nigeria, Islam was deeply entrenched both in the religious 
belief and educational orientation of the people who relied on Quranic education (Ozigi 
& Ocho, 1981). So, in the North of the country, the Quranic school system with its often 
itinerant pupils continued to thrive and ran parallel with the national educational system 
but even though the Universal Primary Education (UPE) made primary education free 
and universal, no attempt was made to make it compulsory for all children (Imam, 2003; 
Imam, 2012: 191). In the Southern parts of the country, each ethnic group had its own 
traditional form of education based on its own culture and tradition, but, and unlike in 
the North, Western education was taken up widely (Taiwo, 1980; Imam, 2012: 182) as 
noted in the previous section. 
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7.6.2 Education in the Post-Colonial Era 
In Nigeria, educational policy at independence was mainly concerned with using 
schools to develop manpower for economic development and the Africanisation of the 
civil service (Woolman, 2001). Equally, education was meant to provide the individual 
with the basic and necessary tools for informed interaction and participation in Nigeria 
today (Bing, 1984: 104). And the Nigerian government has revised its education policy 
with the aim of eradicating illiteracy and providing equal opportunity for all (see Imam, 
2012) and to bridge the educational imbalance between the North and the South (Nnoli, 
1978: 117-119). Consequently, in 1999 the Federal Government of Nigeria flagged the 
UBE programme as a means of achieving equal educational opportunities and 
eradicating illiteracy (Imam, 2012: 192-193). However, “... access to basic education 
is inhibited by gender issues and socio-cultural beliefs and practices, among other 
factors” (Imam, 2012: 194). As mothers, and first teachers to their children, women 
have been stereotyped as only being able to go into a “limited number of fields 
culturally approved for their sex” (Aluko & Alfa, 1985: 164) which in turn influences the 
manner in which they socialise their children. 
With the revised National Policy on Education from 1998 to 2004 aimed at providing 
equal and adequate educational opportunities for all, at all levels of the educational 
system (Imam, 2012: 195-196) the imbalance in the North continues to pose new 
challenges. One of the problems is that Quranic schools in the North do “not provide a 
favourable environment for the inculcation of the right kind of values for the survival of 
the individual in the larger Nigerian society. As noted in the previous section, the 
Quranic schools adapt pupils for their own immediate community and to practice the 
Islamic religious rites” (Imam, 2012: 199).  
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Part of the problem of this lack of integration is the past leadership in the North and 
“British colonial policy which favoured the retention and protection of Islamic culture 
and values” (Okpu, 1977: 49-51). Kukah (1994: 6) equally opined that “Western 
education and the opportunities it offered was not available in the North… if Sardauna 
[Ahmadu Bello, the Northern Region’s leader at Independence] had [had] the chance, 
he would have outlawed Western education in Northern Nigeria and promoted Koranic 
education instead.” This statement points to the fact that educational backwardness in 
the North can partly be blamed on the leaders who have shown little support for its 
growth and expansion in the North. But it also implies that the educational uptake within 
Northern Nigeria was often higher among Christians than among Muslims. Following 
the legacy of the Sardauna, the Northern leaders have ignored the fact that by the mid-
twentieth century western civilization had become dominant in the world and the main 
question was how one could function effectively within such a system. Muslims, or any 
religious group for that matter, have the right to educate their people according to their 
faith, but it could be argued that if they also want to function effectively in a modern 
society which has become hegemonic, and be relevant then they have to strategically 
find a way to educate themselves effectively while maintaining their faith.  
The consequence of not being integrated or the feeling of not belonging to the larger 
society for national unity is enormous. If people are driven by their limited outlook, and 
by hunger and poverty, there is the potential for social instability and sectarian crises” 
(Imam, 2012: 199). Because education in this part of Nigeria is dominated by 
Christians, Muslims sometimes feel under-represented and marginalised in the school 
or university environment. At the same time, education is important in order to obtain 
the qualifications needed to work in the formal sector and political leadership, and 
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those who are educationally disadvantaged tend to feel insecure. Moreover, those who 
perceive that they are educationally disadvantaged may also feel disadvantaged at the 
political level. And within this context, Western education becomes politicised by the 
conflict and is seen as part of the conflict.  It may therefore seem to some Muslims that 
the Christian bias within education contributes to their disadvantage.  
As education is funded by the state, and thus supported by funds that theoretically 
belong to the citizens, this means that the sector is subject to extremely close scrutiny 
and debate by Christians and Muslims. The impulses deriving from the local 
constellation can be complex. While Muslims can suffer from their outsider status in 
education, Christian teachers are sometimes seen as potential agents of subversion 
because they might influence their pupils religiously. The local discrepancy was 
reinforced by the fact that both Christianity and Islam promote a system of belief that 
asserts that women are subordinate to male authority. As many primary school 
teachers are women, gender dynamics complicate the already difficult relationships 
between teachers and pupils of different religions further. 
 
7.7 Gender Disparity in the Education Sector 
As set out above, gender disparities exists throughout the public sector in Nigeria. In 
many parts of Nigeria “the public space is dominated by men in general and women 
are generally confined to areas where, in addition to being less visible, they also 
exercise little discretion and power.” (Action Aid, 2014: 9). This is particularly relevant 
in the education sector, even though the teaching profession in Nigeria has traditionally 
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been dominated by women (cf. Beoku-Betts, 1998: 172)135, partly because it 
conveniently fits as an extension of women’s domestic work as carers, there is a widely 
held notion that women’s natural inclination and skill in teaching and managing the 
welfare of children equip them to succeed as teachers (Nwagwu, 1994: 176).  
Nicholas (2006)136 considers that the proximity of school buildings to residential areas 
is a contributing factor, because this proximity makes teaching in primary and 
secondary schools very convenient for many women as they can spend part of their 
lesson preparation time at home with their family. The acceptance of this situation 
reflects the fact that many women (and their families) view domestic responsibility as 
primary and other forms of formal responsibility as secondary. At the same time they 
face discrimination by a pervading culture of male dominance in private and public 
spaces (Para-Mallam et al. 2011). For example, in many instances women are 
relegated to teach elementary subjects such as general studies and social studies 
which are thought to be female staff subjects. It is also implicit that women will, through 
these subjects, teach the students about the traditional structure of the family, including 
the position of women within this system. In this way, these teachers are involved in 
reproducing and maintaining the gender status quo.  
                                                          
135
 In 2010 for example, Nigeria has more qualified female public primary and junior secondary school 
teachers Though adult [female] literacy still varies widely across geopolitical zones: in 2008 it was lowest 
in the North West (22 percent female; 58 percent male) and the North East (23 percent; 1 percent). 
These figures contrast significantly to the southern zones, where there was an average literacy rate of 
80 percent for women and 90 percent for men. See Action Aid (2011)    
 
136
 On the impact of Changing Conditions of Service on the Recruitment of Teachers in Nigeria, see 
Nwagwu (2006). 
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Today, although some mothers prefer to take up jobs that enable them to have time 
for the family, motherhood is often used against women in formal sector employment 
(Williams, 1990). “Whilst all have acknowledged the need to uphold integrity and 
discipline and preserve the independence of the service, there have been cases where 
this principle has been sacrificed for political, tribal or other considerations” (Olusanya, 
1975: 87).  Just as in politics, women who take up public sector employment and desire 
to succeed are often labelled as over-ambitious. The use of the word over-ambitious 
is intended to demoralise women, to remind them of appropriate femaleness. The 
effect of all this is to “create in public officers [particularly women] a sense of insecurity 
and frustration” (Olusanya, 1975: 87).  
Having discussed the regional disparity in education in Nigeria and gender 
discrimination in the education sector and other professions at large, I will now proceed 
to discuss the impact of conflict on the education sector in Jos.  
 
7.8 Impact of the Conflict on Professional Relations in Institutions of Learning 
Throughout Jos, the hate, suspicion, fear and animosity associated with the conflicts 
has filtered into the public institutions of learning. This is partly a process that has 
resulted from the segregated settlement patterns that have come to define residential 
choices. As Fukshiwe (2010: 37) points out, “one of the most potent effects of violent 
conflicts is the displacement of people from their residences.” Displacement is often 
experienced as a terrible loss and a form of victimisation because residents run to 
safety without any hope of returning to their original homes where the conflicts are 
escalating. This means that many people in Jos have lost not only their property and 
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neighbourhood, but also their businesses, networks and offices. Returning to other 
examples from the Middle Belt, in Nasarawa State for instance, the conflict has also 
forced many families to relocate. Action Aid (2014: 18) in a recent study found out that 
“…most of the schools in the conflict areas are not functioning. Many of the pupils have 
fled with their parents. Some other children have been transferred to other schools 
either outside of the state or to relatively more peaceful communities where schools 
are running. Similarly, in Plateau state, “ethno-religious crises have led to the de-
population of [some] areas” (Action Aid, 2011: 10), causing a serious strain on school 
attendance for the girl child. It is also a major challenge to education in general as it 
puts a lot of pressure on female teachers who are forced out of paid employment due 
to displacement.  
This displacement also has a negative impact on the education sector due to hundreds 
of learning hours wasted during conflicts and when relocating. The de-population of 
some of the areas in Jos and the Middle due to conflict has created a culture of 
antagonism and hate in the new communities to which refugees have escaped and 
told people their stories. Evidence from my fieldwork indicates that some of this 
antagonism also affects the educational workplace. Here, anyone sharing the same or 
similar identity with the perceived enemies of the majority is often instantly labelled an 
enemy too. In one my interviews with the teachers at one of the Government Primary 
Schools in Jos, some of them explained in an FGD that: 
One of the challenges we have here is that we have 95 percent of the teachers 
as Christians, out of about 45 staff and only about 5 percent are Muslims. We 
have more than 600 students who are majorly Muslims. When we go to teach, 
they [the students] will not listen to us, they will not give us attention, but once 
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their Mallam137 or the Muslim [male] teachers come into the class, they give 
them full attention, they listen to them. But if it is the Christian [female teachers], 
they will be playing.  
But the focus here is not with the (mostly female) teachers who feel that they are not 
accorded the respect they deserve from their employers for their work to improve the 
children’s future; rather the fact that the children disrespect the teachers, and that the 
teachers are helpless in the face of this, indicates a total lack of trust between pupils 
(and their parents) on the one hand and teachers on the other hand. The interview 
above also describes the acrimony and hardening of opinions that has greatly affected 
gender relations in the workplace. All the participants in the FGD from which this 
testimony was drawn were female, but the Mallam, and the other teachers – including 
the Islamic Religious Knowledge (IRK) teacher – to whom the children allegedly paid 
attention were male. So, here a complex mix of religious rivalry and gendered 
disadvantage is at play, and it seems as if the distance between men and women in 
this particular school has become much greater since the start of the conflict because 
it coincides with the religious divisions in other aspects of the community.  
The gap is further widened by the fact that the female teachers I met are especially 
resentful of male students who pay little attention, a practice which appears to be tacitly 
encouraged by the parents. In another FGD in a primary school in Jos, the teachers 
narrated some of the experiences they have had with the male students. According to 
them:  
                                                          
137
 Malam is a Hausa name usually referring to a male teacher, while Malama refers to a female teacher. 
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Some of them [male students] come to school with light weapons such as 
lighters, pocket/ kitchen knives, we can even show you some of them, which we 
seized and [that] are in the office. And when you ask them why they carry them 
around, they will not respond. So we are feeling frustrated.  And when we send 
words for their come, see and explain, they will simply say “wannan aikin yara 
ne.”138 That they are just small children and do not know what they are doing. 
But how can you believe what these parents are saying.139 
While this causes uneasiness for the teachers, fear is also likely to be the rationale 
behind the students’ need to carry light weapons for their own protection. Another 
possible explanation for the students’ threatening behaviour is that they learnt it from 
the neighbourhood which has become militant over the years. Either way, for these 
children the schools are dominated by people (teachers) whom they have only heard 
about as their enemies. As the schools are located in the pupils comfort zones is not 
surprising that they feel the need to be armed or vigilant or protective should there be 
any intruder.  
Another example of the impact of the conflict is segregated settlement, and is 
described in the next section. 
 
7.9 The impact of Segregated Settlement on Institutions of Learning 
                                                          
138
 My translation. “They are just kids’ stuff”. In other words, it is just the children trying to be mischievous 
and nothing more. 
 
139
 FGDs Government Primary School in Jos. 28/8/2012. 
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One of the major impacts of the segregated settlements on the education sector is that 
the separation of schools has reinforced social divisions within communities in Jos. For 
example, while the impact of conflict on relations between pupils and staff is not clear, 
its effects on required work hours has been drastic. This is because most of the 
teachers stay away from school for days without coming to work whenever there is a 
conflict. Some of them feel frustrated because they have to stay off work against their 
wishes although a few, in contrast to the narrative above, are happy working in schools 
in the no-go-areas and one informed me that:  
I am very happy working here…even though the School is located in a no-go-
area for me. The kids in this school are very obedient and it is surprising how 
much interest they show and their willingness to learn. You can 
sometimes…notice a few of them struggling to catch up with the others, but 
generally they are enthusiastic learners and I love to teach them. One of the 
major setbacks for me since this conflict is that most of us have to relocate far 
from the school…we have to stop coming to work when there is conflict…the 
head of our school and some of our Muslim colleagues are quite understanding. 
They keep us up-to-date with the security situation around the area and often 
we are advised to stay off work until the situation improves.140 
This narrative is in contrast to the preceding interview, as the pupils in this case are 
better behaved and the teachers are satisfied with their conduct. This means that 
inability of teachers to work regularly in the narrative above might have led to 
resentment and resulted in a lower educational standards in these schools.  
                                                          
140
 Interview with Mrs Asabe a teacher with the Government Primary Muslim School. Interviewed in Jos. 
27/8/2012.  
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Educational attainment by the children might have been lowered because they are 
being denied the opportunity of full-time learning as a result of restriction in movement 
during conflicts and displacement as a result of the conflicts. This situation further 
narrows the interaction and relational gap for these pupils as unlike their parents’ 
generation they have not had the opportunity of growing up in communities where 
Christians and Muslims lived together happily and studied under the same roof.  
Born into mono-religious communities confined to often bounded settlements, they 
play only with children of their own background. Having had no contact with Christians 
apart from hearing about them in relation to the conflicts, they then have to go to school 
to be taught by people of that faith as discussed earlier. In the medium term, the 
situation may contribute to mistrust from students and their parents, who may feel that 
the teachers are not really committed to their work because of their absence from 
school. In many other schools, however, relations are far worse. In an FGD held in one 
of the Government Primary Muslim Schools in Jos, the teachers told me that: 
Now when we relate with colleagues, we try as much as possible not to mention 
things that I know will be offensive, and you know now anything can be 
offensive. When you smile at someone in the morning, all you see is irritation 
on the face already. So when it comes to interaction, you have to be very careful. 
As colleagues, we sometimes visit each other’s family during festive seasons, 
or when there is an occasion, but now, one cannot visit like those days. We now 
understand that the differences in our communities is affecting the work place.  
This narrative points out the impact of conflict on how teachers feel they have to 
behave, which since their personal relationships are not cordial, one can easily assume 
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gradually affects the children. It is possible that some of these teachers might have lost 
loved ones or faced forceful displacement, or live in segregated settlements, and that 
these experiences will also inculcate hate and antagonism towards the students they 
teach. To illustrate this, one of the teachers I interviewed told me how difficult it was 
for her to forgive her offenders. Mrs Silvia Boki141 said:  
Conflict has affected me, because, in those days when I lived amidst Muslims 
in Angwan Doki (aka Rahol Kanan), we use[d] to have [a] good relationship with 
the Muslims. During Christmas, they will come, we will give them food and they 
will eat. But after the conflict started, we hardly sit together to discuss as 
neighbours like we used to. We hardly enter each other’s house. Even in our 
place of work, the relationship we use[d] to have with our Muslim brothers is no 
longer there. It has created a division in our homes, our children no longer play 
with them like they used to play before. I still live in Angwan Doki, but there is 
no form of relationship. We now look at each other as enemies. I see those of 
them who burnt down part of my house and my small shop passing every day. 
When I am sitting down and I see them passing to the mosques, I use to abuse 
them, because there is that hatred in me. The crisis has created so much hate 
that it will be difficult for us to forgive one another. It will only take the Grace of 
God. Because I was affected and how will I now forgive these people if not for 
the Grace of God that will help me. 
                                                          
141
 Mrs Silvia Boki is a teacher in one of the Government Primary Schools Jos. In the past, she combined 
her teaching and petty business to make ends meet. She had a small shop in front of her compound 
where she retails provisions and call cards. She lost the shop to the crises and part of her house was 
demolished during the crises. Interviewed in Jos. 24/9/2012. 
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This teacher’s narrative is typical of some of the responses obtained during the 
interviews. Some of the respondents said that such issues had not been part of their 
thinking in the past, but that now they were beginning to worry and think about the 
religious and ethnic hatred they experienced at the workplace and sometimes from 
their work associates. This has negative consequences for workplace cohesion 
because normal everyday behaviour becomes subject to wrong interpretation 
particularly when viewed from a religious point. Similarly, communication is constantly 
politicised and misinterpreted because people internalise ethnic and religious 
intolerance as result of the lingering conflicts. Likewise, in many schools, there is 
segregation with people/teachers sometimes openly referring to each other as 
enemies. As the example from the schools illustrates, the children are fast learning 
from what they see going on in their community and neighbourhood.  
 
7.10 The Impact of the Conflict on Trust Confidence in Tertiary Education 
This section addresses the fact that the impact of the conflict affects not only schools 
but also tertiary institutions. Although in the past both Christians and Muslims worked 
confidently and peacefully together in groups and in offices in Jos and the Middle Belt, 
they are now very conscious of their differences. The ethnic and religious crises have 
created a lot of gaps between colleagues and are gradually eroding trust and mutual 
confidence between people of different faiths and ethnic groups. This has dramatically 
affected people, particularly women’s, perception not only of their ability to have a voice 
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in the workplace, but also their confidence, as illustrated by Dr Bakwando 
Dan’azumi,142 who said that:  
For me as a Hausa-Fulani in the University, I feel I belong to the small minority 
group and that actually keeps me in a very uncomfortable situation. And so 
whatever I do, or wherever I go, I have that feeling in me… so wherever I go, 
whether in the office, I feel that or have the feeling of being in the minority. 
Sometimes people look at me differently or they throw questions that ought not 
to have been asked.  
So therefore, like in ASUU [Academic Staff Union of Universities] meetings or 
during elections, I have this feeling that I cannot be elected to a certain position 
because I do not belong to the majority. Worse still is that I am always careful 
to say some things in order not to be misunderstood… this feeling is with me all 
the time. 
Such feelings in the educational workplace reflects the general impact of the conflict 
on the wider society and the new forms of identity that have emerged in the workplace 
as a result of ethnic and religious intolerance. A significant number of those people that 
I interviewed in the university explained to me that they normally observed the way 
people looked at them when they stood before a class. In one of the informal 
discussions I had, a visiting professor who is resident outside this country decided to 
come back to work in one of the universities in Nigeria. When he arrived he found that 
                                                          
142
 Dr Bakwando Dan’azumi: A Lecturer at the University. 
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there were a lot of politics in the department where he now worked, with unhealthy 
competition amongst colleagues. He told me that: 
There were cases you keep working, while someone who is below you is 
elevated above you because of ethnicity or religion. That makes you so 
uncomfortable, so I prefer to go to places where there are more people of the 
same ethnicity and religion as mine and I can easily be given certain positions.  
This clearly shows that religion and ethnicity now play a big role in determining job 
progression, particularly when colleagues are competing for the same position. While 
most ethnicities, as mentioned earlier, have complained of marginalisation of some 
sort within their community, most of these groups now work to prevent this by jealously 
guarding their professional career path with that mind-set that their jobs will be taken 
over if not protected violently. This means that the issue of competition for positions 
and promotion now pervades the workplace, similar to what is on-going in political 
arena, where opposing parties resort to violence. Further, people working together who 
come from different ethnic, religious and social backgrounds have conflicting ideas of 
how work life should be organised in terms of attitudes towards female behaviour.  
Having focussed on the impact of conflict on workplace relations in the primary and 
tertiary institutions, the next section will discuss the gendered notions of professional 
behaviour and dress.  
 
7.11 Conflict and Gendered Notions of Professional Behaviour and Dress 
There has been increasing emphasis on gendered notions of professional behaviour 
in most institutions of learning in Jos and the Middle Belt. And now “gender difference 
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invades the workforce not simply through the conflict of work and family for women, 
but more subtly, through workplace structures and assumptions” (Morris & Lyon, 1996: 
4). While the ethnic and religious divisions in the educational sector clearly affect both 
men and women, women suffer more because their male colleagues tend to equate 
their domestic control of women with their control of women in the workplace. In other 
words, it is usual for women in the educational sector to be regarded as being under 
the control of men.  
The control exerted over women in the educational sector might not be unrelated to 
the strategy of exclusion in the face of competition for the retention of one’s position, 
just like in the Federal competition for the centre, women are tactically oppressed using 
religion and notions of an acceptable dress standard, just to frustrate them as a 
subordinate class. It is interesting to contrast Dr Dan’Azumi’s experiences with those 
of Dr Marot Yohom,143 a female and Christian lecturer in the same department at the 
University. While Dr Dan’Azumi was concerned about his minority experience and 
inability to gain recognition as a representative of the University union, Dr Yohom had 
to deal with issues relating very specifically to the fact that she is female. She explained 
that her relationships with colleagues of a different religion could be difficult: 
Our relationship is not so cordial. Particularly a colleague who I will say is a kind 
of a very strong practitioner of his faith, I would not want to use the word 
fundamentalist… will attack you on every little thing you do; from the way you 
dress, to the way you greet him.  
                                                          
143
 Dr Marot Yohom: A Lecturer at the University. Interviewed in Jos. 8/1/2013 
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It was really very difficult relating to this particular colleague … that relationship 
was not too good for me especially when I had to work under him as a 
postgraduate student, he will complain about everything I wear, which makes 
me a little uncomfortable. 
Her statement points to the fact that the conflicts have not only drawn sharper 
boundaries between colleagues of different backgrounds, but have also encouraged 
some men to criticise individual women Behaviour such as how they dress and greet 
people. As both Islam and Christianity emphasise male authority, it is likely that the 
growing hostility of religious discourse have given individuals the courage to express 
their hostility towards members of the other group not just in terms of their general 
dislike but, especially where women are concerned, also as a very personal critique of 
their character and upbringing.  
The experience of Muslim female lecturers at the University is similar to the experience 
of the Christian female lecturers interviewed. For instance, in an interview with Hajia 
(Dr) Miriam Ladi’le,144 she expressed concern over how she feels she is being 
monitored closely and viewed by her other male colleagues, both Muslim and 
Christian. She told me that this sometimes makes her uneasy, especially when her 
colleagues make jokes about other Muslim women who are under purdah, which they 
seem to do frequently when she is around. In one of her narratives, she recollects how 
one of them said to her: 
 The day you become the minister of education in Nigeria, I am sure banning 
 purdah and liberating other women will be the number one on your agenda. 
                                                          
144
 Hajia (Dr) Ladi’le is a lecturer at the University. Interviewed in Jos. 9/1/2013. 
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She continues: 
 I know he thinks I think that is a compliment, but I know he was saying that 
with a bit of sarcasm with the looks on his face, and I know that comment would 
never have been said to a male colleague. 
Such patronising comments, even though seemingly of minor importance, paint a 
picture of the way in which men have extended their control of women beyond the 
domestic arena. This stigmatisation of women in the workplace is similar to the control 
exerted on women in politics which creates fear and erodes the confidence of some of 
these women. It also excludes women from having the opportunity to feel equal and 
safe in the workplace, and these tensions in the educational sector, just as in the 
political arena, have turned what is otherwise a professional environment into an 
extended zone of conflict and competition. Thus the conflicts in Jos and the Middle Belt 
have not just created new problems for women but have also served to enforce the 
existing status quo. 
Both Christians and Muslims narrated their experiences of encountering people who 
disapproved of them. Such comments support the fact that increasingly people go to 
work conscious of their differences (in most cases ethnic or religious) from those they 
work with. They look out for dress codes which can easily be used to label one as 
Muslim or Christian. When confronted with others, they pay unnecessary attention to 
every move around them and become suspicious quickly. This narrative by Dr (Mrs) 
Matlu Gube145 is another relevant example to support our argument. According to her:  
                                                          
145
 Interview with Dr (Mrs) Matlu Gube, a staff of the University.  Interview in Jos. 20/1/2013. 
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Since…this conflict started, I noticed my colleagues [who are non-Muslims] are 
suddenly becoming very cold towards me; they will greet me in a hurry, ask me 
questions in a hurry and never want to spend an extra moment listening to me. 
It is as if they are tactically avoiding any form of discussion that we would 
normally have before the conflict. In the past, they would care to ask me about 
the welfare of my family and my welfare as a person. But nowadays it is just as 
if I have become an internal suspect, and in fact pronounced guilty as someone 
who is a part of the conflict in Jos. They do not necessarily say that, but I can 
read it from their faces and actions and how cold they have suddenly become 
towards me. 
This attitude in my opinion is aimed at belittling women and affecting their ability to do 
their job well and be successful. It also creates a kind of gendered relationship where 
the men are the controllers and the women are the controlled in the workplace. As 
mentioned in my earlier chapters, the experiences of women in conflict, their 
associational and social interactions and daily lives are often not reported and the 
implications of this on their general wellbeing is often underestimated.  
It is argued that Hajia (Dr) Miriam Ladi’le’s experience might be similar to that of other 
women across the various professions beyond the teaching and education sector, 
where the biology of an individual is projected ahead of their competence and 
experience with religion used as a controlling factor. Beyond the rhetoric of equal 
opportunity and access in Nigeria’s Federal system, there is the need for a holistic 
approach that ensures that the rights of women and minor voices are heard. This is 
very crucial because women are facing an increased violation of the human right in the 
workplace especially the right to freedom. It is very common to hear women say that 
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the recent conflicts in Jos and the Middle Belt have brought a lot of mistrust into the 
workplace and thereby affecting the cohesion that would hitherto be essential to 
productivity.    
In describing the impact of inter-ethnic prejudices and hostility and the struggle over 
scarce resources on the economy, Nnoli (1980:218) posits that:  
Individuals to begin to give and receive ethnic preferences and to act on the 
basis of such expectations. But this outlook sanctions nepotism and thrives on 
it, sharply contradicts the bureaucratic and entrepreneurial ideals of efficiency, 
meritocracy and universalism. It encourages the bureaucrat to devote his 
working hours more to the serious and lucrative business of watching who 
moves up in the hierarchy than his responsibility to the society as a whole. In 
the process he exacerbates interethnic tension.  
Nnoli’s (1980) point supports the argument put forward in this chapter, that the struggle 
among groups and individuals within the society and within formal organisations is 
exacerbated by inter-ethnic tensions. These struggles increase the hostility between 
members of ethno-religious groups who fear and conceive of one another as 
untrustworthy, thereby making it easy for them to manipulate group sentiments, even 
in the workplace. 
 
7.12 Conclusion: The Failure to Institutionalise Liberal Values in the Workplace 
Since independence, Nigeria’s institutions are said to be run based on liberal values. 
But how women are treated in institutions in the Middle Belt and Nigeria suggests 
otherwise and that liberal values have not been institutionalized in Nigeria, particularly 
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considering the way and manner in which women and their concerns are almost shut 
out, whether in formal organizations in the public square or in religious matters. Given 
the general disparity in women’s employment in other sectors of the economy and the 
context within which women experience discrimination and violence during conflict, this 
thesis argues that what makes competition in Nigeria's workplaces so serious is the 
idea of the ‘national cake.’ The non-implementation of liberal values certainly favours 
this principle and men who are able to introduce and influence policies that 
disadvantage others are ensured exclusive access to this cake.  
In addition, by not educating women and encouraging the  gender gap in employment 
to persist Nigerian society is losing out in terms of the economic productivity that would 
result from increased investment in human capital; and the impact of women's 
education on how children are raised will in turn will affect the future development of 
the country. By keeping Northern women relatively uneducated and backward, both 
the North, Middle Belt and Nigeria at large are losing by not developing the human 
resource of a majority of its population. Further, the attitude of men towards women 
and of certain religious groups towards others is a significant part of a broader strategy 
to maintain control of the labour market and reduce competition by discrediting others 
and increasing ones chances of retaining success. There is the danger that suspicious 
or negative attitudes towards most of the increasing numbers of female teachers in the 
schools may adversely affect the students they teach. First, the students will be taught 
by “disgruntled, uninspiring teachers. As such, their interest in learning may become 
blunted. Secondly, those students who may be looking at their teachers as role models 
and motivators in their search for career choice may develop hostile and negative 
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attitudes towards teaching, and hence reject it as a possible career option” (Nwagwu, 
1994: 177).  
Another significant point is that discrimination in the workplace contributes to making 
women feel unsafe there. In addition existing policies in many other organisations like 
the military are discriminatory and not liberal, thereby constituting a barrier to women’s 
career progression.  Furthermore, there are no complaint procedures for women to 
report any form of structural violence they face. This is because their complaints are 
not normally taken seriously. As in many other professions in the world, reporting such 
complaints may increase their vulnerability and they end up falling victims of the same 
crime that was committed against them. 146  
In the public sphere, local debates about inclusion and exclusion centre on ethnic and 
religious boundaries rather than on the relations between different social groups, 
meaning that women are less likely to be accepted as equal partners in the formal 
sector. The ever-increasing focus on, and control of, female behaviour and dress within 
the public sector significantly affects confidence in the workplace. The idea that women 
are subject to scrutiny, fuelled by the widespread sense of alienation at the communal 
level from those public sector workers who belong to another group, also increasingly 
shapes the interaction of public sector workers with the public. In professions 
dominated by Christian women, such as education, this can lead to particular forms of 
gendered aggression and alienation. 
                                                          
146
 For instance, Dr Caroline Tan who was a surgical student at a Melbourne hospital in Australia filed 
in a case of sexual harassment. When she won the sexual harassment suit against a superior, she was 
"blackballed" as a result and had not been able to get work at a hospital. See McMullin, (2015). 
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Equitable human resources policies and policies to ensure a respectful work 
environment are both crucial to supporting female recruitment, retention and 
advancement (Gaaderse & Valasek, 2011:9). As this chapter illustrates, experiences 
of ethno-religious conflict affect relationships at the workplace negatively and 
destructively, especially for women who are at the receiving end of criticism directed 
both at their religious group and their gender. The workplace has also become what 
Gwamna (2010) refers to as a ceaseless battleground for ethnic and religious 
demagogues who are continually fanning the flames of religious intolerance. They use 
religion and ethnicity not just to support their general dislike but, especially where 
women are concerned, also as a very personal critique of character and good 
upbringing. The contribution of women to education and the formal sector is seen 
through a doubly critical lens that criticises them both as members of particular groups 
and as women. 
The professional positions/status of men and women cannot be considered to be 
equal, since women usually occupy less senior positions and men make laws that 
affect organisations and women in obviously negative ways. This is exacerbated where 
religion has become a weapon of control and discrimination, especially when women 
are expected to conform to certain behavioural and dress patterns. This is done with 
the aim of checkmating the growth of women in the teaching and many other 
professions. While it is hard to imagine the hostility and opposition faced by many 
women in whatever organisation they work in, the research evidence suggests that 
such discrimination and violence is not limited to the female gender but also other men 
who tend to be in a minority in a particular situation. However, this needs to be studied 
further in understanding group dynamics. 
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     CHAPTER EIGHT 
  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS  
8.1 Summary of the Findings  
This study is an exploration and analysis of the impact of ethno-religious conflict both 
on the everyday lives of women and on gender relations more generally in Nigeria. It 
has shown that as a result of conflict in Jos and the Middle Belt, gendered differences 
and difficulties have increased, and that even outside direct conflict situations women 
are disadvantaged in many aspects of life, including their marital and family lives, trade 
and work in the formal sector, and the political system. It has also explained that both 
ethnicity and religion have been mobilized in the context of competition for the national 
cake (Bayart, 2009). While this mobilization primarily aims at excluding others, it also 
contributes, directly and indirectly, to the exclusion of women.  
This research has established that, within Nigeria’s Federal system, resource 
distribution and control encourages ethnic and religious leaders to mobilize group 
sentiments and fan conflict in pursuit of personal and political gains through access to, 
and control of, the local state and its resources. Although conflicts have existed in Jos 
for decades before the present day, the beginning of the democratic era in 1999 offered 
increased opportunities for groups to mobilize and compete. Even where this has led 
to conflict, leaders have been able to legitimize their actions on the grounds of 
demanding recognition within a democratic Federal system.  
Federalism in Nigeria was expected to integrate and encompass all the differences 
and minority groups, providing a level playing ground for even development (Elaigwu, 
2005; Suberu, 2001), it denotes a principle of minority-group inclusion in Federal 
266 
 
government and its affairs.147 This initial role of Federalism led to the creation of many 
States and Local Government units in response to demands for representation by 
ethno-religious and ethno-linguistic groups. However, each time a new Federal unit 
was created to satisfy what became a new majority in that unit new minorities also 
were created, and all down the line women’s concerns and voices were not usually 
considered as part of the process (see Sawer & Vickers, 2010). Worst still, many of 
the people and leaders who have promoted democratic Federalism in Nigeria have 
done so as a strategy for pursuing their private economic interests (Mill, 1861). Thus,   
the actual practice of Federalism breeds competition as is the case in Nigeria where 
the mobilization of ethnic and religious identities offers a network and a clientele in 
support of competitive local politics.  
Chabal and Daloz (1999: 16) emphasize that the mobilization of group identities 
enables political entrepreneurs to maintain relevance and to accrue gains. Since 
Nigeria’s return to civilian rule, many sections of its elite have deliberately intensified 
competition in order to ensure that they gain access to the ‘national cake’. This process 
is not just linked to the political liberalisation of the country, but also reflects its 
economic effects. As the public sector has declined, politics now offers an alternative 
area in which individuals can pursue self-realisation. Bayart’s metaphor of the ‘politics 
of the belly’ illuminates the rationale governing a society based on personal networks, 
where links based on family, alliance and friendship – as well as of course ethnicity 
and religion – ensure access to power (2009: 260-262). He specifically points out that 
                                                          
147Refer to the 1979 and 1999 Nigerian Constitution. It provided for the even representation of Nigerians 
through the Federal Character‖ principle. 
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“ethnicity is almost never absent from politics in Africa…It exists mainly as an agent of 
accumulation- both of wealth and power” (Bayart, 2009: 55).  
These tactics are linked to the widespread belief that in Nigeria people could only run 
for office in units in which their ethno-religious group was the majority and in control. 
In democratic Federations like Nigeria, the constitution is supposed to protect 
individuals of different ethnic and religious groups when they are in the minority. One 
might imagine that this protection should also extend to vulnerable groups like women. 
But neither is the case, as long as parties and politicians continue to rely on 
personalised power and draw legitimacy from practices of redistribution (Chabal & 
Daloz, 1999: 2). As a result, many believe that minorities can only achieve fair 
treatment if they too become majorities, which has led to the clamour for ever smaller 
areas of local government. In Jos, most of the ethnic groups and religious bodies 
believe that if they take control of government, they can use its power to drive others 
off the land they consider their own, or to deny them access to locally held resources. 
As this thesis illustrates, the growing importance of identity politics have also led to a 
transformation of gender relations.  
The majority of the women interviewed for this thesis – regardless of faith, belief, 
religion, culture and ideology – face daily discrimination. Their experiences suggest 
that as ethnic and religious conflict redefines society it transforms gender relationships 
in many walks of life. As discussed in chapter four, it was seen that women in inter-
faith marriages become easy targets of mistrust and suspicion. The fact that the 
position of women in Nigerian society is  related both to their ability to negotiate 
acceptability within the family and within the larger and more general religious 
communities to which the families belong, means that “they often are in a theoretical 
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position of choice to demonstrate loyalty to their own husband’s clan” (Strathern, 1995: 
281). In Jos and the Middle Belt, this perception means that these women’s loyalty is 
continuously tested. And because the women already hold a position of in-betweeness 
between their natal families and their in-laws, knowing the inner workings of the two 
families, the contradiction is that these women are widely recognised not only as 
mediators but also as potential ‘enemies within’ as they are in the perfect position to 
play off one group against another.  
Thus, as group boundaries are hardened and affirmed, women are increasingly seen, 
in all areas of life as well as in the family, not as potential links between groups but as 
intruders and threats. The situation described in chapter six illustrates that as political 
leaders, even at the lowest level of government invest great energy to maintaining 
exclusive control of their political territory, women are increasingly considered 
untrustworthy simply on the basis of their sex.  
At the political level, the desire for ever smaller groups to be recognised works against 
the representation of women. At the private level, the growing importance of group 
boundaries means that women’s life choices are increasingly subject to control. 
Beyond the private, the growing importance of group boundaries makes it increasingly 
difficult for women to participate in the informal sector, especially in typically female 
activities such as trading and selling, because many trading networks historically cut 
across ethnic and religious differences. As existing networks are replaced by parallel 
ethno-religiously based economic structures, the increased violence and insecurity of 
change, as well as the growing control of female activities, is often associated with a 
relative empowerment of men vis-à-vis women.  Chapter five shows how market and 
trading networks have been restructured in the wake of many conflicts. Market traders, 
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like politicians, have also been faced with forced displacement and violence and 
affected by growing insecurity, which has reduced their ability to access resources they 
had used previously. The conflicts have forced them increasingly into relations where 
they relied only on trust if they must remain in business. 
As the exclusion of women in Nigerian politics shows little sign of ending, one can also 
understand the ‘politics of disorder’ (Chabal & Daloz, 1999) as an ongoing gendered 
struggle in which women and other social groups are disadvantaged. As political 
leaders mobilise their teeming supporters through a focus on shared religious and 
ethnic identities, the implicit disadvantage of this discourse to women is indirect and 
not always clear to their audience. Despite the fact that the increasing political 
competition disadvantages them, some women may be as convinced of the need to 
patrol group boundaries as men. The in-between position associated with women on 
the basis of their gender also encourages others to try to overcome these growing 
social divisions. 
Discrimination and violence have also affected the professional environment. 
Unhealthy forms of competition have implicitly institutionalised structural violence in 
the workplace to the disadvantage of women. For example, in this context, Chabal and 
Daloz (1999: 6) point out that “offices are allocated to clients on the basis of patronage, 
rather than according to the criteria of professionalism and competence which [is 
supposed to] characterise the civil service.” The situation described in chapter seven 
shows that, women occupy subordinate positions and are at the receiving end of 
oppressive practices of organisations. Women’s oppression in the formal sector goes 
to show that not all clients are equal, especially when the suspicion of women, both as 
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representatives of their group and as potential transgressors of group boundaries, has 
led to an increasing scrutiny of women. 
Further, in the public sphere, competition and conflict exclude women partly because 
of their greater –perceived or real – vulnerability to violence. In addition to this, the fact 
that local debates about inclusion and exclusion centre on ethnic and religious 
boundaries rather than on different social groups means that women are less likely to 
be included in the local political elite; because given the association of women with the 
transcendence or transgression of group boundaries in private life, they are, in the 
Nigerian context, seen as being less capable than men of representing overall group 
interests. Moreover, the privileging of ethnic and religious difference in political 
discourse means that the representation of different social groups, including those 
defined by gender, appears to many people as having secondary importance. 
Finally, experiences in Jos and Middle Belt suggest that the struggles over the control 
of resources;  the national cake, the increasing political division of the population into 
separate factions even within the formal professional environment of public sector 
workers, and the displacement of markets is the starting point for mistrust and 
discrimination. Similarly, the control of female behaviour and the widespread mistrust 
about inter-faith marriages has left women vulnerable in their homes and community. 
This means that differences are increasingly reinforced in everyday relations leading 
to increasing alienation of women in all aspects of life.  
 
8.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
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The strength of this study is its exploration and analysis of the implication of the 
struggle for scarce resources on gender relations and on the everyday life experiences 
of women through personal narratives. This thesis is a modest contribution to the 
discourse on ethno-religious conflict, gender relations and democracy in Nigeria and 
in Africa. It also offers a new perspective on the study of women in conflict by studying 
the disadvantages faced by women in everyday life, instead of focusing on the aspect 
of physical loss and injury which constitutes much of the existing research on conflict, 
both in Jos and the Middle Belt and beyond. By exploring the way in which everyday 
social relations are gendered, this research also offers a contribution to the 
understanding of various aspects of the social life of ordinary women in Nigeria. By 
exploring the areas of marriage, politics, trade and professions, it also offers an insight 
into the way in which gendered inequality is linked to other forms of social inequality.  
Although this research has focused on the impact of conflict on gender relations and 
the everyday life of women in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, the findings may potentially be 
useful for other African countries that experience recurring conflicts. Exploring the 
everyday problems faced by women in a conflict zone, this study offers a valuable 
means of understanding how various peace intervention measures or conventions on 
the rights of women, like the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), 
the Beijing Platform of Action and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 
(UNSCR-1325), can become successful. This can be achieved by integrating the 
various aspects of this study into the implementation strategy because it provides an 
understanding of the everyday life experiences of women. Although this approach 
might be time consuming, it is the most productive means of understanding the impact 
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of social dynamics on a large and comprehensive scale. Because of its subtlety, further 
research into the everyday lives of women also offers the possibility of ensuring the 
success, not just of these conventions, but also achieving durable peace and gender 
equity in society. 
 
8.3 Areas for Further Research  
This thesis has described an alternative approach to understanding the impact of 
conflict on the everyday lives of women and gender relations in Nigeria by using 
appropriate and rigorous methods to explain the experiences of these women 
especially when it comes to conflicts. As discussed, the conflicts are a result of the 
incessant struggle and intense competition for power which characterise the Federal 
system in Nigeria.  And this study has revealed the suffering this has caused as well 
as the impact it has had on many women, their children, as well as their spouses. And 
because very little is known about the impact of the conflict on men in inter-faith 
marriages and their children, It is necessary for further research to seek an 
understanding of how these issues disadvantage men and the children in inter-faith 
families.  
There is equally a need for more comprehensive research which fully addresses the 
gender constraints of women in divided communities. The focus should be on opening 
up discussions on other ways in which conflict continues to disadvantage women and 
therefore impacts on gender inequality. The possible research areas could include the 
long term impact of conflict in increasingly segregated settlements and on social 
integration. This in turn may have repercussions for the implementation of gender 
equity policies and conventions. This is important because these policies are the 
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blueprint for the vital involvement of government and other decision-makers and power 
brokers in the country.  
More in-depth research is required also into the integration of the four areas explored 
in this research, namely inter-faith marriage, economic and professional lives, and 
politics. Such research should precede any further research and policies directed at 
incorporating both men and women in conflict and post-conflict societies. For any 
development policy to be successful, it has to take into account the effect of conflict on 
women’s everyday lived experiences as persons who are at the extreme end of the 
power relations in society. Only by so doing will we understand the causal link between 
women and their disadvantaged position in many other aspects of society. This 
approach will be helpful to understanding the persistent inequality between men and 
women. 
Finally, further research is also needed on the role of traditional and religious 
institutions in Jos and the Middle Belt in shaping gender discourses and relationships.  
 
8.4 The Way Forward 
First, there is an urgent need for society to deconstruct the structure of violence and 
unhealthy competition in relation to power and economic resources, and construct 
networks of peace among ordinary people, most especially women. This can be 
achieved by integrating women into different positions of power and giving them a role 
as effective actors in the management and resolution of conflict (see Elaigwu, 2012). 
Secondly, there is the need to open up channels of communication to break down 
“sentimental walls as well as stereotypes, and erode prejudices that were deeply 
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entrenched” (Elaigwu, 2012: 3) as a result of the lingering conflict. To really address 
this, there is need for strong leadership among women who are very courageous to 
challenge the system. In pursuing this goal, the political machinery, and especially 
male dominated party executives, should be encouraged to give women leadership 
positions and give women the opportunity to stand for/compete for leadership 
positions. Husbands and male relatives who act as gatekeepers who prevent women 
being able to act as independent persons should be condemned. One way might be to 
expose, or even punish, anyone found guilty of using provocative words or messages, 
especially directed at female politicians. Such condemnation should be extended to 
the various professions and the community at large.  
For women to move ahead in society, they have to find a way of working with men who 
are sympathetic towards the cause of women’s liberation. House-Midamba & Ekechi 
(1995: 31) demonstrates how this can be achieved- Firstly, they propose building links 
with prominent male members of parties and institutions who are willing to be 
incorporated into market organisations through offices and honorary titles. Secondly, 
men may be appointed as honorary consuls, not because women cannot undertake 
this role, but as a clever way of forging alliances with men who can deliver crucial 
linkages with power, authority and resources. It is important, however, to ensure that 
such men are unable to hijack such positions to the disadvantage of the women who 
invited them. 
Finally, a very important task will be to find ways that encourage the more equitable 
position of women through moral reform. Every head, community leader, party and 
government institution should secure justice and truth in all dealings by ensuring that 
there are no more conflicts. In addition, those holding power and responsibility must 
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focus on establishing processes that ensure victims of the conflict are able to secure 
their rights to truth, justice and reparations, and they must guarantee that violations will 
not be repeated.  
From my point of view as a Nigerian, it is also remarkable that the thesis has illustrated 
that religion itself can be a burden when it is used to discriminate, marginalise, 
dominate and control. Often religion is thought of by believers to be a source of peace, 
calm, blessing and strength. But the reality described in this thesis by the people that 
I interviewed suggests it is far more complicated. Rather it is an empirical question 
depending on the social context since, in the personal evidence presented in this 
thesis, religion appears to be a problematic and political issue, most especially for 
women.    
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 APPENDIX I Plateau State Indigenous Ethnic Groups 
1. Afizere  
2. Amo 
3. Anaguta 
4. Attakar  
5. Atten 
6. Basher 
7. Berom 
8. Bogghom 
9. Buji 
10. Bwall 
11. Bwarak 
12. Chakfem 
13. Chokoboko 
14. Doemak 
15. Fier 
16. Gamai 
17. Gusu 
18. Irigwe 
19. Jere 
20. Janji 
21. Jipal 
22. Jar 
23. Jukun 
24. Kadung 
25. Koenoem 
26. Kulere 
27. Kurama 
28. Kwagalak 
29. Lemoro 
30. Miship 
31. Montol (Tehl) 
32. Merniyang 
33. Mupun 
34. Mushere 
35. Mwaghavul 
36. Ngas 
37. Nteng 
38. Paipung 
39. Piti 
40. Pyem 
41. Ribina 
42. Ron 
43. Rukuba (Bache) 
44. Runzu 
45. Takas 
46. Tal 
47. Tambes 
48. Tarok 
49. Tarya 
50. Youm
 
Source: Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network (PIDAN), The History, 
Ownership, Establishment and Misconceptions about the Recurrent Jos Conflicts. Vol. 
1. 
 
Appendix 2: Kaduna State Indigenous Ethnic Groups  
 
1. Adara (Kadara) 
2. Akurmin (Kurama) 
3. Anghan (Kamanton) 
4. Amo 
5. Aruruma (Ruruma) 
6. Ataka 
7.Atachaat 
(Kachechere)   
8. Atyab (Kataf) 
9. Atuku 
10. Ayu 
11. Bajju 
12. Bakulu (Ikulu) 
13. Bhazar (Koro) 
14. Bur (Sanga) 
15. Binawa 
16. Dingi 
17. Fantswam 
18. Fulfulde 
19. Gbagyi 
20. Gure 
21. Gwandara 
22. Gwong (Kagoma) 
23. Ham (Jaba, Chori,    
 Lungu, amba) 
24. Hausa 
24. Jangi 
26. Kaibi 
27. Kaje 
28. Kahugu 
29. Kaningkon (Nindem, 
Kanufi)            
30. Kigono 
31. Kinugu 
32. Kitimi 
33. Kiwafa 
34. Kiwollo 
35. Kono 
36. Kuvori (Surubu) 
37. Kuturmi 
38. Lemoro 
39. Mada (Mardan) 
40. Moroa 
41. Nandu 
42. Nduyah 
43. Numana 
44. Ningeshe 
45. Ninkyop 
46. Ninzo (Ninzam) 
47. Nunku 
48. Nyenkpa (Yeskwa) 
49. Oegworok 
50. Pikal 
51. Pitti 
52. Ribang 
53. Rishuwa 
54. Rumada 
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55. Rumayya 
56. Shemawa 
57. Sholio (Marwa) 
58. Siyawa 
59. Takad 
60. Tarri 
61. Tsam (Chawai)
Source: Adopted from Hayab, P. (2014) Part of ongoing doctoral research on 
sociolinguistics at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Additional Names and 
revisions have been added from 2012/2013 field notes © Plangsat Dayil. 
 
Appendix 3: List of Ethnic Groups in Nasarawa State 
1. Agatu  
2. Alago  
3. Basa 
4. Ebira  
5. Eggon  
6. Gbagyi  
7. Gade  
8. Goemai  
9. Gwandara  
11. Ham  
12. Kanuri  
13. Kofyar 
14. Lijili  
15. Basa-Gumna – is 
extinct 
 
Source: Field Notes 2012/2013 © Plangsat Dayil. 
 
 
Appendix 4: List of Ethnic Groups in Benue State 
1. Tiv 
2. Idoma  
3. Igede  
4.  Etulo  
5. Abakpa 
6. Juku  
7. Hausa  
8. Akweya  
9. Nyifon 
 
Source: Field Notes 2012/2013 © Plangsat Dayil. 
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  Appendix 5: Map of Nigeria Showing the Middle Belt. 
 
 Source: The MessengerVoice.com 2013  
